

**MCWP 5-1**

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# **Marine Corps Planning Process**

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**U.S. Marine Corps**

PCN 143 000068 00

## To Our Readers

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**Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both men and women are included.**

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Headquarters United States Marine Corps  
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

24 September 2001

CHANGE 1 to MCWP 5-1

1. This change adds new Appendix J, *Rapid Planning*.
2. This change also replaces the second page of the book's Table of Contents to include Appendix J.
3. File this transmittal sheet in the front of the publication.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

/s/

EDWARD HANLON, JR.  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding General  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia

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# Marine Corps Planning Process

## Table of Contents

		<b>Page</b>
<b>Chapter 1.</b>	<b>Planning Overview</b>	
1001	Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process	1-2
1002	The Marine Corps Planning Process	1-3
<b>Chapter 2.</b>	<b>Mission Analysis</b>	
2001	Inputs	2-2
2002	Process	2-4
2003	Outputs	2-9
<b>Chapter 3.</b>	<b>Course of Action Development</b>	
3001	Inputs	3-2
3002	Process	3-2
3003	Outputs	3-5
<b>Chapter 4.</b>	<b>Course of Action War Game</b>	
4001	Inputs	4-2
4002	Process	4-2
4003	Outputs	4-4
<b>Chapter 5.</b>	<b>Course of Action Comparison and Decision</b>	
5001	Inputs	5-2
5002	Process	5-2
5003	Outputs	5-3
<b>Chapter 6.</b>	<b>Orders Development</b>	
6001	Inputs	6-1
6002	Process	6-2
6003	Outputs	6-2
<b>Chapter 7.</b>	<b>Transition</b>	
7001	Inputs	7-1
7002	Process	7-2
7003	Outputs	7-3

## Appendices

A	Marine Corps Planning in Joint Operations	A-1
B	Warfighting Functions	B-1
C	Organization for Planning	C-1
D	Marine Corps Planning Process Tools	D-1
E	Wargaming	E-1
F	Commander and Staff Estimates	F-1
G	Basic Operation Plans, Operation Orders, Annexes, and Appendices	G-1
H	Glossary	H-1
I	References	I-1
J	Rapid Planning	J-1

## Notes

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Headquarters United States Marine Corps  
Washington, D.C. 20308-1775

5 January 2000

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, describes a planning process that supports decisionmaking by the commander. It is also a vehicle that conveys the commander's decisions to his subordinates. It is applicable to all echelons of command and across all ranges of military operations.

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) complements joint deliberate and crisis action planning and the naval planning process. It is a responsive and flexible process that can adapt to the needs of any size unit and adjust to any timetable. The Marine Corps planning process embodies our maneuver warfare doctrine with its tenets of top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning in order to generate and maintain tempo.

2. SCOPE

This publication links to higher-level Marine Corps doctrine by describing how different echelons of command can adapt the planning process to their needs and illustrating a variety of planning tools (i.e., matrices, worksheets, formats, and examples). Although the publication is written for planning at the Marine Corps component, Marine expeditionary force (MEF), and major subordinate command (MSC) levels, the planning process is easily scalable to the regiment, group, battalion, or squadron levels.

3. SUPERSESSION

MCWP 5-1 replaces the planning process and orders portions of Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*, dated 21 May 1979.

4. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS



J. E. RHODES  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps  
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## Chapter 1

# Planning Overview

*“Planning involves projecting our thoughts forward in time and space to influence events before they occur rather than merely responding to events as they occur. This means contemplating and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance.”<sup>1</sup>*

—MCDP 5, *Planning*

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) supports the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Since planning is an essential and significant part of command and control, the Marine Corps Planning Process recognizes the commander’s central role as the decisionmaker. It helps organize the thought processes of a commander and his staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. The Marine Corps Planning Process focuses on the mission and the threat. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of effort and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The Marine Corps Planning Process is applicable across the range of military operations and is designed for use at any echelon of command. The process can be as detailed or as abbreviated as time, staff resources, experience, and the situation permit.

Planning is the act of envisioning and determining effective ways of achieving a desired endstate. It supports the commander in making decisions in a time-constrained and uncertain environment. Whether planning is performed at the strategic, operational, or tactical level, its key functions, as identified in MCDP 5, *Planning*, are to—

- Direct and coordinate actions.
- Develop a shared situational awareness.
- Generate expectations about how actions will evolve and how they will affect the desired outcome.

- Support the exercise of initiative.
- Shape the thinking of planners.

More than anything else, the considerations of time and uncertainty dictate the approach to planning, and are its defining features. Time is most often the scarcest resource and is vital to the planning process. The commander must adjust the planning process to optimize this perishable resource. When time is critical, the commander uses intuition, judgment, and experience to guide his staff and subordinate commanders. Since planning is future-oriented, and the future is uncertain, all planning is based on imperfect knowledge and involves assumptions. This uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in the environment. Given the fundamental uncertainty of war, planners must recognize that planning will not eliminate uncertainty, but it allows the commander to decide and act effectively in the midst of uncertainty.

The Marine Corps Planning Process is applicable across the range of military operations and is designed for command and staff actions at any echelon of command. Commanders at higher echelons tend to use a more formal and detailed approach to the Marine Corps Planning Process. Higher echelons can consist of a component, Marine expeditionary force (MEF), and major subordinate commands (MSCs) (e.g., division, wing, or force service support group). These

commands typically consist of larger staffs, have longer planning horizons, and have access to more information. Commanders at lower echelons, such as a regiment and/or group and below, may modify the planning process to meet their situation (staff resources, shorter planning horizons, information available). Whether planning occurs at the component level, the battalion level, or the squadron level, the commander and his staff must master the Marine Corps Planning Process so they can fully participate in integrated planning.

The Marine Corps Planning Process is an internal planning process used by Marine Corps operating forces. It aligns with and complements the joint deliberate and crisis action planning processes found in Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Appendix A discusses the relationship between the Marine Corps Planning Process and joint planning. When designated as a joint force commander or when preparing a supporting plan in a campaign, a Marine commander and his staff will use the joint planning procedures and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) found in the Joint Pub 5 series. If planning an amphibious operation, a Marine commander and his staff refer to Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, for guidance.

## **1001. Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process**

The tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process—top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning—are derived from the doctrine of maneuver warfare. These tenets guide the commander's use of his staff to plan and execute military operations. Top-down planning and the single-battle concept ensure unity of effort, while the commander uses warfighting functions (see app. B) as the building blocks of integrated planning.

### **a. Top-Down Planning**

Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander must not merely participate in planning, he must drive the process. His intent and guidance are key to planning. The commander uses planning to gain knowledge and situational awareness to support his decisionmaking process. His plan, communicated in oral, graphic, or written form, translates his guidance into a concept of operations. His subordinate commanders use his guidance and concept of operations to accomplish the mission.

### **b. Single-Battle Concept**

Operations or events in one part of the battlespace may have profound and often unintended effects on other areas and events, therefore a commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. The single-battle concept allows the commander to effectively focus the efforts of all the elements of the force to accomplish the mission. While the battlespace may be conceptually divided as deep, close, and rear to assist planning and decentralized execution, the commander's intent ensures unity of effort by fighting a single battle.

### **c. Integrated Planning**

Integrated planning is a disciplined approach to planning that is systematic, coordinated, and thorough. It is based on the warfighting functions of command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. Planners use these warfighting functions to integrate the planning effort and supervise execution of the plan. Planners use integrated planning to consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information across all the warfighting functions. The key to integrated planning is the assignment of appropriate personnel to represent each warfighting function. This does not mean that a warfighting function representative cannot be a staff representative. A warfighting function representative must be knowledgeable and experienced in his functional area. See appendix B for further information on the warfighting functions.



## 1002. The Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps Planning Process establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing and wargaming courses of action (COAs) against the threat, comparing friendly COAs against the commander's criteria and each other, selecting a COA, preparing an operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN) for execution, and transitioning the order or plan to those tasked with its execution. The Marine Corps Planning Process organizes these procedures into six manageable, logical steps (see fig. 1-1). These steps provide the commander and his staff, at all levels, a means to organize their planning activities, to transmit plans to subordinates and subordinate commands, and to share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent. Interactions among various planning steps allow a concurrent, coordinated effort that maintains flexibility, makes efficient use of time available, and facilitates continuous information sharing. See appendix C for further information on organizing the planning effort.

### a. Mission Analysis

Mission analysis is the first step in planning, and it drives the Marine Corps Planning Process. Its purpose is to review and analyze orders, guidance, and other information provided by higher headquarters and to produce a unit mission statement.

### b. Course of Action Development

During COA development, planners use the mission statement (which includes the higher headquarters commander's tasking and intent), commander's intent, and commander's planning guidance to develop COA(s). Each prospective COA is examined to ensure that it is suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete with respect to the current and anticipated situation, the mission, and the commander's intent.

### c. Course of Action War Game

Course of action wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the enemy and the battlespace. Each friendly COA is




Figure 1-1. Steps in the Marine Corps Planning Process.

wargamed against selected threat COAs. Course of action wargaming assists planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. Course of action wargaming also identifies branches and potential sequels that may require additional planning. Short of actually executing the course of action, COA wargaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA.

#### **d. Course of Action Comparison and Decision**

In COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs against established criteria, then evaluates them against each other. The commander then selects the COA that will best accomplish the mission.

#### **e. Orders Development**

During orders development, the staff uses the commander's COA decision, mission statement, and commander's intent and guidance to develop orders that direct unit actions. Orders serve as the principal means by which the commander expresses his decision, intent, and guidance.

#### **f. Transition**


Transition is an orderly handover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides those who will execute the plan or order with the situational awareness and rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution.

## Chapter 2

# Mission Analysis

*“There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason . . . . The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the desired result of the action.”<sup>2</sup>*

—MCDP 6, *Command and Control*



**BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS**

Mission analysis is the first step in planning. Its purpose is to review and analyze orders, guidance, and other information that is provided by higher headquarters in order to produce a unit mission statement. Mission analysis drives the remainder of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

The keys to successful mission analysis are preparation, professional competence, and the identification of the operation's purpose and all its essential tasks. A thorough mission analysis focuses the efforts of the commander and the staff, thereby saving time. The staff should be well

organized, prepared to plan as required, and begin development of staff estimates during mission analysis. To plan effectively, planners should have access to all documents relative to the mission, area of operations, etc. (e.g., standing operating procedures, operation plans).

Before the commander and the staff can begin mission analysis, they must develop an understanding of their potential employment. Their understanding must include the possible area of operations; probable mission; available forces; and political, military, and cultural characteristics of the area. They can gain this understanding from national-level intelligence products, other military and governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academia (military war colleges, developmental centers, etc.), businesses, and their innate knowledge. If operations are already underway, the commander and the staff will require less time and information to gain understanding and situational awareness.

## 2001. Inputs

Each step in the Marine Corps Planning Process begins with inputs. Inputs may derive from higher headquarters, the commander or staff, or outputs from previous steps. Inputs to mission analysis include, but are not limited to, the commander's orientation, higher headquarters' warning order or operation order, restraints and/or constraints, and higher headquarters' intelligence and intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) products.

### a. Commander's Orientation

Initially, the commander's orientation is based on a preliminary analysis of available information. The commander's initial information may only be the purpose of the operation as assigned by higher headquarters, or it might include—

- Higher headquarters' plans, orders, and estimates, including IPB products.
- Force availability and suitability.

- Personal reconnaissance results.
- Intelligence preparation of the battlespace products and other input from the staff.

As more information becomes available, such as a higher headquarters order (including the mission and intent of the higher headquarters [two levels up] and the missions of supporting, supported, and adjacent commands), the commander conducts his preliminary analysis of the mission (or potential mission). The commander may conduct his analysis using mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T). He must also consider the ability of his command—personnel, materiel, and morale—to accomplish the mission.

Once the commander completes his preliminary analysis, he issues his commander's orientation. The commander's orientation includes the commander's battlespace area evaluation (CBAE) and initial guidance. Ideally, the commander personally issues his guidance to subordinate commanders and principal staff. The commander's orientation helps shape the remainder of the planning process.

**(1) Commander's Battlespace Area Evaluation.** The commander's battlespace area evaluation is the commander's personal vision based on his understanding of the mission, the battlespace, and the enemy. The commander uses this evaluation to develop, assess, and communicate knowledge to the staff. This knowledge supports the planning and decisionmaking processes. The CBAE may be as simple as the commander's initial thoughts or it may be as complex as the product of his detailed analysis. It identifies the battlespace, centers of gravity, commander's intent, and commander's critical information requirements.

**(a) Commander's Battlespace.** The commander's battlespace consists of his area of operations, the area of influence, and the area of interest. The commander uses the information he receives to create his initial view of the

battlespace. The commander passes his initial view of the battlespace to his planners for use throughout the remainder of the planning process.

The commander is normally assigned an area of operations. He considers his mission, forces, inherent warfighting functions requirements, and area of operations (assigned or proposed) to determine an area of influence. The commander compares his area of operations against the area of influence to determine if its size and location allow him to accomplish his mission. If, during the comparison process, the commander determines that the area of operations is too large, too small, or not located appropriately, he informs his superior commander.

The commander uses all the information discussed above to define his area of interest. An area of interest includes all the factors (e.g., enemy forces and capabilities, host nation support, flow of forces and supply, sustainment, command relationships, boundaries, fire support coordinating measures) that may influence the commander's operations. His area of interest also encompasses the area of influence and area of operations.

**(b) Center of Gravity.** MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, defines a center of gravity (COG) as any important source of strength. It may be mental, moral, or physical strength, power, or will. Centers of gravity may exist at each level of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. It may be tangible or intangible, and there may be multiple centers of gravity.

The concept of centers of gravity applies equally to both threat and friendly forces. At the tactical level, the enemy's center of gravity is normally an enemy unit. At the operational level, an enemy's center of gravity may also be a threat capability; e.g., the ability to mass fires or conduct resupply. Friendly centers of gravity are the strengths that the commander uses to attack enemy weaknesses and to protect his forces from enemy attack.

Subordinate commanders and staff personnel may assist the commander in the identification of centers of gravity. The G-2/S-2 may be particularly helpful in identifying enemy centers of gravity. If the commander is unable to identify enemy centers of gravity, he may substitute enemy strengths. The commander provides the staff with initial enemy centers of gravity so they can begin to identify possible shaping and decisive actions.

**(c) Commander's Intent.** Commander's intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear, concise, and easily understood. It may also include how the commander envisions achieving a decision as well as the endstate or conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose.

Commander's intent helps subordinates understand the larger context of their actions and guides them in the absence of orders. It allows subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—in a way that is consistent with the higher commander's aims—when the unforeseen occurs. This freedom of action, within the broad guidance of the commander's intent, creates tempo during planning and execution. Higher and subordinate commanders' intents must be aligned. The purpose of the operation may be derived from the "in order to . . ." portion of the mission statement or the execution paragraph of the higher commander's operation plan or operation order.

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During commander's orientation, the commander may only know the purpose of the operation as assigned by his higher headquarters. As the commander proceeds through the planning process, he gains additional insight on METT-T. As a result, the commander may refine his intent to include how he plans to achieve a decision and reach the endstate that accomplishes the purpose of the operation.

**(d) Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** The commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) identify information on friendly activities, enemy activities, and the environment that the commander deems critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decisionmaking. The commander's critical information requirements focus the commander's staff and subordinate commanders planning and collection efforts. They help the commander tailor the command and control organization. The commanders critical information requirements are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, flow, and use of information throughout the force. While the staff can recommend CCIRs, only the commander can approve them.

**(2) Commander's Initial Guidance.** The commander develops his initial guidance using his commander's battlespace area evaluation, his experience, and the mission information available from higher headquarters. The commander's initial guidance provides the staff and subordinate commanders with additional insight on how the commander views the mission. Depending on the time available, the commander may provide general guidance and specific points he wants the staff and subordinate commanders to consider (a particular enemy capability, a certain task organization, etc.).

### **b. Higher Headquarters' Warning Order or Operation Order**

A verbal or written order from a higher headquarters provides important information used in mission analysis. The higher headquarters' planning products, such as operation plans, operation orders, and contingency plans provide input throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process. If higher headquarters' orders or guidance is unclear, the commander or the staff should immediately seek clarification. Liaison officers and higher headquarters planning representatives (e.g., G-5 liaison cell at joint force headquarters)

who are familiar with the plan can provide valuable information and should actively participate in the planning process.

