UFC 4-023-07, UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC): DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS EFFECTS (07 JUL 2008)
UFC 4-023-07, UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC): DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS EFFECTS (07 JUL 2008)., This document provides guidance for design of new buildings and for retrofits of existing buildings against the effects of direct fire weapons. Direct fire weapons, for the purposes of this UFC, are limited to small arms and shoulder fired antitank weapons. Small arms include ballistic weapons such as pistols, rifles, shotguns, and submachine guns up to 12.7 mm (0.50 caliber). Anti-tank weapons are limited to shoulder fired rockets such as the Russian RPG-7, RPG-18, and RPG-22 and the U.S. M-72 Light Antitank Weapon (LAW). For guidance on protecting against weapons outside of this scope, refer to UFC 3-340-01, Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects.
The ballistic weapons in this UFC are described in terms of ballistic standards developed by Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) for testing the resistance of building elements or assemblies to the ballistics effects. Those standards indicate the weapon to be used in the test, the ammunition, the muzzle velocity, the number of rounds to be fired, and the acceptance criteria for the targets. Coverage of the ballistic threat in this UFC includes the penetration mechanics of the ammunition, threat mitigation measures, and the use of ballistic resistant materials that prevent penetration. Countermeasures vary with level of protection and include blocking sight lines to facilities or assets, facility siting strategies, obscuration techniques, and facility hardening to resist the weapons effects. While there are more effective anti-tank weapons and missiles than those listed above, only weapons of the class described above will be considered in this UFC due to their wide availability and their frequent use. In addition, constructing conventional buildings to resist more effective weapons is impractical. The countermeasures described in this document are based on protecting against single hits, not volleys, since protecting against multiple hits is also impractical and since the accuracy of these weapons is such that firing two rounds through the same hole is difficult. Protection against multiple stage and delayed fuse warheads is also not addressed in this UFC. Strategies to mitigate the effects of these antitank weapons include obscuring assets from lines-of-sight and hardening building components