### **c. Restraints and/or Constraints**

Restraints are things a command prohibits its subordinates from doing. For example, do not damage religious shrines, archeological sites, or civilian schools. Constraints are things that may limit a commander's freedom of action. For example, avoid damaging adjacent civilian buildings, use only precision-guided munitions to destroy key targets in the city. Restraints and constraints are included in the rules of engagement, commander's guidance, or instructions from higher headquarters. Simply put, restraints are things the commander cannot do; constraints are the things he must do.

### **d. Higher Headquarters' Intelligence and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products**

Higher headquarters' intelligence products and the commander's IPB products are critical inputs to mission analysis. These products are the basis of the commander's IPB process and are updated and used throughout the operation. Higher headquarters' intelligence products include their IPB products, intelligence estimates, intelligence summaries, and Annex B, Intelligence, of the operation order. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace products that the commander receives from higher headquarters and the intelligence staff may include the modified, combined obstacle overlay and threat situation templates. See appendix D for more information on IPB products.

## **2002. Process**

Once planners understand higher headquarters commander's orders and intent and their own commander's battlespace area evaluation and initial guidance, they identify specified, implied, and essential tasks. Essential tasks are the foundation



of the mission statement because they define mission success. After evaluating the battlespace, commander's intent, available assets, restraints and/or constraints, assumptions, risks, initial CCIRs, ongoing intelligence operations, and the initial timeline, planners draft a mission statement. Planners list specified and implied tasks, assumptions, resource and subject matter expert shortfalls, restraints and/or constraints, and information requirements to help them identify essential tasks and develop the mission statement.

Planners present mission analysis results to the commander and the staff to ensure that the mission statement and identified essential tasks facilitate development of a COA that will accomplish the mission. After the mission analysis brief, the commander approves or modifies the proposed mission statement.

#### **a. Identify the Higher Headquarters' Commander's Intent**

The higher headquarters' operation order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO) contains the higher commander's intent.

#### **b. Identify Purpose of the Operation**

The purpose of the operation may be found in the commander's intent (provided in the commander's orientation). If not specifically stated, the operation's purpose may be derived from the higher commander's intent or assigned missions or tasks. A clear understanding of the purpose of the operation is essential for maintaining tempo in both planning and execution.

#### **c. Identify Tasks**

Using the information provided in the commander's orientation and higher headquarters' orders, the staff identifies specified and implied tasks. Of these, tasks that define mission success and may be applicable to the force as a whole are further identified as essential tasks. Approved taskings may become the basis for subparagraph 3c of the 5-paragraph OPLAN or OPORD.

**(1) Specified Tasks.** Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. Specified tasks are derived primarily from the execution paragraphs of the higher headquarters operation order, but they may be found elsewhere, such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, or annexes. Any specified task that pertains to any element of the unit should be identified and recorded.

**(2) Implied Tasks.** Implied tasks may not be specifically stated in the higher headquarters' order, but they are performed to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks emerge from analysis of the higher headquarters' order, the threat, and the terrain. Routine, inherent, or standing operating procedure tasks are not included in the list of tasks.

**(3) Essential Tasks.** Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. If a task must be successfully completed for the commander to accomplish his purpose, it is an essential task. The mission statement is derived from the essential tasks.

#### **d. Prepare and Refine Intelligence and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products**

Higher headquarters' intelligence and IPB products are reviewed and refined by the staff. New intelligence and IPB products, to include enemy COAs, are prepared by the staff to support centers of gravity and mission analysis.

#### **e. Analyze Centers of Gravity**

The staff conducts a more detailed center of gravity analysis based on the CBAE to identify or refine threat and friendly centers of gravity and to determine which friendly and threat weaknesses are critical vulnerabilities. A critical vulnerability is something that a force needs to function effectively and is, or can be made, vulnerable to attack. Critical vulnerabilities provide an aiming point for the application of friendly strengths

against threat weaknesses. The staff identifies and directs the force's strengths against the enemy's critical vulnerabilities in order to hamper his ability to function; to defend, attack, or sustain his forces; or to command his forces. Once identified, critical vulnerabilities assist the commander in choosing where, when, and what will constitute decisive action. By attacking critical vulnerabilities, the commander increases the potential that the attack may in fact be a decisive action. The staff also identifies friendly critical vulnerabilities in order to protect friendly centers of gravity from enemy attack.

#### **f. Convene and/or Alert the Red Cell**

A red cell assists the commander in assessing COAs against a thinking enemy. It develops likely enemy COAs and portrays a doctrinally-correct enemy during wargaming. A red cell can range in size from an intelligence officer to a task-organized group of subject matter experts. A red cell refines the threat COAs that will be used during COA and wargaming, develops planning support tools such as the synchronization matrix, and may also participate in the analysis of enemy centers of gravity. See appendix E for more information on the red cell.

#### **g. Begin Development of Staff Estimates**

The staff begins to gather information that will be refined throughout the planning process and continuously develops and refines staff estimates. A staff estimate provides a logical and orderly examination of all factors that affect mission accomplishment. It provides the commander and the staff with necessary information that supports decisionmaking throughout the planning process and subsequent execution of the operation. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the staff estimate could be as formal as a detailed written document or as informal as an oral briefing. See appendix F for more information on formal staff estimates.

#### **h. Refine the Area of Interest and Area of Influence**

The staff refines the area of interest and area of influence, which are identified in the CBAE, based on the current terrain analysis and current analysis of friendly and threat centers of gravity, capabilities, and limitations. The size of the area of interest may change based on the commander's understanding of the situation. Refining the area of interest may generate requests for information. The extent of the area of influence may change if forces are added or deleted, equipment capability and availability change, or rules of engagement change.

#### **i. Review Available Assets and Identify Resource Shortfalls**

As mission analysis is conducted, resource or capability shortfalls are noted. The commander and staff identify critical shortfalls and request support from higher headquarters.

#### **j. Identify Subject Matter Expert Shortfalls**

Based on the activities anticipated during an operation, planners determine what specialized planning or other expertise may be required. If this expertise is not readily available, the commander should request augmentation.

#### **k. Determine Additional Restraints and Constraints**

Additional restraints and constraints may be identified as a result of mission analysis. If additional restraints and constraints are identified, they are recorded and carried forward for use in subsequent planning.

#### **l. Determine Commander's Recommended Critical Information Requirements**

Only the commander decides what information is critical, but the staff may propose CCIRs to the commander. Commander's critical information



requirements are continually reviewed and updated or deleted as required.

### **m. Identify Requests for Information**

Planners identify if additional information is required to support future plans or to conduct current operations. Based on the initial IPB and information requirements (including CCIRs), the commander and staff identify gaps in the available information and intelligence. As requests for information are identified, they are forwarded to the appropriate staff section for action or to higher headquarters for answers.

### **n. Determine Assumptions**

Assumptions are suppositions about the current situation or about future events that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They are made for both friendly and threat situations. Assumptions should only be used when necessary to allow the commander to make a decision concerning the COA. A valid assumption should answer all of the following questions:

- Is it logical?
- Is it realistic?
- Is it essential for planning to continue?
- Does it avoid assuming away a threat capability?

As planning continues, additional assumptions may be needed and previous assumptions may be deleted as the operation changes. A record is kept of assumptions in order to track and validate them as they are confirmed or disapproved. Assumptions are contained in operation plans, but are not included in operation orders. If the operation plan contains assumptions that are not validated before execution, the assumptions become part of the inherent risk of the operation.

If possible, assumptions are forwarded to higher headquarters for validation. This ensures that the higher headquarters commander understands the potential risks that a subordinate command is ac-

cepting. It may prompt the higher headquarters to pursue facts that support the assumption or to request additional information.

### **o. Draft the Mission Statement**

The purpose of the operation and the essential tasks are the foundation for mission statement development. Planners should determine if the purpose of the operation and essential tasks are still valid before they draft the mission statement. A properly constructed mission statement answers the following questions:

- **Who?** (the forces that will conduct the operation)
- **What?** (the type of operation)
- **When?** (the time the operation will start and end)
- **Where?** (the location of the area of operation)
- **Why?** (the purpose of the operation)

Who, what, when, and where are derived from the essential tasks. Why is derived from the purpose of the operation.

### **p. Present a Mission Analysis Brief**

The staff presents a mission analysis brief to the commander to obtain approval of the mission statement. The mission analysis brief reviews the products of mission analysis. The mission analysis brief may be as simple as a proposed mission statement, or it may include the following:

- Situation update (battlespace organization, area of operations, area of interest, area of influence).
- Intelligence estimate and IPB products (terrain analysis, weather analysis, threat integration [possible COAs]).
- Higher headquarters' mission.
- Higher headquarters' commander's intent (two levels up).
- Commander's intent.
- Commander's initial guidance.

- Review of purpose and tasks (specified, implied, essential).
- Review of assumptions.
- Review of restraints and/or constraints.
- Review of shortfalls (resources, subject matter experts).
- Center of gravity analysis (friendly, enemy).
- Requests for information.
- Recommended CCIRs.
- Proposed mission statement.

### q. Commander Approves Mission Statement

Once the commander receives the mission analysis brief, he may approve or modify the proposed mission statement or develop a new mission statement. He also approves all mission analysis products. Once the mission statement is approved, it remains valid unless a significant change occurs. The approved mission statement becomes paragraph 2 of the 5-paragraph operation plan or operation order.

### r. Draft a Warning Order

Once the commander approves or modifies the results of mission analysis, the staff may draft and issue a warning order to subordinate units. The warning order should include the approved mission statement (to include the commander's intent), the commander's guidance and any other information that will assist subordinate units with their planning (e.g., changes in task organization, earliest time of movement).

### s. Refine the Commander's Intent

After reviewing the mission analysis briefing and the mission statement, the commander may consider making refinements to his previously issued commander's intent.

### t. Develop the Commander's Planning Guidance

The commander's planning guidance focuses the staff during COA development. It should be specific enough to assist the planning effort, but not

so specific as to inhibit COA development. This guidance may be expressed in terms of warfighting functions, types of operations, forms of maneuver, etc.

#### Types of Operations

##### Offense

Movement to Contact  
Attack  
Exploitation  
Pursuit

##### MOOTW

Combating Terrorism  
Counter Drug Operations  
Humanitarian Assistance  
NEO  
Strikes and Raids

##### Defense

Mobile Defense  
Position Defense

#### Forms of Maneuver

Frontal Attack  
Penetration  
Flank Attack  
Envelopment  
Turning Movement  
Infiltration

Planning guidance should include the commander's vision of decisive and shaping actions, which assists the staff in determining the main effort, phases of the operation, location of critical events, and other aspects of the operation the commander deems pertinent to COA development. Guidance may include (but is not limited to)—

- Threat vulnerabilities.
- Risk.
- Any further restraints and/or constraints.
- Decisive and shaping actions.
- Selection and employment of the main effort.
- Types of operations.
- Forms of maneuver.
- Command relationships.
- Task organization.
- Arrangement of the operation (phasing).
- Timing of the operations.

- Reserve.
- Evaluation of the battlespace.
- Mobility and countermobility.

**(1) Decisive Actions.** The purpose of any military operation is mission success. Decisive actions achieve mission success with the least loss of time, equipment, and, most importantly, lives. They cause a favorable change in the situation or cause the threat to change or to cease planned and current activities. For an action to be truly decisive, it must result in an action that is larger than itself. Decisive actions create an environment in which the enemy has either lost the physical capability or the will to resist. The unit conducting the decisive action is normally identified as the main effort.

**(2) Shaping Actions.** Shaping sets conditions for decisive actions. Shaping actions are activities conducted throughout the battlespace to influence a threat capability or force, or the enemy's decisionmaking process. The commander shapes the battlespace by protecting friendly critical vulnerabilities and attacking enemy critical vulnerabilities. Shaping incorporates a wide array of functions and capabilities and is more than just fires and targeting. It may include direct attack, psychological operations, electronic warfare, deception, civil affairs, information management, public affairs, engineer operations, and preventive medical services. Logistic operations (e.g., the stockpiling of critical ammunition, fuel, and supplies to facilitate future operations) shape both friendly and threat forces.

Shaping makes the enemy vulnerable to attack, impedes or diverts his attempts to maneuver, aids

friendly maneuver, and dictates the time and place for decisive actions. It forces the enemy to adopt courses of action favorable to the commander's plans. The commander attempts to shape events in a way that allows him several options, so that by the time the moment for decisive action arrives, he is not restricted to only one course of action.

## 2003. Outputs

Mission analysis activities produce outputs that are vital inputs to subsequent steps in the Marine Corps Planning Process. The required outputs are the mission statement, commander's intent, and commander's planning guidance. Additional outputs may include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Specified tasks.
- Implied tasks.
- Essential tasks.
- Warning order.
- Restraints and/or constraints.
- Assumptions.
- Resource shortfalls.
- Subject matter experts shortfalls.
- Center of gravity analysis (friendly and enemy).
- Approved CCIRs.
- Requests for information.
- Initial staff estimates.

All outputs should be retained and refined as necessary throughout the planning process.




## Chapter 3

# Course of Action Development

*“Decisionmaking requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution.”<sup>3</sup>*

—MCDP 1, *Warfighting*



BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

A course of action (COA) is a broadly stated, potential solution to an assigned mission. The COA development step of the Marine Corps Planning Process is designed to generate options for follow-on wargaming and comparison that satisfy the mission, commander's intent, and guidance of the commander. During COA development, planners use the mission statement (which includes the higher headquarters commander's tasking and intent), commander's intent, and commander's planning guidance to develop courses of action.

Each prospective COA is examined to ensure that it is suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete with respect to the current and anticipated situation, the mission, and the commander's intent.

Normally, the commander develops several COAs for follow-on wargaming and comparison. The commander may limit the number of COAs that the staff develops, especially if the staff is operating under severe time constraints.

## 3001. Inputs

Course of action development requires a mission statement, commander's intent, and commander's planning guidance before development can begin. Other planning tools useful in COA development include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Specified tasks.
- Implied tasks.
- Essential tasks.
- Warning order.
- Restraints and/or constraints.
- Assumptions.
- Resource shortfalls.
- Subject matter expert shortfalls.
- Centers of gravity analysis (friendly and enemy).
- Commander's critical information requirements.
- Requests for information.
- Initial staff estimates.

## 3002. Process

Planners develop broad COAs using METT-T, threat versus friendly capabilities assessment, and possible employment options. Using at least the minimum required inputs, planners consider two fundamental questions:

- What do I want to do?
- How do I want to do it?

Answering the question, "How do I want to do it?" is the essence of COA development. The following paragraphs address actions that assist COA development.

### a. Update Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace enables planners to view the battlespace in terms of the threat and the environment. It helps planners determine how the enemy will react to proposed friendly COAs, the purpose of enemy actions, the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs, and the type of friendly operations that the terrain and infrastructure will allow. It is critical that planners use IPB to answer the two fundamental questions—What do I want to do? How do I want to do it?—posed in COA development.

### b. Display Friendly Forces

The graphic display of friendly forces allows planners to see the current and projected locations of friendly forces.

### c. Assess Relative Combat Power

Relative combat power assessment provides planners with an understanding of friendly and threat force strengths and weaknesses relative to each other. While force ratios are important, the numerical comparison of personnel and major end items is just one factor that must be balanced with other factors such as weather, morale, level of training, and cultural orientation. The goals of relative combat power assessment are to identify threat weaknesses that can be exploited through asymmetric application of friendly strengths and identify friendly weaknesses that require protection from threat actions.

### d. Refine Center of Gravity Analysis

Center of gravity analysis began during mission analysis. The commander and staff refine center of gravity analysis based on updated intelligence and IPB products, initial staff estimates, and input from the red cell. The refined centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities are used in the development of the initial centers of gravity.

## e. Develop Initial Courses of Action

Using the commander's planning guidance, as well as updated IPB products, the relative combat power assessment, and center of gravity analysis, planners begin developing possible ways that the force can accomplish the mission. This requires creativity, imagination, and unbiased and open-minded participants. The number and detail of the COAs to be developed depend on the time available for planning. Planners do not judge or eliminate potential COAs; all possibilities are recorded for potential use. It is critical that COAs provide the commander with a variety of employment options. Factors that impact COA variety include—

- Commander's planning guidance.
- Forms of maneuver.
- Type of attack.
- Designation of main effort.
- Requirement for supporting effort(s).
- Scheme of maneuver (land, air, or maritime).
- Sequential and simultaneous operations.
- Sequencing essential task accomplishment.
- Task organization.
- Use of reserves.
- Rules of engagement.

Planners use METT-T and an array of employment possibilities to design a broad plan of “how” they intend to accomplish the mission. How they intend to accomplish the mission becomes the course of action.

**(1) Commander's Input to Initial Courses of Action.** The commander reviews the initial COAs to see if they meet his commander's intent. This is normally an informal review that is conducted as rapidly as possible. This review ensures that valuable time is not spent developing COAs that will not be approved. The commander may direct modifications to the initial courses of action or that additional courses of action to be developed.

**(2) Course of Action Refinement.** Using the commander's planning guidance and input from the initial COAs, the staff further develops, expands, and refines the courses of action to be used in COA wargaming. The staff may also recommend to the commander how a course of action should be wargamed. This recommendation may include the war game method to be used and which enemy COAs should be wargamed. See appendix E for a discussion of wargaming.

## f. Develop Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

The COA graphic and narrative clearly portray how the organization will accomplish the mission. Together, the graphic and narrative identify who (notional task organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (intent). The COA graphic and narrative are essential and inseparable. Together, they help the commander, subordinate commanders, and the staff understand how the organization will accomplish its mission. The graphic clearly portrays the scheme of maneuver of the main and supporting efforts and critical maneuver and fire support control measures, such as objectives, boundaries, phase lines, and fire support coordination lines. The narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main and supporting efforts, the reserve, and the sequencing of the operation. The COA graphic and narrative, when approved by the commander, form the basis for the concept of operations and operations overlay in the basic plan or order. See appendix D for more information.

## g. Ensure Conformance with Course of Action Criteria

Once courses of action are developed, they should conform with the following criteria:

- Suitability: Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the commander's planning guidance?
- Feasibility: Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and resources?



- Acceptability: Does the COA achieve an advantage that justifies the cost in resources?
- Distinguishability: Does the COA differ significantly from other COAs?
- Completeness: Does the COA include all tasks to be accomplished? Does it describe a complete mission (main and supporting efforts, reserve, and associated risks)?

#### **h. Prepare Course of Action Brief**

Developed courses of action, along with updated facts, assumptions, risk, etc., are briefed to the commander. Each course of action is briefed separately and is sufficiently developed to withstand the scrutiny of COA wargaming. Although the COA briefing is tailored to the needs of the commander and the time available, standardized briefing formats help focus the briefing and prevent omission of essential information. The COA briefing will include the COA graphic and narrative. It may also include—

- Updated intelligence estimate (terrain and weather analysis, threat evaluation).
- Possible enemy COAs (at a minimum the most likely and most dangerous, situation template[s]).
- Mission statement.
- Higher headquarters commander's intent.
- Own commander's intent.
- Commander's planning guidance.
- Relative combat power assessment.
- Rationale for each COA (why specific tactics were used, why selected control measures were used, why units are arrayed on the map as depicted).
- Updated facts and assumptions.
- Recommendations for wargaming (enemy COAs, evaluation criteria).

The COA briefing may also include initial estimates of supportability from subordinate commands and staff estimates. Estimates of supportability are provided by subordinate commanders. They evaluate the courses of action and

make recommendations on which course of action they can best support. Staff estimates are developed by the commander's staff and warfighting representatives. They summarize those significant aspects of the situation which influence the course of action, analyze the impact of all factors upon the course of action, and evaluate and determine how the means available can best support the course of action.

#### **i. Select and/or Modify a Course of Action**

Following the COA briefing, the commander may select or modify the courses of action to be evaluated during COA wargaming. He may also provide additional COA and wargaming guidance and express his desires concerning evaluation criteria.

**(1) Develop Commander's Wargaming Guidance.** The commander's wargaming guidance may include—

- A list of friendly courses of action to be wargamed against specific threat courses of action (e.g., COA 1 against the enemy's most likely, most dangerous, or most advantageous COA).
- The timeline for the phase or stage of the operation.
- A list of critical events (e.g., shifting the main effort).
- Level of detail (e.g., two levels down).

**(2) Develop Commander's Evaluation Criteria.** Before the staff can begin the next step—the COA war game—the commander must choose the evaluation criteria he will use to select the course of action that will become his concept of operations. The commander establishes evaluation criteria based on METT-T, judgment, and personal experience. Commanders may choose evaluation criteria related to the principles of war, such as mass or surprise. These evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff. The



commander uses the collected data during COA comparison and decision. Other criteria may include—

- Commander's intent and guidance.
- Limitation on casualties.
- Exploitation of enemy weaknesses and/or friendly strengths.
- Defeat of the threat centers of gravity.
- Degree of asymmetrical operations.
- Opportunity for maneuver.
- Concentration of combat power.
- Speed.
- Balance between mass and dispersion.
- Success despite terrain or weather restrictions.
- Risk.
- Phasing.
- Weighting the main effort.
- Logistical supportability.
- Political considerations.

- Force protection.
- Time available and timing of the operation.

### 3003. Outputs

Course of action development activities produce outputs that drive subsequent steps in the Marine Corps Planning Process. Required outputs of COA development are the commander's designated COAs for wargaming, commander's wargaming guidance, and commander's evaluation criteria. Additional outputs may include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools including the COA graphic and narrative.
- Course of action briefing.
- Initial estimates of supportability and additional requirements from subordinate commands.
- Initial staff estimates and additional requirements from staff and warfighting function representatives.




## Chapter 4

# Course of Action War Game

*“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”<sup>4</sup>*

—Sun Tzu



Course of action wargaming allows the staff and subordinate commanders to gain a common understanding of friendly—and possible enemy—courses of action. This common understanding allows them to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action and forms the basis for the commander's course of action comparison and decision. It is based on wargaming and estimates prepared by the staff and subordi-

nate commanders. Course of action wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each course of action as it pertains to the enemy and the battlespace. Each friendly course of action is wargamed against selected threat courses of action. Course of action wargaming assists planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly course of action. Course of action wargaming may

identify branches and potential sequels that require additional planning. Short of actually executing the course of action, COA wargaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each course of action.

## 4001. Inputs

Course of action wargaming requires the commander's designated courses of action for wargaming, wargaming guidance, and evaluation criteria. Other inputs useful in COA wargaming include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools including the COA graphic and narrative and synchronization matrix.
- Estimates of supportability and additional requirements from subordinate commanders.
- Staff estimates and additional requirements from staff and/or warfighting representatives, including an updated intelligence estimate with an event template and threat courses of action.
- Updated facts and assumptions.

## 4002. Process

During COA wargaming, the staff evaluates the effectiveness of friendly courses of action against both the enemy's courses of action and the commander's evaluation criteria. The staff makes adjustments to identified problems and weaknesses of the friendly courses of action and identify branches and sequels. Each friendly course of action is wargamed independently against selected enemy courses of action. Course of action wargaming helps the commander determine how best to apply his strength against the enemy's critical vulnerabilities while protecting his critical vulnerabilities. Wargaming pits friendly courses of ac-

tion against enemy courses of action, it does not compare friendly courses of action against each other. Friendly courses of action are compared against each other in the next step, COA comparison and decision. Estimates provide the staff and subordinate commanders views on the courses of action. These views assist the commander during COA comparison and decision.

### a. Conduct COA War Game

The staff may conduct wargaming using the enemy's most likely, most dangerous, and most advantageous (to friendly forces) courses of action. The commander approves the enemy courses of action that will be used during wargaming. If possible, enemy courses of action are played by a "thinking enemy" in the form of a red cell. See appendix E for additional discussion on wargaming and the red cell.

When conducted formally, wargaming is a disciplined, interactive process that examines the execution of the friendly courses of action in relation to the enemy. When conducted informally, it may be as simple as a "What if?" conversation between the commander and staff. Wargaming relies heavily on the operational judgment and experience of the participants. Whether formal or informal, wargaming attempts to foresee the action, reaction, and counteraction dynamics of friendly versus enemy courses of action. During wargaming—

- Evaluate each course of action independently. Do not compare one course of action with another during the war game.
- Remain unbiased and avoid making premature conclusions.
- Continually assess the suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness of each course of action.
- Record the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.
- Record data based on commander's evaluation criteria for each course of action.

- Keep to the established timeline of the war game.
- Identify possible branches and potential sequels for further planning.

### **b. Refine Staff Estimates and Estimates of Supportability**

The commander's staff and subordinate commands continue to develop their staff estimates and estimates of supportability. These estimates are used during the next step, COA comparison and decision. Criteria used in the development of estimates may include—

- Risk assessment.
- Casualty projections and/or limitations.
- Personnel replacement requirements.
- Projected enemy losses.
- Enemy prisoners of war procedures.
- Intelligence collection requirements and limitations.
- Rules of engagement.
- High-value targets.
- High-payoff targets.
- Support (fires, logistics, aviation) strengths and limitations.
- Projected assets and resource requirements.
- Operational reach.
- Projected allocation of mobility assets, lift, and sorties versus availability.
- Requirement for prepositioning equipment and supplies.
- Projected location of units and supplies for future operations.
- Projected location of the combat operations center and command post echelons (rear, main, tactical).
- Command and control system's requirements.

### **c. Prepare Course of Action War Game Brief**

The COA war game brief presents the commander with the results of the staff's evaluation and

war game. The brief includes the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action and suggested modifications. It may also include—

- Enemy COA situation templates:
  - Updated intelligence estimate (terrain, weather, enemy).
  - Wargamed enemy courses of action.
- Mission analysis and COA development products:
  - Higher, supporting, supported, and adjacent commander's mission statements (two levels up).
  - Tasks and intent provided by higher headquarters.
  - Commander's intent for subordinate units.
  - Overview of courses of action.
  - Wargame technique used.
  - Wargamed critical events.
- COA war game products and results (see app. D for more information on Marine Corps Planning Process tools)—
  - COA war game worksheet.
  - Identification of any additional tasks.
  - Revised COA graphic and narrative.
  - List of critical events and decision points.
  - Branches and potential sequels.
  - Assets required and shortfalls.
  - New requests for information.
  - Estimated time required for the operation.
  - Any accepted risk.
- Recommended changes to the commander's evaluation criteria.

### **d. Refine Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products**

The staff refines and prepares IPB products as necessary to support the next step, COA comparison and decision.

## 4003. Outputs

COA war game activities produce outputs that drive subsequent steps in the Marine Corps Planning Process. Required outputs of COA wargaming are the wargamed COA graphic and narrative and information on the commander's evaluation criteria. Additional outputs may include—


- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools:
  - COA war game worksheet.
- War game results:
  - Synchronization matrix.
  - Initial task organization.
  - Identification of assets required and shortfalls.
  - Refined CCIRs.
  - List of critical events and decision points.
- Refined staff estimates.
- Subordinate commander's estimates of supportability.
- Branches and sequels identified for further planning.

## Chapter 5

# Course of Action Comparison and Decision

*“The first principle of a [commander] is to calculate what he must do, to see if he has all the means to surmount the obstacles with which the enemy can oppose him and, when he has made his decision, to do everything to overcome them.”<sup>5</sup>*

—Napoleon Bonaparte



**BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS**

During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly courses of action against established criteria, evaluates them against each other, and selects the course of action that he believes will best accomplish the mission. The commander may also refine his mission statement (including his commander's intent and essential tasks) and concept of operations, and identify any branches of the chosen course of ac-

tion that needs further staff attention. Finally, a warning order may be issued to subordinate commanders.

This step requires the commander, subordinate commanders, and staff involvement from start to finish. Ideally, all participants attend one collective meeting. If attendance by all participants is not possible, the commander may interact with

subordinates in several separate meetings or through electronic means (e.g., video teleconference).

## 5001. Inputs

COA comparison and decision inputs require wargamed COA(s) graphics and narratives and information on the commander's evaluation criteria. Other inputs useful in COA comparison and decision may include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools:
  - COA war game worksheet.
  - Synchronization matrix.
- War game results:
  - Initial task organization.
  - Identification of assets required and shortfalls.
  - Updated CCIRs.
  - List of critical events and decision points.
- Refined staff estimates.
- Subordinate commander's estimates of supportability.
- Branches and sequels identified for further planning.

## 5002. Process

The COA comparison and decision process at lower levels of command may simply be an informal exchange of information between the commander and selected staff members concerning the results of the war game. At higher levels of command, the process is normally a formal sequence of activities that may involve the following actions.

### a. Perform Course of Action Evaluation

The commander uses the information gathered, which was based on his evaluation criteria, to elect a course of action to develop into his concept of operations. In a discussion led by the commander or his representative (i.e., chief of staff, deputy commander), each course of action is examined against the commander's evaluation criteria. Advantages and disadvantages of each course of action are discussed and recorded. Subordinate commanders, staffs, and planners provide feedback in their areas of expertise.

The commander can evaluate courses of action through a number of approaches. One approach is to evaluate each course of action against all the commander's evaluation criteria to give the commander a view of the entire course of action. Another approach is to evaluate all of the courses of action against each of the commander's evaluation criteria so the commander gains a perspective from each separate criterion. Regardless of the approach used, staff and subordinate commanders provide estimates and judgments to the commander.

### b. Perform Course of Action Comparison

The results of the COA evaluation allow the commander to conduct COA comparison. The commander may use a comparison and decision matrix to help him compare one course of action against another. (See app. D for more information on the comparison and decision matrix.) Course of action comparison provides the commander with an understanding of the relative merit of each course of action and aids in his decisionmaking process.

### c. Make Commander's Decision

Once all courses of action are evaluated and compared, the commander selects a course of action.



In making his decision, the commander may —

- Select a course of action without modification.
- Modify a course of action to overcome disadvantages.
- Develop a new course of action by combining favorable elements of multiple courses of action.
- Discard all courses of action and resume mission analysis or COA development, as required.

Once the commander has made a decision, he should conduct a review of the course of action with subordinate commanders. He must review his mission statement to ensure that he has captured all essential tasks required by the selected course of action. The commander's decision guides the preparation of the concept of operations and orders development.

#### **d. Prepare the Concept of Operations**

The staff prepares the concept of operations that is the basis of the next step, orders development. The concept of operations is the basis for supporting concepts such as the concept of fires, logistics, or force protection. Included in the concept of operations is a general description of actions to be taken and a generic organization for combat.

The concept of operations includes a complete description with graphics and narrative.

#### **e. Issue the Warning Order**

With the preparation of the concept of operations, the commander may issue another warning order to allow subordinate commanders to begin concurrent planning.

#### **f. Refine Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products**

The staff refines and prepares IPB products as a result of COA comparison and decision.

### **5003. Outputs**

The output of COA comparison and decision provides the basis for orders development. The required output is the concept of operations. Additional outputs may include—

- Updated IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Updated CCIRs.
- Staff estimates.
- Commander's identification of branches for further planning.
- Warning order.




## Chapter 6

# Orders Development

*“As a rule, plans should contain only as much detail as required to provide subordinates the necessary guidance while allowing as much freedom of action as possible.”<sup>6</sup>*

—MCDP 5, *Planning*



BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

The orders development step in the Marine Corps Planning Process communicates the commander's intent, guidance, and decisions in a clear, useful form that is easily understood by those executing the order. An order is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses a subordinate's tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission. Various portions of the order, such as the mission statement and staff estimates, have been prepared during previous steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

The chief of staff or executive officer, as appropriate, directs orders development. The order contains only critical or new information—not routine matters normally found in standing operating procedures. A good order is judged on its usefulness—not its weight.

### 6001. Inputs

The initial task organization, mission statement, commander's intent, concept of operations, and

specified and implied tasks are the required inputs to orders development. Other inputs may include—

- Updated intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Updated CCIRs.
- Staff estimates.
- Commander's identification of branches for further planning.
- Warning order.
- Existing plans, standing operating procedures, and orders.
- Chief of staff or executive officer orders development guidance.

## 6002. Process

Normally, the chief of staff or executive officer coordinates with staff principals to assist the G-3/S-3 in developing an order. The chief of staff or executive officer dictates the format for the order, sets and enforces the time limits and development sequence, and determines which annexes are published by which staff section.

### a. Refine Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products

The staff refines or prepares IPB products to support orders development.

### b. Preparation of Order or Plan

Orders are produced in a variety of forms. Orders or plans can be detailed, written documents with many supporting annexes, or they can be simple verbal commands. Their form depends on time available, complexity of the operation, and levels of command involved. Supporting portions of the order or plan, such as annexes and appendixes, are based on staff estimates, subordinate commander's estimates of supportability, and other planning documents. If the basic order has been published, a FRAGO may be issued to subordinate commanders. Whatever the format, orders

and plans must be clear, concise, timely, and useful. See appendix G for operation plan, operation order, annex, and appendix formats.

### c. Orders Reconciliation

Orders reconciliation is an internal process in which the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire order. This reconciliation ensures that the basic order and all the annexes, appendixes, etc., are complete and in agreement. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in the planning. If discrepancies or gaps are found, the staff takes corrective action. Specifically, the staff compares the commander's intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the concept of operations and the supporting concepts (e.g., maneuver, fires, support). Priority intelligence requirements and the intelligence collection plan must support the CCIRs.

### d. Orders Crosswalk

During the orders crosswalk, the staff compares the order with the orders of higher and adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure that the superior commander's intent is met. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. If discrepancies or gaps are found, the staff takes corrective action.

### e. Commander Approves Order or Plan

The final action in orders development is the approval of the order or plan by the commander. While the commander does not have to sign every annex or appendix, it is important that he reviews and signs the basic order or plan.

## 6003. Outputs

The output of orders development is an approved order or plan. Additional outputs may include—


- Refined intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Outline FRAGOs for branches.

## Chapter 7

# Transition

*“... plans and orders exist for those who receive and execute them rather than those who write them.”<sup>7</sup>*

—MCDP 5, *Planning*



**BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS**

The purpose of transition is to provide a successful shift from planning to execution. It enhances the situational awareness of those who will execute the order, maintains the intent of the concept of operations, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo.

Transition is a continuous process that requires a free flow of information between commanders and staffs by all available means. At higher echelons, such as the component, the MEF, or an MSC where the planners may not be executors, the commander may designate a representative as a proponent for the order or plan. After orders development the proponent takes the approved order or plan forward to the staff charged with supervising execution. As a full participant in the development of the plan, the proponent is able to answer questions, aid in the use of the planning support tools, and assist the staff in determining necessary adjustments to the order or plan.

Transition occurs at all levels of command. A formal transition normally occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams. Planning time and personnel may be limited at lower levels of command, such as the regiment, aircraft group, or below; therefore, transition may take place intuitively because the planners are also the executors.

### 7001. Inputs

For transition to occur, an approved order or plan must exist. The approved order or plan, along with the products of continuing staff actions, forms the input for transition. These inputs may include—

- Refined intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Outline FRAGOs for branches.

- Information on possible future missions (sequels).
- Any outstanding issues.

## 7002. Process

Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing the order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent, the concept of operations, and Marine Corps Planning Process tools. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans or future and current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and his subordinate commands.

### a. Transition Brief

At the higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides an overview of the mission, commander's intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. It is given to ensure that all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing the order. The commander, deputy commander, or chief of staff provides transition brief guidance, which may prescribe who will give the brief, the briefing content, the briefing sequence, and who is required to attend. Time available dictates the level of detail possible in the transition brief. Orders and supporting materials should be transmitted as early as possible

before the transition brief. The brief may include items from the order or plan such as—

- Higher headquarters mission (tasks and intent).
- Mission.
- Commander's intent.
- Commander's critical information requirements.
- Task organization.
- Situation (friendly and enemy).
- Concept of operations.
- Execution (including branches and potential sequels).
- Planning support tools.

### b. Transition Drills

Drills are important techniques used during transition to ensure the greatest possible understanding of the plan or order by those who must execute it. Drills improve the ability of the commander and staff to command and control operations. A transition drill is a series of briefings, guided discussions, walk throughs, or rehearsals used to facilitate understanding of the plan throughout all levels of the command. Transition drills are conducted by the commander and his subordinate commanders or the commander and the staff tasked with execution of the plan or order. Typically, a transition drill is the only drill used at lower levels of command, where the staff both develops and executes the plan. Transition drills increase the situational awareness of the subordinate commanders and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.

**c. Confirmation Brief**

A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate commander after he receives his order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of commander's intent, their specific task and purpose, and the relationship between their unit's missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify gaps in his plan, identify discrepancies between his and subordinate commander's plans, and learn

how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their mission.

**7003. Outputs**

The outputs of a successful transition are subordinate commanders and staffs that are ready to execute the order and possible branches and prepared to plan sequels.





## **Appendix A**

# **Marine Corps Planning in Joint Operations**

The Marine Corps will continue to operate in a joint environment. The Marine Corps Planning Process is the vehicle through which commanders and their staffs in the operating forces provide input to the joint planning process.

## **1. Types of Joint Planning**

There are three types of planning at the joint level: campaign planning, deliberate planning, and crisis action planning. Deliberate and crisis action planning have distinct processes. Campaign planning uses deliberate and crisis action processes to develop plans.

### **a. Deliberate Planning**


The joint staff and combatant commanders use deliberate planning to develop plans such as operation plans (OPLANs) and operation plans in concept form (CONPLANs) in support of national strategy. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan apportions forces and resources for use during deliberate planning by combatant commanders and their Service component commanders.

### **b. Crisis Action Planning**

Crisis action planning is conducted in response to crises where national interests are threatened and a military response is being considered. In crisis action planning, the time available for planning at the national level may be as little as a few days. Crisis action planning procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information and the timely preparation of campaign plans or OPORDs.

## **2. The MCPP and Joint Planning**


The Marine Corps Planning Process interfaces with the joint deliberate planning process during the supporting plan development phase. See figure A-1. Supporting plans are developed once the combatant commander's concept has been approved and a plan has been developed. Marine Corps supporting plans address the tasks identified for Marine Corps operational forces and outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces. The Marine Corp Planning Process provides a disciplined approach for the Marine Corps component commanders and staffs to prepare Marine Corps supporting plans.



**Figure A-1. MCPP Interface with the Deliberate Planning Process.**

Marine Corps Order P3000.18, *Marine Corps Planner's Manual*, establishes Marine Corps policies, procedures, and standards for the development, maintenance, and execution of Marine Corps war plans. The *Marine Corps Planner's Manual* describes Marine Corps service responsibilities within JOPES. It provides specific procedures for Headquarters, Marine Corps planners and for the commanders and staffs in the Marine Corps operating forces for deliberate and crisis action planning. This order addresses the combatant commander's requirements for standing plans, which includes sourcing the types and numbers of units, sustainment for units, and replacement manpower.

The Marine Corps Planning Process interfaces with the crisis action planning process beginning in situation development and throughout the process as Marine Corps planners develop new plans, or expand or modify existing plans. See figure A-2.



**Figure A-2. MCP Interface with the Crisis Action Planning Process.**



## Appendix B

# Warfighting Functions

Marine Corps warfighting functions encompass all military activities in the battlespace. Planners consider and integrate the warfighting functions when analyzing how to accomplish the mission. Integrating the warfighting functions helps achieve unity of effort and focus.

As stated in MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning*, maximum impact is obtained when all warfighting functions are harmonized to accomplish the desired objective within the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties. The six warfighting functions are command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. These warfighting functions apply equally to both conventional operations and other types of operations such as military operations other than war and information operations.

### 1. Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. It is how the commander transmits his intent and decisions to the force and receives feedback. Command and control involves arranging personnel, equipment, and facilities to allow the commander to extend his influence over the force during the planning and conducting of military operations.

### 2. Maneuver

Maneuver is the movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish an objective. It normally includes the movement of forces on the battlefield in combination with fire or fire potential. Maneuver is a dynamic element of combat, a means of concentrating forces for decisive action to achieve the surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, and moral dominance that enables smaller forces to defeat larger ones.

### 3. Fires

Fires are the employment of firepower against the enemy's air, ground, and sea targets. Fires delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities, as well as affect the enemy's will to fight. It includes the collective

and coordinated use of target acquisition systems, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal and nonlethal means. Fires are normally used in concert with maneuver and help to shape the battlespace, setting conditions for decisive action.

## **4. Intelligence**

Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the enemy and the battlespace as well as identifying the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. It assists the commander in understanding the situation, alerts him to new opportunities, and helps him assess the effects of actions upon the enemy. This warfighting function supports and is integrated with the overall operational effort and is always focused on the enemy.

## **5. Logistics**

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and sustain military forces. At the tactical level, logistics is referred to as combat service support and involves arming, fueling, fixing equipment, moving, supplying, manning, and providing personnel health and services.

## **6. Force Protection**

Force protection is the measures taken to protect the force's fighting potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. It includes those measures the force takes to remain viable by protecting itself from the effects from enemy activities and natural occurrences. Force protection safeguards friendly centers of gravity and protects, conceals, reduces, or eliminates friendly critical vulnerabilities.

## Appendix C

# Organization for Planning

The commander organizes his staff to gather, manage, and process information essential to decisionmaking. Organization for planning not only involves personnel and structure, it is also affected by planning modes and the planning, decision, execution, and assessment (PDE&A) cycle.

## 1. Planning Modes

The Marine Corps Planning Process is designated to facilitate planning at all levels and to satisfy three modes of planning (orientation, contingency, and commitment) as described in MCDP 5, *Planning*. Orientation planning is used when the degree of uncertainty is so high that it is not worthwhile to commit to a specific plan. Planners focus on assessing the situation and designing flexible preliminary plans that can be adapted to a broad variety of situations. Contingency planning is used when there is less uncertainty but enough is not known about the situation to allow for the adoption of a specific plan. Normally, planners prepare for several contingencies, allowing the commander to respond quickly when the situation requires action. Commitment planning is used when there is certainty about the situation and the commander has selected a plan and committed resources to executing the plan. See MCDP 5 for further discussion on planning modes. Commanders and planners consider these modes when organizing their planning efforts to ensure they use a mode and planning sequence appropriate to the situation. The Marine Corps Planning Process facilitates planning in each of these modes of planning.

These modes span the planning horizon based on degrees of uncertainty. Additionally, planning may also be viewed as a hierarchical continuum with conceptual, functional, and detailed levels of planning. Conceptual planning is the highest level, establishing aims, objectives, and broad concepts for action. Detailed planning is the lowest level of planning, translating the broad concept into a complete and practicable plan. In between these two levels is the functional level of planning. Functional planning involves elements of both conceptual and detailed planning and is concerned with designing supporting concepts for war-fighting functions such as maneuver or force protection. For instance, commitment planning normally includes considerable detailed planning that facilitates execution, while orientation planning most often remains at the conceptual planning level.


To gain and maintain tempo, commanders and their staffs must be involved in all modes and levels of planning by ensuring a constant flow of information

vertically within the chain of command and laterally among staff sections. At the small-unit level, this information exchange can be simple and direct—commander to commander or operations officer to operations officer. In larger-sized units, such as the component or MEF, a more formal arrangement that uses liaison officers and distinct planning organization is necessary due to the scope and detail involved. The requirement to align with higher headquarters planning organizations and to properly address the entire planning continuum will also be a factor in determining the size and complexity of the planning organization.

Planning is an event-dominated process. Therefore, planning organizations should be designed to enhance planning for significant events such as changes in mission. Conversely, time-driven processes are a necessary, yet subordinate, aspect of planning. Planners must address both time- and event-driven processes, while maintaining the proper perspective between the two. For example, the air tasking order is critical to the planning and execution of operations, and it is produced in a cycle that requires timely input from subordinates. Nevertheless, the air tasking order is produced in support of the plan—it is not the plan.

## 2. Planning, Decision, Execution, and Assessment Cycle

The PDE&A cycle is the process the commander and his staff use to plan operations, make accurate and timely decisions, direct the effective execution of operations, and assess the results of those operations. See figure C-1.



**Figure C-1. Planning, Decision, Execution, and Assessment Cycle.**




The PDE&A is a complete cycle that starts with the initial receipt of the mission and continues through mission accomplishment. It is both time and event driven. It provides a framework that supports the commander's efforts to assimilate information in the chaotic environment of war to increase tempo through timely and decisive actions.

### 3. Planning Organizations

The Marine Corps Planning Process is scalable from the component level down to the battalion and squadron level. Typically, resources, information, and time available for planning are limited at the lower command levels; therefore, planning organizations must form or adapt to meet these limitations. Command and staff relationships are established and function within a defined organizational structure. These relationships are key to providing the command and control necessary to effect operational success.

Lower command levels, like battalions and air groups, adapt and consolidate certain Marine Corps Planning Process planning responsibilities and functions within their limited structures. Normally at these command levels, most Marine Corps Planning Process procedures are performed by the commander and his primary staff officers and selected special staff officers. Figure C-2 shows the planning organization and relationships found at lower levels of command, such as a battalion.




**Figure C-2. Lower Level Organizations and Planning Relationships.**

Only at the higher levels of command (MEF, division, wing, or force service support group) are specialized planning staff elements and organizations formed. Figure C-3 illustrates planning organizations at the Marine Corps component and MEF and their link to higher headquarters. The Marine Corps Planning Process at the component and MEF levels is primarily conducted by three planning organizations: future plans, future operations, and current operations. Their efforts must be coordinated for the smooth transition from long-term planning to execution. To ensure integrated planning, these agencies must have warfighting function representation from within the command, as well as subordinate and adjacent commands. Manning limitations may require placing some of this expertise in general support of the planning effort as a whole.

### a. Sections

**(1) Future Plans Section.** The future plans section is normally under the staff cognizance of the G-5. The G-5 forms a liaison element to the higher headquarters' staff and integrates the higher headquarters plan into the MEF's planning process, ensuring that it meets the intent of the higher commander.

The future plans section focuses beyond the immediate next battle or next phase that is being planned to provide a link between higher headquarters and the future operations section. The future plans section plans the command's next mission. Upon receipt of a mission from higher headquarters, this section initiates



**Figure C-3. Component and MEF Organizations and Planning Relationships.**

the MEF's planning process and develops an outline plan. Depending on the situation, it may focus on a phase of a campaign, develop reconstitution requirements, or plan deployment. An operational planning team (OPT) may be formed to focus the planning effort and gather relevant planning expertise. This section's responsibility is to get the mission correct with regard to MEF capabilities, command relationship requirements, and battlespace geometry. It is this effort that generates tempo external to the force.

The future plans section may also develop sequels, support relationships for the next phase, and develop plans to ensure that the force does not reach a culminating point. It transitions to the future operations section the outline plan that provides the salient features of a mission that precedes detailed planning.

**(2) Future Operations Section.** The future operations section is under the staff cognizance of the G-3 and is the focal point of the planning process. It usually forms the nucleus of the OPT and coordinates with both the future plans and current operations sections to integrate planning of the next battle. The future operations section fully integrates the other staff sections' plans officers, war-fighting function representatives, and subordinate unit liaison officers into the planning process. It takes the outline plan from the future plans section and uses it as the basis for further planning. The future operations section focuses on changes to MEF or MSC missions; develops branch plans and sequels; and recommends potential CCIRs. This section interacts with intelligence collection and the targeting process to shape the next battle. The current operations section may provide a representative to the future operations section to guarantee that the transition process is continuous (this representative returns to the current operations section as a proponent for the next OPORD). The future operations section's efforts generate tempo internal to the force.

**(3) Current Operations Section.** The current operations section is under the staff cognizance of the G-3. During operations, it receives the OPORD from the OPT at the transition brief. The current operations section—

- Coordinates and executes the OPORD.
- Prepares and transmits OPORDs.
- Monitors operations of the force.
- Tracks CCIRs and immediately reports relevant information to the commander.
- Analyzes battlespace information.

Branch plans are normally passed to the current operations section during the transition brief. When an unforeseen enemy action begins to develop, the current operations section will refine already existing branch plans or develop a

branch plan. To support the commander, the current operations section may develop new COAs, allocate resources, and prepare FRAGOs to modify the current OPOD. This section assesses shaping actions and the progress toward the commander's decisive actions, monitors the status of forces and materiel, monitors rear area operations, coordinates terrain management, maintains essential maps and information, and provides the future operations section with situational awareness.

## **b. Teams**

**(1) Operational Planning Team.** The OPT is a dynamic, ad hoc organization that may be formed by either the future plans section or future operations section to conduct integrated planning. It helps conduct mission analysis, develops and war games COAs, and assists the staff in the preparation and transition of the order. Normally, the OPT is built around a core of planners from either the future plans section or the future operations section and may include the future plans or future operations officer, assistant plans or assistant future operations officer, future plans or future operations chief, and a clerk/plotter. It integrates additional staff representatives (e.g., G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, staff judge advocate, provost marshal, health services, public affairs) as appropriate to the mission. The OPT may also be augmented by warfighting function representatives, liaison officers, and subject matter experts needed to support planning. The OPT serves as the linchpin between the future plans, future operations, and current operations sections.

**(2) Crisis Action Team.** The crisis action team falls under the staff cognizance of the G-3. The crisis action team is usually formed in the initial stages of a crisis and has the requirement to rapidly collect and manage information. It can be task-organized to reflect the unique nature of each crisis. Often, at the initial stage of a crisis, the commander's primary concern is force readiness status and deployment planning. The crisis action team may initiate the planning process, develop situational awareness, and access previously prepared and emerging planning products from JOPES. To facilitate a common situational awareness, potential members of the crisis action team are identified in advance and are recalled for initial crisis action planning. For extended operations, the crisis action team's planning and execution functions transition to the normal planning sections (current operations, future operations, and future plans) and their manning and functions are redefined. The crisis action team may assume the functions of a rear element, primarily maintaining situational awareness for follow-on and supporting units.

## 4. Warfighting Function Representatives

Warfighting functions encompass all military activities in the battlespace. Planners consider and integrate the warfighting functions when analyzing how best to accomplish the mission. The warfighting functions include maneuver, intelligence, fires, logistics, command and control, and force protection. The integration of warfighting functions helps to achieve focus and unity of effort and provides a method for planners to think in terms of how each function supports the accomplishment of the mission. Critical to this approach to planning is the coordination of activities not only within each warfighting function but also among all the warfighting functions. By using warfighting functions as the integration elements, planners ensure all functions are focused toward a single purpose. This does not mean that the MEF or a major subordinate command is restricted in their planning or conduct of operations (e.g., the ground combat element only considering maneuver or the aviation combat element only considering fires). Planners at all echelons of command must consider and integrate activities within and among all the warfighting functions.

Warfighting function representatives should be selected because of their experience and training in the functional area. They should be trained and experienced in the Marine Corps Planning Process. Consideration as to the rank of the warfighting function representative may be necessary at higher command levels. A warfighting function representative may be on the commander's staff, a member of a subordinate unit staff, a commander of a supporting unit or organization from another Service or nation, or any Marine qualified to address the issues of a particular functional area. Designation as a warfighting function representative may be an additional responsibility; for example, a Marine could serve simultaneously as a warfighting function representative, a staff member, and a staff representative to the OPT.

## 5. Liaison to Support the MCPP

Liaison is the contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Liaison helps to reduce the fog of war through direct communications. It ensures that senior commanders remain aware of the tactical situation by providing them with exceptional, critical, or routine information; verification of information; and clarification of operational questions. Overall, liaison is another tool to help commanders overcome friction and accomplish their mission.

**a. Command Liaison**

Commanders of all organizations routinely initiate contact with commanders of other units in their locale even though there may be no official command or support relationship between them. This contact opens the channels of communications to facilitate mutual security and support. This is dictated by METT-T as well as by command relationships or by direction from a common superior.

**b. Staff Liaison**

Staff officers of all organizations routinely initiate contact with their counterparts at higher, lower, adjacent, supporting, and supported commands. This contact opens channels of communication that are essential for the proper planning and execution of military operations. Staff liaison may also include temporary assignment of liaison elements to other commands.

**c. Liaison Officers**

The liaison officer is the most commonly used means of maintaining close, continuous contact with another command. He is the commander's personal representative. He has the special trust and confidence of the commander to make appropriate recommendations and estimates in the absence of communications. As necessary, the commander uses a liaison officer to transmit or receive critical information directly with key persons in the receiving headquarters. The liaison officer must possess the requisite rank and experience to properly represent his command. The ability to communicate effectively is essential, as is sound judgment. Equally, he must have immediate access to his commander.

**d. Operational Planning Team Liaison Officers**

The subordinate command's OPT liaison officers are key contributors to the Marine Corps Planning Process and the future operations plan. These liaison officers provide timely and accurate movement of information between the OPT and their commands. Normally, this officer's primary responsibility is to the planning effort. He may only be able to provide part-time support to other activities such as logistic coordination or targeting.

**e. Liaison Team**

A liaison team, usually headed by an officer, is assigned when the workload or need for better communications is greater than the capabilities of a single liaison officer. The liaison team will normally consist of an officer, a liaison chief, clerical personnel, drivers, and communications personnel with equipment. Members of the liaison team may function as couriers when necessary. The grade of the senior member of the liaison team depends on unit size and personnel available. Liaison teams are generally required for continuous operations.

**f. Couriers**

Although infrequently used because of the capabilities of electronic communications, the courier remains a valuable liaison element. The courier is more than a messenger. He is expected to provide more information than is contained in the message he is delivering. For this reason, the courier should possess sufficient experience and maturity to respond to questions and provide more than superficial insight into the situation or issues of concern. Individuals selected as couriers are often junior officers or staff noncommissioned officers. If such personnel are available, dedicated couriers may be used to augment the liaison officer or liaison team.

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## Appendix D

# Marine Corps Planning Process Tools

The commander and his staff use Marine Corps Planning Process tools to record, track, and analyze critical planning information relative to the battlespace, the enemy, and friendly actions. These tools, when used properly, assist the commander and the staff in building situational awareness, assist in the preparation of plans and orders, facilitate the commander's decisionmaking process, and increase tempo. Marine Corps Planning Process tools must serve the needs of the commander and the requirements of the situation. Use of Marine Corps Planning Process tools consists of IPB products and planning support tools.

Table D-1 identifies commonly used templates, worksheets, and matrices and how each tool supports the Marine Corps Planning Process. The examples in this appendix are at the MEF level, but these tools may be employed at any level of command. The formats and uses of these tools may be modified as required.

**Table D-1. Marine Corps Planning Process Tools.**

OVERLAYS, TEMPLATES, MATRICES, WORKSHEETS, AND GRAPHICS AND NARRATIVES	MISSION ANALYSIS	COA DEVELOPMENT	COA WAR GAME	COMPARISON AND DECISION	ORDERS DEVELOPMENT	TRANSITION
Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (see fig. D-1, page D-4)	X	X	X			
Doctrinal Template (see fig. D-2, page D-5)	X	X	X			
Situation Template (see fig. D-3, page D-6)	X	X	X			
Event Template (see fig. D-4, page D-7)	X	X	X			
Event Matrix (see table D-3, page D-8)	X	X	X			
Decision Support Template (see fig. D-5, page D-9)		X	X	X	X	X
Decision Support Matrix (see table D-4, page D-10)		X	X	X	X	X

**Table D-1. Marine Corps Planning Process Tools—Continued.**

<b>OVERLAYS, TEMPLATES, MATRICES, WORKSHEETS, AND GRAPHICS AND NARRATIVES</b>	<b>MISSION ANALYSIS</b>	<b>COA DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>COA WAR GAME</b>	<b>COMPARISON AND DECISION</b>	<b>ORDERS DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>TRANSITION</b>
Course of Action Graphic and Narrative (see fig. D-6, page D-11)		X	X	X	X	
Synchronization Matrix (see table D-5, page D-12)		X	X	X	X	X
COA War Game Worksheet (see table D-6, page D-14)			X	X	X	
Comparison and Decision Matrix with Comments (see table D-7, page D-15)				X		
Comparison and Decision Matrix with Sample Ranking (see table D-8, page D-15)				X		

## 1. IPB Products

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and the environment in a specific geographic area. The IPB process helps the commander selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space. It determines the threat's likely COA, and it describes the environment in which the command is operating and the effects of the environment on the command's operations. Battlespace and weather evaluations assist in identifying obstacles, mobility corridors, and avenues of approach; predicting weather effects for numerous mobility options; and estimating sea conditions. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace includes templating with a threat doctrinal assessment to show potential threat objectives and activities. This templating continues from planning to execution, both to assess current operations and to support planning for future operations.

**Table D-2. IPB Integration Throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process.**

		MISSION ANALYSIS	COA DEVELOPMENT	COA WAR GAME	COA COMPARISON/ DECISION	ORDERS DEVELOPMENT	TRANSITION
Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay	G-2/S-2 →						
Doctrinal Template	G-2/S-2 →						Continuous <sup>1</sup>
Situation Template	G-2/S-2 →						Continuous <sup>1</sup>
Pertinent Threat COAs	G-2/S-2 →						Continuous <sup>1</sup>
Refined and Prioritized Threat COAs and Event Templates and Matrices		G-2/S-2 →					Continuous <sup>1</sup>
Initial Decision Support Template			G-3/S-3/OPT →				Continuous <sup>1</sup>
Decision Support Template Matrix				G-3/S-3/OPT →			Continuous <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Templates are updated throughout the operation.

### a. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

The modified combined obstacle overlay is a graphic of the battlespace's effects on military operations. It is normally based on a product depicting all obstacles to mobility, and it is modified as necessary. Modifications can include cross-country mobility classifications, objectives, avenues of approach and mobility corridors, likely obstacles, defensible battlespace, likely engagement areas, key terrain, and built-up areas and civil infrastructure.




Figure D-1. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay.

### b. Doctrinal Template

Doctrinal templates are models based on postulated threat doctrine. They illustrate the disposition and activity of threat forces conducting a particular operation arrayed on ideal terrain. Doctrinal templates depict the enemy's nominal organization, frontages, depths, boundaries, and control measures for combat. They are usually scaled for use with a map background, and they are one part of a threat model. See figure D-2.




Figure D-2. Doctrinal Template.

### c. Situation Template

A situation template is a doctrinal template that has been modified to depict threat dispositions based on the effects of the battlespace and the pursuit of a particular COA. This accounts for the threat's current situation with respect to the terrain, training and experience levels, logistic status, losses, and dispositions. Normally, the situation template depicts threat units two levels down and critical points in the COA. Situation templates are one part of a threat COA model. Models may contain more than one situation template to depict locations and formations at various times. See figure D-3.




Figure D-3. Situation Template.

#### d. Event Template and Matrix

The event template is derived from the situation template and depicts the named areas of interest. Named areas of interest are areas where activity (or lack of activity) will indicate which COA the threat has adopted. Named areas of interest are described in FM 34-130/FMFRP 3-23-2, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. Time phase lines indicate movement of forces and the expected flow of the operation, and they are also indicated on the event template. The event template is a guide for collection planning. The event matrix depicts types of activity expected in each named area of interest, when the named area of interest is expected to be active, and any additional information to aid in collection planning. See figure D-4 and table D-3.




Figure D-4. Event Template.

**Table D-3. Event Matrix.**

NAMED AREA OF INTEREST	NO EARLIER THAN	NO LATER THAN	EVENT/INDICATOR
1	H + 6	H + 12	Brigade-sized forces moving north.
2	H + 6	H + 12	Brigade-sized forces moving north.
3	H + 12	H + 24	Orangeland forces enter Blue-land. Northern Operational Group driving on Jesara oil-fields.
4	H + 14	H + 24	Orangeland forces seize junction of Highways 7 and 8. Northern Operational Group turns northwest toward Jesara.
5	H + 18	H + 24	Orangeland forces enter Teal-ton. Northern Operational Group driving on Jesara.

### e. Decision Support Template and Matrix

The decision support template is normally developed during COA wargaming. It is derived from doctrinal, situational, and event templates. The decision support template depicts decision points, time phase lines associated with movement of threat and friendly forces, the flow of the operation, and other information required to execute a specific friendly COA. The decision support template is a key planning tool for use during transition and execution. The decision support matrix provides a recap of expected events, decision points, and planned friendly actions in a narrative form. It shows where and when a decision must be taken if a specific action is to take place. It ties decision points to named areas of interest, targeted areas of interest, CCIRs, collection assets, and potential friendly response options. The decision support template and matrix may be refined as planning progresses after the war game. See figure D-5 and table D-4.






Figure D-5. Decision Support Template.

**Table D-4. Decision Support Matrix.**


EVENT NUMBER	EVENT	NO EARLIER THAN/NO LATER THAN	NAMED AREA OF INTEREST	TARGETS AREAS OF INTEREST	FRIENDLY ACTION
1	Orangeland forces enter Blueand, Northern Operational Group division driving on Tealton.	H + 14/H + 24	1, 2	A, B	Covering force withdraws; Marine aircraft wing (MAW) conducts interdiction west of phase line TEAL.
2	Orangeland forces seize junction of Highways 7 and 8. Northern Operational Group turns northwest on Jesara.	H + 18/H + 24	3, 4	C	1 <sup>st</sup> and 3 <sup>d</sup> Marine Divisions (MARDIVs) execute branch plan HAWK.

## 2. Planning Support Tools

Planning support tools support the commander's and staff's planning effort by recording and displaying critical planning information on the COAs and the commander's decisions and guidance. They aid the commander in decisionmaking by displaying critical information in a useful format. Planning support tools include the COA graphic and narrative, synchronization matrix, COA war game worksheets, and the comparison and decision matrix.

### a. Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

The COA graphic and narrative are a visual depiction and written description of a COA. They clearly portray how the organization will accomplish the mission, identifying the who (notional task organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (intent). It should include the tasks and purpose of the main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve. It also includes maneuver control measures, such as boundaries. The COA narrative and graphic, when approved by the commander, forms the basis for the concept of operations and operations overlay in the OPLAN or OPORD. See figure D-6.



A MARDIV, as the main effort, conducts an envelopment to defeat enemy forces north of Gray City. A MARDIV(-)(Rein); as a supporting effort, it attacks in zone to fix and defeat enemy forces west of Tealton and conducts a link up with Blueland forces in Tealton. The MAW, as a supporting effort, isolates the MEF battlespace from enemy reinforcement from the south, while focusing efforts against the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades and the 401<sup>st</sup> and 402<sup>d</sup> Artillery Regiments. The supporting MARDIV(-)(Rein) designates one infantry regiment as the MEF reserve and one battalion as the MEF tactical combat force. This phase concludes with enemy forces defeated north of Gray City.

**Figure D-6. Course of Action Graphic and Narrative.**

## b. Synchronization Matrix

A synchronization matrix is a planning support tool designed to integrate the efforts of the force across the warfighting functions and to record the results of the COA war game. It depicts, over time, the diverse actions of the entire force that are necessary to execute the COA. When completed, it provides the basis for an execution matrix or Annex X, Execution Checklist, to the OPLAN or OPORD. See table D-5.

**Table D-5. Synchronization Matrix.**

TIME/EVENT		PRE D-DAY	D-DAY – D + 2	D + 3 – D + 4	D + 5 – D + 6
Enemy Action					
Decision Points				1	2
Intelligence		MEF conducts reconnaissance in zone.			
	Named area of interest		1, 2	3, 4	5
Force Protection	Survivability	Establish combat air patrol over MEF area of operation.			
	NBC		Priority of support to aviation combat element (ACE).		

Table D-5. Synchronization Matrix—Continued.

TIME/EVENT		PRE D-DAY	D-DAY – D + 2	D + 3 – D + 4	D + 5 – D + 6
Maneuver	Deep		MAW attacks Northern Operational Group armor and artillery, command and control (C2), and combat service support (CSS) facilities.	MAW attacks 102, 103, 401, and 402.	
	Security		Covering forces conduct security operations		
	Close		1 <sup>st</sup> and 3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIVs complete rupture of enemy defenses.	1 <sup>st</sup> MARDIV attacks enemy forces south of phase line TEAL. 3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV conducts link up with Blue-land forces.	1 <sup>st</sup> MARDIV and MAW defeat enemy forces south of phase line TEAL. The 3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV conducts a link up with Special Purpose MAGTF-B (SPMAGTF-B).
	Reserve	3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV—one regiment to MEF reserve.			
	Rear	3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV—one battalion to tactical combat force.			
	Mobility	Priority of main supply route development in main effort zone.			
	Counter-mobility			Complete execution of Barrier Plan South.	
Fires	Lethal				Execute long-duration family of scatterable mines (FAS-CAM) in targeted areas of interest B.
	Nonlethal			Fire expendable jammer to disrupt Northern Operational Group attack.	
	Targeted areas of interest			A	B

**Table D-5. Synchronization Matrix—Continued.**

TIME/EVENT		PRE D-DAY	D-DAY – D + 2	D + 3 – D + 4	D + 5 – D + 6
Logistics	Sustain-ment	Logistic Throughput Plan.			
	Trans-port	Movement Control Plan.			
C2				MEF assumes tactical control of BlueLand Forces in the vicinity of Tealton.	
	Information warfare and C2 warfare	Build enemy electronic order of battle nodal analysis.	Attack Northern Operational Group C2 nodes.		

### c. Course of Action War Game Worksheet

The COA war game worksheet is used during the war game to record friendly action, enemy reaction, and friendly counter-action involved in each COA. It is also used to capture critical information that may be identified during the war game, such as potential CCIRs, decision points, and named areas of interest. See table D-6.

**Table D-6. Course of Action War Game Worksheet.**

COA 1, STAGE A; BOX: MOST LIKELY							
ACTION	REACTION	COUNTER ACTION	ASSETS	APPROX. TIME	DECISION POINT (DP)	CCIR	REMARKS
MARDIV envelops Orangeland forces north of Gray City.	102 <sup>d</sup> and 103 <sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades counter-attack.	MAW interdicts moving enemy forces. MARDIV engages and destroys enemy armor at long range.	Surge MAW attack assets to interdict enemy armor.	D + 3	DP 3	Will 102 <sup>d</sup> and 103 <sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades move west to counter-attack.	MARDIV has priority of close air support.

### d. COA Comparison and Decision Matrix

The COA comparison and decision matrix is a planning support tool designed to assist the commander and staff in recording the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as it is compared against the commander's evaluation criteria. It may reflect various techniques for weighing the COA against the commander's evaluation criteria, as shown below in tables D-7 and D-8. The commander may use the COA comparison and decision matrix to aid his decisionmaking process during the selection of a COA for execution.

**Table D-7. Comparison and Decision Matrix with Comments.**

<b>COMMANDER'S EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>	<b>COA 1</b>	<b>COA 2</b>	<b>COA 3</b>
Force Protection	Moderate casualties.	High casualties. Increased nuclear, biological, and chemical threat.	Light casualties.
Tempo, Surprise		Achieving surprise unlikely.	High chance of achieving surprise.
Shapes the Battlespace	ACE interdiction of enemy lines of communication limits enemy's ability to reinforce.		Deception likely to be effective.
Asymmetrical Operations	ACE operates against second echelon armor forces. Ground combat element (GCE) mechanized forces attack enemy dismounted infantry.	MEF mechanized forces against enemy mechanized forces.	
Maneuver	Frontal attack followed by penetration.	Frontal attack.	Turning movement.
Decisive Actions	ACE disrupts deployment of second echelon forces through interdiction.		Isolate first echelon forces. Disrupt lines of communication, logistics facilities, and assembly areas.
Simplicity		Simplest.	Demanding command and coordination requirements.

**Table D-8. Comparison and Decision Matrix with Sample Ranking.**

<b>COMMANDER'S EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>	<b>COA 1</b>	<b>COA 2</b>	<b>COA 3</b>
Intelligence	3	2	1
Force Protection	2	1	3
Tempo, Surprise	1	2	3
Focus, Speed, Concentration	3	2	1
Shapes the Battlespace	3	2	1
Asymmetrical Operations and Combined Arms	1	2	3
Maneuver	2	1	3
Decisive Actions	3	2	1
Simplicity	2	3	1
Friendly Casualties	2	3	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>

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## **Appendix E**

# **Wargaming**

Wargaming evaluates friendly COAs against enemy COAs to identify weaknesses of the friendly COAs and opportunities that can be exploited in future operations. During wargaming, each friendly COA is individually wargamed against selected enemy COAs—most likely, most advantageous, most dangerous—to determine how best to attack enemy critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical vulnerabilities.

The red cell plays the enemy during wargaming. The red cell is a task-organized element under the staff cognizance of the G-2/S-2. It presents a “thinking” enemy that uses threat doctrine and operational experience to react to friendly threats and dispositions in order to test friendly COAs during wargaming. The red cell ensures that assessed threat capabilities and vulnerabilities are realistically evaluated against each friendly COA. At the MEF or MSC level, the red cell may include four to six personnel; while at the battalion or squadron level, the red cell may be the S-2 or a representative designated by the commander.

Generally, wargaming includes the commander’s wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria, war game preparation, and the conduct of the war game. The results of the war game are used during COA comparison and decision. The following general guidelines may assist in conducting the COA war game step in the Marine Corps Planning Process.

### **1. Commander’s Wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria**

The commander assesses the time available at the conclusion of the COA development brief before providing guidance for the war game. The degree to which a COA achieves the essential tasks allows the commander to determine which COA is optimum with respect to suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness based on the available time, space, and resources. His evaluation criteria addresses specific issues and/or questions that he wants the staff to determine on each validated COA during the conduct of the war game. At this point in the planning process, the commander has begun to think about various options and capabilities available to the enemy commander. He is also mindful of his own command’s vulnerabilities. He will evaluate the major concerns, select the most important concerns, and incorporate them into his wargaming guidance.



### **a. Wargaming Guidance**

The commander's wargaming guidance may include, but is not limited to, the following items:

- Friendly COAs that will be wargamed against specific threat COAs (e.g., COA against the threat's most likely, most dangerous, or most advantageous COA).
- A determination, within each COA, of the number of essential tasks that can be successfully executed concurrently in order to generate more simultaneous attacks throughout the area of operations.
- A requirement to execute the war game assuming the threat does not react to a deception being conducted by the higher headquarters and targeted on the threat operational level commander in the command's zone.
- Critical events that must be wargamed in specific detail, such as critical decision points identified during COA development.
- The level of war game detail.
- Validation that the command can achieve the commander's intent (i.e., subordinate commands in prescribed positions, each at a prescribed level of readiness, and the enemy force also in the posture specified).
- A requirement to determine whether specific timelines are attainable.
- Reinforcement of the importance and role of the main effort so that priority of support can be delineated.
- Specification of the weather conditions to be assumed by the wargamers (e.g., rainy conditions, although the norm for the time of year is dry weather).
- Timeline for the phase or stage of the operation.

### **b. Commander's Evaluation Criteria**

To be adopted as the plan, a COA has to survive two sets of evaluation criteria. The first broad set, discussed in COA development in chapter 3, requires that a COA must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. The second set is intended to identify which COA—among those that did prove to be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete—is the best COA. The commander's evaluation criteria may include, but are not limited to, the following items:

- Principles of war.
- Commander's intent and guidance.
- Limitation on casualties.
- Exploitation of enemy weaknesses and/or friendly strengths.

- Defeat of the threat centers of gravity.
- Degree of asymmetrical operations.
- Opportunity for maneuver.
- Concentration of combat power.
- Speed.
- Balance between mass and dispersion.
- Success despite terrain or weather restrictions.
- Risk.
- Phasing.
- Weighting the main effort.
- Logistical supportability.
- Political considerations.
- Force protection.
- Time available and timing of the operation.

### **c. Staff Evaluation Criteria**

The staff should also develop their own evaluation criteria to support their staff estimates. This provides the basis for their effort in preparing staff estimates to be presented during the COA comparison and decision step. The staff criteria may include, but are not limited to, the following items:

- Risk assessment.
- Casualty projections and/or limitations.
- Personnel replacement requirements.
- Projected enemy losses.
- Enemy prisoner of war handling procedures.
- Intelligence collection requirements and limitations.
- High-value target acquisition.
- High-payoff target identification.
- Supporting arms limitations.
- Support limitations or opportunities.
- Projected assets and resource requirements.
- Projected reach of capabilities against distance or time required.
- Projected allocation of assets, lift, and sorties against availability.
- Requirement for prepositioning equipment and supplies.
- Projected location of units and/or supplies for future operations.
- Projected location of combat operations centers or command posts (rear, main, tactical).
- Command and control systems shortfalls and limitations.

## 2. War Game Preparations

Before beginning wargaming, the planners should post the following information or have it readily accessible in workbooks:

- Approved mission statement.
- Commander's intent and planning guidance.
- Assumptions.
- Constraints and restraints.
- Commander's critical information requirements.
- Maps covering the entire area of operations and area of interest.
- Friendly force list.
- Enemy order of battle.
- Modified combined obstacle overlay with terrain and weather analysis.
- Current and projected enemy situation overlay.
- Current and projected friendly situation overlay.
- Enemy situation templates for each enemy COA.
- Enemy event template and matrix.

Planners should also have the following additional tools that were completed during the COA development:

- Assessment of relative combat power.
- Courses of action as selected and amended by the commander. This includes COA graphic and narrative, event template, decision support template and matrix.

Planners will also need to have the following items at the beginning of the COA analysis:

- War game rules.
- Recording tools (synchronization and COA war game matrices).

### a. Review the Friendly Force List

The planning group reviews the friendly force list to consider all available units that can be committed to the battle, paying special attention to command relationships and task organization. They ensure that the force list reflects all units that may be employed by the wargamers. Ideally, the wargamers employ units two levels down from their level of command. For instance, MEF wargamers will represent the wing and division commanders and will therefore include all aircraft groups and infantry regiments on their force list—as well as all Marine expeditionary units and separate battalions (e.g., light armored reconnaissance

battalion, tank battalion). Because commanders frequently task-organize forces, wargamers should also list the number of subordinate units in each element; e.g., one regiment is currently operating with two battalions, another with three. Similarly, the wargamer employing the MAW would be expected to know the number of squadrons in each group (by type) and the number of aircraft in each squadron. Although task organizations may vary by COA, the friendly force list remains constant for all analyzed COAs.

### **b. Analyze Assumptions**

The planners review previous assumptions to determine whether they are still valid. Most assumptions will impact the war game. It is important that the wargamers analyze each assumption as they proceed. This enables them to accurately brief the commander regarding the consequences of the assumptions.

### **c. List and Graphically Display Known Critical Events and Decision Points**

Critical events are events that influence mission accomplishment. They include—

- Events that accomplish essential tasks listed during mission analysis.
- All major events from current locations to mission accomplishment.
- Enemy initiated events that trigger significant friendly actions or decisions.
- Complex activities initiated by the friendly force that, even without direct pressure from the enemy, must be completed by a set time; e.g., a passage of lines or opening a main supply route.

A decision point is an event or a location in the battlespace where a tactical decision is required during mission execution. Decision points do not dictate the substance of the decision, only that a decision must be made because the event is expected to affect friendly COAs. Geographical decision points are almost always related to a specific type of enemy unit appearing at a specific location in the battlespace. Event-related decision points can relate to either the friendly force or the enemy. Examples of decision points are as follows:

- The friendly commander specifies that the main attack will not begin until the supporting attack has reached phase line red.
- The friendly force is in defensive positions waiting for additional follow-on forces. The commander determines that if the enemy does not begin an attack on the friendly vital area within 48 hours, he will conduct a limited objective attack to harass the enemy and continue to keep the enemy's timetable in turmoil.

Decision points relate to critical events and are linked to named areas of interest and tactical areas of interest. A decision point may have an associated CCIR. When the commander receives the information he requires, it becomes the trigger to make a decision. Critical events and decision points come from several planning documents that at this point in the planning process have been completed by the G-2/S-2. The G-2/S-2 will already have completed situation templates for each enemy COA, as well as a consolidated situation template superimposing all enemy COAs onto one graphic. From that graphic, the G-2/S-2 will have developed an event template to identify named areas of interest. The G-2/S-2 has also identified the enemy's high-value targets and the times that these targets may move through the named areas of interest. The planners, in preparing the friendly COAs, will have assessed which of the high-value targets should be considered high-payoff targets.

#### **d. Select the War Game Method**

Four wargaming techniques—sequence of essential tasks, avenue in depth, belt, and box—are available. Each technique is suited to a particular situation or type of command.

**(1) Sequence of Essential Tasks.** The sequence of essential tasks highlights the initial shaping actions necessary to establish a sustainment capability and to engage enemy units in the deep battle area. At the same time, it enables the planners to adapt if the red cell commander executes a reaction that necessitates the reordering of the essential tasks. This technique also allows wargamers to concurrently analyze the essential tasks required to execute the concept of operations.

**(2) Avenue in Depth.** Avenue in depth focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This technique is good for offensive COAs or for defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.

**(3) Belts.** Belts divide the terrain into belts that span the width of the sector (defense), zone (offense), or area of operation. This technique is most effective when the terrain is divided into well-defined cross compartments during phased operations (e.g., a river crossing or helicopterborne assault), or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined echelons. This technique is based on the sequential analysis of events in each belt; that is, events are expected to occur more or less simultaneously. This type of analysis is preferred because it focuses on essentially all forces affecting particular events in one timeframe. A belt will normally include more than one event. When time is short, the commander may use a modified belt technique; i.e., belts are separated and selected on the basis of

the locations of critical events, which, again, are expected to occur in the same timeframe. At a minimum, belts should include the area of—

- Initial contact along the forward line of own troops, the line of departure and/or the line of contact, or in the covering force area.
- Initial penetration or initial contact along the forward edge of the battle area.
- Passage of the reserve or commitment of a counterattack.
- The objective (offense) or defeat of the enemy (defense), such as the limit of advance for the counterattack.

**(4) Box.** The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as a colored landing beach, an infiltration route, or a raid objective. It is most useful when time is limited. This technique applies to all types of units. When using it, the staff isolates the area and focuses on the critical events within that area. The assumption is that the friendly units not engaged in the action can handle the situations in their region of the battlespace and the essential tasks assigned to them.

#### **e. Select a Method to Record and Display Results**

Recording the war game results gives the planners a record from which to—

- Confirm and refine event templates.
- Integrate all warfighting functions.
- Develop decision support templates.
- Analyze the COA by using the evaluation criteria outlined earlier.
- Build the task organization.
- Prepare the order.

One method for recording the results of the war game is the synchronization matrix. It allows the staff to synchronize a COA across time and space in relation to the enemy COA. As shown in table D-5, on pages D-12 through D-14, the first entry is the time period or phase of the operation. The second entry is the enemy action as determined by the red cell. The third entry records friendly decision points identified for that time interval based on the enemy's actions. Recorded on the remainder of the matrix are the activities during the game turn that the friendly force wargamers decide need to be performed to support the COA. The result is that the planners have evaluated their COA for a specific period of time, they have recorded the activities necessary to support the COA, and they have prepared a comprehensive snapshot of what the entire command should be executing during that period. As wargamers work across the remaining time periods or phases, they obtain a clear understanding of what the command and its subordinate commands must do to accomplish the mission.

The completed matrix facilitates the writing of two portions of the order if this COA is selected as the basis for the plan. By working horizontally across the matrix for each warfighting function, planners are able to describe in writing a clear concept for each warfighting function. By working across the matrix for each subordinate command, planners are able to prepare the tasks to subordinate commands portion of the OPORD.

### **3. Conduct the War Game**

#### **a. General Rules of Wargaming**

Time is a critical resource during wargaming, and rules are key to accomplishing the objectives of the war game in the least amount of time possible. Rules structure the discussions and keep the process objective and focused. The following rules may be used during wargaming:

- Use approved enemy COAs as developed by the G-2/S-2. The goal is to evaluate the friendly COA, not for the red cell to win the war game.
- Remain objective and unbiased.
- Assess feasibility continually. If a COA becomes infeasible during the war game, the commander rejects the COA.
- Analyze each COA independently.
- Avoid comparing one COA with another.
- Record advantages and disadvantages of each COA.
- Ensure that the established timeline is not violated.
- Avoid premature conclusions.
- Record counteractions.
- Record data.
- Use COA war game worksheets.

#### **b. Game Turns**

A game turn covers all friendly and threat actions that are planned to occur during a specified time interval and are focused on a specific task or event. Each game turn usually consists of three moves—two by the friendly force, one by the threat force. The friendly force has two moves because the activity is intended to validate and refine the friendly forces' COA, not the threat's. If necessary, additional moves may be required to achieve desired effects.

#### **c. War Game Preparations**

The facilitator has already determined the H-hour being replicated at the war game's starting point. The red cell commander and the friendly force commanders will have drawn their situation overlays at war game H-hour on the war

game map. The red cell commander apprises the facilitator of the starting point locations of his key forces and their missions. The facilitator will use the event template and matrix provided by the G-2 to address friendly intelligence collection activities (reconnaissance and surveillance).

#### **d. Game Turn Objective**

The objective for each game turn is to answer one or a combination of the following questions:

- Does the friendly forces' planned action achieve all purposes intended?
- What additional actions (and resources) would be necessary to achieve the purpose if the original actions fall short?
- Has the threat force executed any actions that were not anticipated and that would require the friendly force to change their COA or prepare a branch plan?

#### **e. Sequence of Moves**

Although direct contact between forces normally will not occur at the starting point, the red cell has the first move by virtue of positioning its forces and apprising the facilitator of its activities at H-hour. From this point, each game turn proceeds as described in the following paragraphs.

**(1) Friendly Force Action.** Friendly force commanders describe the operations of all forces involved during this event. They describe the force, its mission, and the desired outcome. They annotate the force list to account for all forces employed in the event.

**(2) Threat Reaction.** The red cell commander describes the operations that all of his forces are currently executing. He includes the forces outside the immediate area of operations but within the area of interest that he intends to employ during this event. This allows friendly wargamers to validate the portion of their plan that addresses these additional threat forces. The red cell commander and friendly commanders determine where they would have had contact.

The red cell commander describes the locations and activities of his assets identified as high-value targets. He highlights points during the operation where these assets are important to the threat's COA. If these points affect the friendly COA, friendly wargamers identify the high-value targets as high-payoff targets, thereby making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA. With this information, the operational planning team updates the situation and event templates to reflect tactical areas of interest that support the engagement of those high-payoff targets.

The operational planning team discusses the probable outcome of the contact on both friendly and threat forces. Recording tools are used to annotate the



discussion. If they can agree on the outcome, the game turn proceeds. If they do not agree, the facilitator determines the outcome, and the war game proceeds. If one of the participants disagrees with the facilitator's ruling, and if the matter will bear on the feasibility, suitability, or acceptability of the COA, the point is referred to an arbiter (chief of staff, G-3, G-5) for final resolution.

Each unanticipated event in the red cell commander's reactions may become a potential decision point for the commander when executing the approved plan. Each time the friendly wargamers identify a decision point, the recorder makes appropriate entries in the recording tools, such as the decision support template, COA war game worksheet, and the synchronization matrix. The recorder should capture enough information to allow the staff to anticipate and plan for each decision. At a minimum, the recorder includes these elements—

- **Decision Points.** Estimated time, H + number of hours, and location.
- **Decision Criteria.** What activity, event, or information prompts a decision? This translates into potential CCIRs—information that could trigger a decision to execute a planned action.
- **Friendly Action and/or Response.** What friendly action must be decided? Decisions usually result in engagement of high-payoff targets that may have a decisive impact on one or more of the enemy's critical vulnerabilities.
- **Targeted Areas of Interest.** The planners ensure that the physical distance between the decision point and the targeted areas of interest are computed on the basis of the time-distance requirements involved.
- **Named Areas of Interest that Support the Decision Point.** The recorder must tie each decision point to its associated named areas of interest.

At this point, one of two outcomes will be evident; either the friendly force's planned action was sufficient to achieve its purpose or it was not sufficient. If the action was sufficient and the COA is on track, the players can proceed to the next game turn. If the action was not sufficient to achieve the desired effect, the friendly force considers its counteraction.

**(3) Friendly Counteraction.** The friendly force commander, in discussion with the red cell commander and the facilitator, determines the additional actions and resources necessary to achieve the original purpose. When modifying the COA, it is necessary to revalidate the location and composition of the main and supporting efforts, reserves, and control measures that affect their employment. If resources needed for the counteraction are available and can be reallocated from any intended use in a subsequent game turn, the friendly commander can add the additional forces to the COA.

## **Appendix F**

### **Commander and Staff Estimates**

The following are samples of the formats used during the Marine Corps Planning Process to prepare commander and staff estimates. These formats may be used to assist the commander and planners in recording, tracking, and analyzing important information. Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet situational requirements. Commander and staff estimates will be as formal as the situation requires. The following estimate formats are formal and are consistent with the formats contained in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II Planning Formats and Guidance*.

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**Sample Format of a Commander's Estimate of the Situation**

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

**CLASSIFICATION**

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**COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE (U)****(U) REFERENCES:**

- (a) Maps and charts.
- (b) Other information or documents the commander thinks appropriate.

1. (U) **Mission**. A commander receives a mission from his superior commander or derives his mission from previous instructions and his knowledge of the situation. It may be necessary for the commander to make several estimates if the mission or concept of operations changes.

- a. (U) **Basic Mission**. The basic mission and its purpose, as assigned or derived.
- b. (U) **Previous Decisions**. Decisions resulting from previous estimates, if any.
- c. (U) **Purpose of Estimate**. The specific task within the basic mission that this particular estimate is concerned.

2. (U) **Situation and Course of Action**. The commander lists the factors, assumptions, and previous guidance that will influence his selection of a course of action (COA). He then describes the COAs that he has that could accomplish his mission.

- a. (U) **Considerations Affecting Possible Courses of Action**. The commander considers those factors that may affect the ability of his command to accomplish its mission or the ability of the enemy to act. Factors are grouped into two broad categories: characteristics of the operation and relative combat power. In considering each factor, known facts are stated, logical assumptions are made where facts are not available, and pertinent deductions are drawn from the facts and assumptions. The deductions indicate the influence each factor may have on the enemy's capabilities and on the commander's ability to act. Subparagraphs (1) and (2) provide checklists of factors that might be considered, in whole or in part, in any estimate. The commander considers only those factors that have a bearing on the actual situation.

### Sample Format of a Commander's Estimate of the Situation—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

- (1) (U) Characteristics of the Area of Operations
  - (a) (U) Weather. Temperature, winds, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, and icing conditions, together with their effects on roads, rivers, soil, trafficability, observation, air operations, naval operations, and other essential activities.
  - (b) (U) Terrain. Factors of relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and cultural features. These factors are described in terms of critical terrain features, obstacles, observation, fields of fire, concealment, cover, avenues of approach, and routes of communication.
  - (c) (U) Hydrography. Extent of offshore mineable waters, islands, rocks, shoals, reefs; location and extent of usable landing beaches and beach formations; gradients; depths of water; currents; and tides.
  - (d) (U) Politics. Organization and functioning of the civil government in the area of operations. Emphasize the relationships between political organizations and the military, possible use of the civil population by the enemy and own forces, and the effect of the presence of the civil population on military operations.
  - (e) (U) Economics. Agriculture, commerce, industry, the trades, professions, public works, utilities, transportation, communications, finance, currency, and banking.
  - (f) (U) Sociology. Language, religion, social institutions, attitudes, population distribution, labor conditions, and health and sanitation.
  - (g) (U) Other Pertinent Factors
- (2) (U) Relative Combat Power
  - (a) (U) Composition. Structure of enemy and friendly ground, air, and naval forces, with emphasis on balance or imbalance, unusual organizational features, and identification of units.
  - (b) (U) Strength and Combat Efficiency. Enemy and friendly strengths (including units and numbers of personnel and factors influencing combat leadership). Enemy and friendly will to fight.
  - (c) (U) Dispositions. Disposition and combat readiness of enemy and friendly ground, air, and naval units.

### Sample Format of a Commander's Estimate of the Situation—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

(d) (U) Arms and Armament. The types and quantities of arms and armament available to the enemy and to friendly forces. This applies only to enemy forces actually in the area of operations, and to friendly forces under the control of the commander making the estimate.

(e) (U) Recent and Present Activities. Recent enemy and friendly activity of importance (including supporting activity). Known or suspected enemy knowledge of friendly situation or plans is also addressed here.

(f) (U) Time and Space. Distances over which movements may be necessary, and the time required to make such movements. In amphibious operations, include a listing of the principal enemy and friendly bases with the land, sea, and air distances between each base and the objective and the times required for various types of transport to cover these distances. If the area of operations is located in a large land mass or island group, an additional listing is prepared to show the distances and times from other points of interest to the objectives.

(g) (U) Combat Service Support. Combat service support functions that affect the tactical situation. These include friendly and enemy levels of supply, prisoner of war support, control of civilians, availability of replacements, maintenance, and other combat service support matters.

(h) (U) Personnel Situation. Personnel factors that affect the tactical situation, such as prisoners of war, control of civilians, and replacements.

(i) (U) Reinforcements. Estimated reinforcement capabilities of enemy and friendly forces. Factors that can affect the reinforcement capabilities are considered, such as air and naval superiority, terrain, weather, suitability of the road net, and availability of transportation.

(j) (U) Assistance from Adjacent Forces. Tactical and logistical assistance that adjacent ground, air, and naval forces are capable of rendering to enemy and friendly forces in the area of operations. The character, type, and extent of such assistance are considered. In connection with an amphibious operation, any pre-D-day operations of air, naval, or ground forces in the objective area are included.

(k) (U) Peculiarities and Weaknesses. Significant peculiarities and weaknesses of enemy and friendly forces that may affect the accomplishment of the mission, such as peculiar tactical doctrine, unconventional methods, and idiosyncrasies of individual commanders.

### Sample Format of a Commander's Estimate of the Situation—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

b. (U) Enemy Capabilities. Enemy capabilities are those actions that the enemy is physically capable of and which, if adopted, will favorably or unfavorably affect the accomplishment of the commander's mission. These capabilities are enumerated in this subparagraph for subsequent analysis in connection with the commander's own COAs. When justified by facts and logical assumptions, the relative order of probability of adoption of enemy capabilities is noted. Statements of attack, defense, and reinforcement capabilities address how, when, where, and in what strength. The statement of a withdrawal capability is usually a statement that the enemy can withdraw, usually beyond our objective, at any time.

c. (U) Own Courses of Action. In preparing this subparagraph, the commander visualizes all reasonable and practicable COAs that, if successful, will accomplish his mission. He then eliminates from further consideration those COAs that are obviously inferior to the others. Finally, he lists the COAs that he will analyze, based on enemy capabilities and other factors, in paragraphs 3 and 4.

There may be only one reasonable and practicable COA open to the commander in a simple situation, in a small command, or in a case where the commander's freedom of action has been limited by a detailed mission assigned by his superior. Even in these cases, the decision should not be stated until the COA has been analyzed and the how determined.

3. (U) Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Each COA listed in subparagraph 2c is analyzed to determine its probable outcome when opposed by each of the enemy's capabilities listed in subparagraph 2b. The commander does this by visualizing the results that would occur if each COA were opposed separately by each enemy capability. Enemy capabilities that have little or no effect on the COA are not included in this analysis.

The commander considers the influence of the factors in subparagraph 2a to visualize each COA's possibilities and to develop and refine the how of the decision. At this point in the estimate, the commander determines how he can best exploit the factors to enhance the advantages and reduce the disadvantages of each COA under consideration. This may result in the introduction of new COAs or major changes in the ones already under consideration. The steps that the commander determines to be essential to the success of a COA becomes a part of his concept of operation, if that COA is selected for execution.

From his visualization of the results of each COA, the commander can determine the enemy's ability to oppose that COA, and the degree of success that can be expected from it. The commander then isolates the governing factors of the situation that have the most important bearing on his choice of the most suitable COA. The governing factors are carried forward to paragraph 4 for use in comparing several COAs available to him.

### Sample Format of a Commander's Estimate of the Situation—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

4. (U) Comparison of Own Courses of Action. The commander summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each of his COAs and compares and weighs them against each other. The COA that appears to offer the greatest prospect of success is selected and stated as a conclusion. If several COAs offer equal prospects of success, he chooses the one that most favors future action. During this comparison, certain favorable aspects of two or more COAs may result in formulation of a new COA or combination of COAs that the commander may adopt and state in his decision. In some cases, it will be possible to eliminate all but one of the commander's own COAs by means of deductions made in subparagraph 2a. In such cases, the comparison required by paragraph 4 is omitted.

5. (U) Decision. The COA selected for adoption is formally stated in this paragraph as the decision. The decision is a clear, concise, and logical statement of the commander's intentions. Appropriately amplified, it becomes the commander's concept of operation. The decision and the concept of operation form the basis for the preparation of plans and orders.

A commander's decision always indicates what the command as a whole is to do. It also indicates as much of the who, when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate and practicable under the circumstances. Specifically—

- **What** is a statement of the course of action to be executed to accomplish the mission; e.g., to land and secure, to continue the march, to attack, or to defend.
- **Who** usually refers to the command as a whole, but may refer to a designated subordinate command. If the former, the who may be omitted.
- **When** is a statement of when the course of action is to be initiated; e.g., on D-day at H-hour, or without delay.
- **Where** is a statement of the position or area from which, to which, or over which the COA is to be executed; e.g., over Beaches RED and GREEN, or from carriers and offshore bases. In defense, it is a statement of the positions to be defended.
- **How** is a statement of the scheme of maneuver or major tactical formation to be employed in executing the COA; e.g., with two divisions in the assault, or with maximum-range air strikes and fighter sweeps. Details are usually reserved for the concept of operation.
- **Why** is a statement of the purpose of the operation; e.g., to permit the establishment of air and naval bases in the area, or to neutralize enemy air attacks. It is usually limited to information necessary to ensure intelligent compliance by subordinates. Additional details may be included in the concept of operation.



**Sample Format of a Commander's Estimate of the  
Situation—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
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ANNEXES: (As required)

**Sample Format of an Intelligence Estimate**

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

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Date/time group

Message reference number

**INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NUMBER) (U)****(U) REFERENCES**

- (a) Maps and charts.
- (b) Other appropriate documents.

1. (U) Mission. State the assigned mission and its purpose.
2. (U) Area of Operations. State conditions that exist and indicate the effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission.
  - a. (U) Characteristics of the Area of Operations
    - (1) (U) Military Geography. Topography, hydrography, climate and weather.
    - (2) (U) Transportation
    - (3) (U) Telecommunications
    - (4) (U) Politics
    - (5) (U) Economics
    - (6) (U) Sociology
    - (7) (U) Science and Technology
  - b. (U) Enemy Military Situation. Ground, naval, air, services.
    - (1) (U) Strengths. Committed forces, reinforcements.
    - (2) (U) Composition
    - (3) (U) Location and Disposition
    - (4) (U) Movements and Activities
    - (5) (U) Availability of Reinforcements
    - (6) (U) Logistics
    - (7) (U) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles

### Sample Format of an Intelligence Estimate—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

- (8) (U) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft
- (9) (U) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels
- (10) (U) Technical Characteristics of Equipment
- (11) (U) Electronics Intelligence
- (12) (U) Weapons of Mass Destruction. Nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.
- (13) (U) Air Defense
- (14) (U) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses
- (15) (U) Recent and Present Significant Activities
- c. (U) Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Operations Situation
  - (1) (U) Guerrilla
  - (2) (U) Psychological
  - (3) (U) Subversion
  - (4) (U) Sabotage
- d. (U) Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities
- 3. (U) Enemy Capabilities. List separately each enemy capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission.
- 4. (U) Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2. Attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the enemy. State the effect the enemy adoption of each capability will have on the accomplishment of the mission.
- 5. (U) Conclusions. Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4, and including, when possible:
  - a. (U) Enemy courses of action beginning with the most probable and continuing down the list in order of relative probability.
  - b. (U) Enemy vulnerabilities where applicable.

**Sample Format of an Intelligence Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
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ANNEXES: (As required)

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**Sample Format of a Logistic/Combat Service Support Estimate**

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

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Date/time group

Message reference number

**LOGISTIC/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ESTIMATE (U)**

(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) **Mission**a. (U) **Basic Mission.** State the mission and its purpose as described in the basic plan.b. (U) **Purpose of the Estimate**

(1) (U) Determine if combat service support capabilities are sufficient to support proposed courses of action (COAs).

(2) (U) Determine which COA is most desirable from a logistic and/or combat service support standpoint.

(3) (U) Determine what measures must be taken by the commander to overcome logistic and/or combat service support problems and/or limiting factors in supporting each COA.

2. (U) **Situation and Considerations**a. (U) **Enemy Forces**(1) (U) **Present Disposition of Major Elements.** Reference may be made to the Intelligence Estimate.(2) (U) **Major Capabilities.** Enemy tactical capabilities likely to affect friendly logistic and/or combat service support matters.(3) (U) **Other Capabilities and/or Limitations.** Enemy capabilities and/or limitations likely to affect the logistics and/or combat service support or tactical situation.

### Sample Format of a Logistic/Combat Service Support Estimate—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

b. (U) Own Forces

(1) (U) Present Disposition of Major Combat and Combat Support Elements. May be shown as a situation map or an overlay appended as an annex with reference to the aviation combat element Logistic/Combat Service Support Estimate by including the statement: “See also Aviation Combat Element Logistic/Combat Service Support Estimate.”

(2) (U) Courses of Action. A statement of the COA under consideration.

c. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Those likely to affect the logistic and/or combat service support situation, such as weather, terrain, hydrography, communication routes, and local resources.

d. (U) Current Logistic and/or Combat Service Support Status. A brief description of the current logistic and/or combat service support status, which includes planned or known changes before and during the period covered by the estimate. The following subparagraphs address typical combat service support areas of concern. If possible, state specific quantities.

(1) (U) Combat Service Support Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic combat service support organization or task organization is described using the following format:

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay.

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in paragraphs (2) through (13) below.

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any.

(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Identify strengths of each major subordinate unit.

(b) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be received, and the quality of the replacements.

**Sample Format of a Logistic/Combat Service Support  
Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

- (c) (U) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors affecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards.
- (d) (U) Personal Services Support. Identify the required exchange, postal, recreational, and special services support.
- (e) (U) Military Justice. Court marital and correction facilities.
- (f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.
- (3) (U) Supply. Procurement, storage, distribution, and salvage.
- (4) (U) Maintenance. Management, operations, and workload.
- (5) (U) Transportation. Motor transport, helicopters, amphibious vehicles, and cargo aircraft; motor transport convoy control; and main supply routes.
- (6) (U) Engineer Support. Construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, airfields, helicopter landing sites, bulk fuel sites and pipelines, camps, and utilities (including bath, fumigation, laundry, electrical power, and water points).
- (7) (U) Landing Support. Beach, landing zone, and air delivery support operations.
- (8) (U) Medical/Dental. Preventive medicine, graves registration, and casualty collection, evacuation (including evacuation policy), and hospitalization.
- (9) (U) Military Police. Prisoners of war (number on hand and evacuation procedures), straggler rates and control, and traffic control.
- (10) (U) Civilian Employees. Number, restrictions on use, and organization.
- (11) (U) Civil Affairs Support. Combat service support of the civil affairs effort.
- (12) (U) Automated Data Processing Systems. Management, operation, and support of command automated data processing systems support.
- (13) (U) Miscellaneous. Food services, material handling equipment, and financial management (disbursing, budgeting, and accounting).
- e. (U) Assumptions. A statement of those assumptions made for the preparation of this estimate. An example of the critical assumption is the estimation of the length of time for the entire operation and for each COA (if different).
- f. (U) Special Factors. Items not covered elsewhere, such as state of training of combat service support personnel or task organizations.



### Sample Format of a Logistic/Combat Service Support Estimate—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

3. (U) Analysis. Each COA under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any limiting factors that may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.

a. (U) Course of Action #1

(1) (U) Logistic and/or CSS Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic logistic and/or combat service support organization or task organization is described using the following format.

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay.

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in paragraphs (2) through (13) below.

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any.

(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Of each major subordinate unit.

(b) (U) Casualties. Expected for this course of action.

(c) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be received, and the quality of the replacements.

(d) (U) Morale. Significant factors affecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards.

(e) (U) Personal Services Support. Exchange, postal, and recreation and/or special services support.

(f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.

(3) (U) Supply. Procurement, storage, distribution, and salvage.

(4) (U) Maintenance. Management, operations, and workload.

**Sample Format of a Logistic/Combat Service Support  
Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

- (5) (U) Transportation. Motor transport, helicopters, amphibious vehicles, and cargo aircraft; motor transport convoy control; and main supply routes.
- (6) (U) Engineer Support. Construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, airfields, helicopter landing sites, bulk fuel sites and pipelines, camps, and utilities (including bath, fumigation, laundry, electrical power, and water points).
- (7) (U) Landing Support. Beach, landing zone, and air delivery support operations.
- (8) (U) Medical and/or Dental. Preventive medicine, graves registration, casualty collection, evacuation (including evacuation policy), and hospitalization.
- (9) (U) Military Police. Prisoners of war (number on hand and evacuation procedures), straggler rates and control, and traffic control.
- (10) (U) Civilian Employees. Number, restrictions on use, and organization.
- (11) (U) Civil Affairs Support. Combat service support of the civil affairs effort.
- (12) (U) Automated Data Processing Systems. Management, operation, and support of command automated data processing systems support.
- (13) (U) Miscellaneous. Food services, material handling equipment, and financial management (disbursing, budgeting, and accounting).
- b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
- c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
- 4. (U) Evaluation. From a logistic and/or combat service support standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA under consideration.
- 5. (U) Conclusion
  - a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which course of action, if any, can best be supported from a logistic and/or combat service support viewpoint.
  - b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or all remaining COAs can be supported from a logistic and/or combat service support viewpoint citing the disadvantages that render the other COAs less desirable or unsupportable.

**Sample Format of a Logistic/Combat Service Support  
Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

- c. (U) Logistic and/or Combat Service Support Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.
- d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve logistic and/or combat service support problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
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ANNEXES: (As required)

### Sample Format of a Communications and Information Systems Estimate

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

#### CLASSIFICATION

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Date/time group

Message reference number

#### COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS ESTIMATE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) Mission. This subparagraph states the basic mission of the command. Specified, implied, and essential tasks should be listed in the appropriate subparagraph.

2. (U) Situation and Considerations

a. (U) Intelligence Situation. Information known or obtained from the G-2/S-2. Where appropriate, reference may be made to the Intelligence Estimate or other intelligence documents.

(1) (U) Characteristics of the Area. Those likely to affect communications and information systems, such as weather, terrain, transportation networks, communications routes.

(2) (U) Enemy Strengths and Disposition of Major Units

(a) (U) Tactical Units

(b) (U) Signals Intelligence and/or Electronic Warfare. Jamming, wire-tapping, imitative deception, etc.

b. (U) Tactical Situation. Information obtained from the commander's planning guidance and from the G-3/S-3.

(1) (U) Present Disposition of Major Units. Show tactical units and communications and control elements. May be shown as a situation map or an overlay appended as an annex.

(2) (U) Courses of Action. A statement of the courses of action (COAs) under consideration.

(3) (U) Projected Operations. If known, the projected operations that will affect the communications and information systems (CIS) situation. Consider rates of advance, command post locations and displacement, uncovering of major communications routes, etc.

### Sample Format of a Communications and Information Systems Estimate—Continued

#### CLASSIFICATION

- c. (U) Personnel Situation. Information known or obtained from the G-1/S-1 regarding personnel matters affecting the CIS system. Where appropriate, reference may be made to the personnel estimate or other personnel documents. Consider strengths, replacements, command post organization and operation, etc.
- d. (U) Logistic Situation. Information known or obtained from the G-4/S-4 about logistic matters affecting the command and control (C2) system. Where appropriate, reference may be made to the Logistics Estimate or other logistic documents. Consider availability of equipment, condition of equipment, availability of repair parts and consumable items, etc.
- e. (U) Assumptions. Any assumptions required as a basis for initiating planning or for the preparation of the estimate.
- f. (U) Command and Control System Situation
  - (1) (U) General. Information regarding current communication installations, the status of the overall communications system, and the location and mission of communication and control agencies. Reference may be made to the communications standing operating procedures and operations instruction or to Annex K (Combat Information System) of the basic operation order of plan.
  - (2) (U) Special. Items not covered elsewhere that affect the C2 system situation. These may include availability and assignment of radio frequencies, assignment of call signs, availability of shipboard communications equipment for troop use, arrangements for communications guard, anticipated traffic volumes, cryptographic matters, etc.
- 3. (U) Analysis. Each COA under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any limiting factors that may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.
  - a. (U) Course of Action #1
    - (1) (U) Support Requirements
      - (a) (U) Terrain and Distance Factors. A discussion of terrain and distance factors that may affect the location of command posts, installations, and the use of communications means.

### Sample Format of a Communications and Information Systems Estimate—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

(b) (U) Installations. A discussion of communications requirements for each communications and control agency and other units. These requirements may be expressed as need lines or may be detailed to include types of circuits and terminal service or other forms of communications required by these activities.

(2) (U) Support Capability. A discussion of the capability to employ all available means of communications to satisfy the foregoing support requirements.

(a) (U) Radio and Wire. Discussed together with the capability to provide various types of circuits and attendant terminal service; e.g., telephone, facsimile, data.

(b) (U) Messenger

(c) (U) Visual and Sound

b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

4. (U) Evaluation. From a C2 system standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA under consideration.

5. (U) Conclusion

a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be supported from a CIS viewpoint.

b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or all remaining COAs can be supported from a CIS viewpoint citing the disadvantages that render the other COAs less desirable or unsupportable.

c. (U) C2 System Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.

d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve those CIS problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

**Sample Format of a Communications and Information Systems  
Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
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ANNEXES: (As required)

**Sample Format of an Aviation Estimate**

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

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Date/time group

Message reference number

**AVIATION ESTIMATE (U)**

(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) **Mission**a. (U) **Basic Mission**. This subparagraph contains a brief restatement of the basic mission of the command as a whole as previously announced by the commander.b. (U) **Previous Decisions**. State any previous decisions by the commander, such as when aviation is to be phased into advance bases and airfields.2. (U) **Situation and Considerations**a. (U) **Enemy**. Refer to the Intelligence Estimate.b. (U) **Friendly**. State the friendly aviation forces available for the operation and their disposition. State probable tactical developments influencing aviation.c. (U) **Courses of Action**. The proposed courses of action (COAs) are stated in full.d. (U) **Characteristics of the Area**. Refer to the Intelligence Estimate.e. (U) **Assumptions**. Any assumptions required as a basis for initiating planning or for the preparation of the estimate.3. (U) **Analysis**. Each COA under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any limiting factors that may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.a. (U) **Course of Action #1**(1) (U) **Employment**. State the employment of aviation units.(2) (U) **Enemy Situation and Capabilities**. State the enemy capabilities with respect to air support of the force.



### Sample Format of an Aviation Estimate—Continued

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#### CLASSIFICATION

- (3) (U) Requirement for Aviation Support. A general statement as to which COA will require the most aviation support.
- (4) (U) Topography. A general statement of potential sites and landing zones for possible use in the operation.
- (5) (U) Weather. A general statement of the impact of weather on aviation support of the operation.
- (6) (U) Observation and Surveillance. A general statement regarding observation and surveillance as they concern aviation support of the operation.
- (7) (U) Communications. A general statement regarding communications requirements for aviation support of the operation.
- (8) (U) Logistic Support. A general statement regarding logistic support for aviation support of the operation.
- b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
- c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
- 4. (U) Evaluation. From an aviation standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA under consideration.
- 5. (U) Conclusion
  - a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be supported from an aviation viewpoint.
  - b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or all remaining COAs can be supported from an aviation viewpoint citing the disadvantages that render these other courses of action less desirable or unsupportable.
  - c. (U) Aviation Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.
  - d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve those aviation problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

**Sample Format of an Aviation Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ANNEXES: (As required)

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**Sample Format of an Artillery Estimate**

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

**CLASSIFICATION**

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OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date/time group

Message reference number

**ARTILLERY ESTIMATE (U)**

(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) Mission. This paragraph contains a brief restatement of the basic mission of the command as a whole as previously announced by the commander.a. (U) Artillery Concept of Employment. State the artillery concept to support the mission.b. (U) Previous Decisions. State any previous decisions by the commander, such as the employment of specific types of munitions.2. (U) Situation and Considerationsa. (U) Enemy. Refer to the Intelligence Estimate.b. (U) Friendly. State the friendly artillery forces available for the operation or refer to the planning document or other document setting forth available forces.c. (U) Courses of Action. The proposed courses of action (COAs) are stated in full.d. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Refer to the Intelligence Estimate.e. (U) Assumptions. Any assumptions required as a basis for initiating planning or for preparing the estimate.3. (U) Analysis. Each COA under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any limiting factors that may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.a. (U) Course of Action #1(1) (U) Artillery Coverage. State the ability of artillery to cover the zone of action of the supported unit.

### Sample Format of an Artillery Estimate—Continued

#### CLASSIFICATION

- (2) (U) Positioning and Displacing Requirements. State the positioning and displacement requirements of the supporting artillery units.
  - (3) (U) Ability to Mass Fires. A general statement of the ability of artillery to mass fires.
  - (4) (U) Weapons Ammunition. A general statement on the availability, type, and amount of ammunition for use in the operation.
  - (5) (U) Terrain and Weather. A general statement of the effects of terrain and weather on observations, ammunition effectiveness, etc.
  - (6) (U) Security. A general statement about security requirements for artillery units.
  - (7) (U) Communications. A general statement regarding communications requirements for artillery support of the operation.
  - (8) (U) Logistic Support. A general statement about logistic and support requirements for the artillery units, and the ability of the artillery units to provide combat service support.
- b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
  - c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
4. (U) Evaluation. From an artillery standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA under consideration.
  5. (U) Conclusion
    - a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be supported from an artillery viewpoint.
    - b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or all remaining COAs can be supported from an artillery viewpoint citing the disadvantages that renders the other COAs less desirable or unsupportable.
    - c. (U) Artillery Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.
    - d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve those artillery problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

**Sample Format of an Artillery Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ANNEXES: (As required)

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**Sample Format of a Naval Surface Fire Support Estimate**

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

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Date/time group

Message reference number

**NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT ESTIMATE (U)**

(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) Mission. This paragraph contains a brief restatement of the basic mission of the command as a whole as previously announced by the commander.

a. (U) Naval Surface Fire Support Concept of Employment. State the naval surface fire support concept to support the mission.

b. (U) Previous Decisions. State any previous decisions by the naval or MAGTF commander, such as the employment of specific types of munitions.

2. (U) Situation and Considerations

a. (U) Enemy. Refer to the Intelligence Estimate.

b. (U) Friendly. State the friendly naval surface fire support means (number and types of ships) available for the operation and their disposition. (At this stage of planning, this may be only an estimate.) Include information on the state of training of shore fire control parties and the ships that will be supporting the operation, if known. State probable tactical developments influencing naval surface fire support.

c. (U) Courses of Action. The proposed courses of action are stated in full.

d. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Refer to the Intelligence Estimate.

e. (U) Assumptions. Any assumptions required as a basis for initiating planning or for the preparation of the estimate.

3. (U) Analysis. Each course of action (COA) under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any limiting factors which may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.



### Sample Format of a Naval Surface Fire Support Estimate—Continued

#### CLASSIFICATION

- a. (U) Course of Action #1
  - (1) (U) Hydrography. A general statement of the impact of hydrography on naval surface fire support of the operation.
  - (2) (U) Terrain. A general statement of the impact of terrain on naval surface fire support of the operation.
  - (3) (U) Weather. A general statement of the impact of weather on naval surface fire support of the operation.
  - (4) (U) Means Required. A general statement about the number and types of ships required to support the COA.
  - (5) (U) Electronic Warfare. A general statement regarding observation and surveillance as they concern naval surface fire support of the operation.
  - (6) (U) Communications. A general statement regarding communications requirements for naval surface fire support of the operation.
  - (7) (U) Logistic Support. A general statement regarding support requirements (logistics, transportation, etc.)
- b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
- c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.
4. (U) Evaluation. From a naval surface fire support standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action under consideration.
5. (U) Conclusion.
  - a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be supported from a naval surface fire support viewpoint.
  - b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or all remaining COAs can be supported from a naval surface fire support viewpoint citing the disadvantages that render these other COAs less desirable or unsupportable.
  - c. (U) Naval Gunfire Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.
  - d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve those naval surface fire support problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

**Sample Format of a Naval Surface Fire Support  
Estimate—Continued**

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CLASSIFICATION

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ANNEXES: (As required)



## **Appendix G**

# **Basic Operation Plans, Operation Orders, Annexes, and Appendices**

This appendix provides instructions and formats that govern the development of a basic operation plan and order, referred to as OPLAN and OPORD, respectively. The formats are based on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II Planning Formats and Guidance*, and should be used by all staffs, subordinate commands, and support agencies.

This appendix applies to commanders of Marine Corps forces at all levels. It contains three sections. Section I provides general administrative guidance for writing a basic operation order or plan. An operation plan/order foldout is included at the end of this appendix for easy reference. Section II provides sample formats of a plan summary, operation plan or order, appendices, tabs, etc. Sample formats are descriptive in nature and identify the information that needs to be placed in the appropriate paragraph. The formats provided in section II will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, modifications are required to meet command requirements. Only those annexes, appendices, and tabs applicable to the level of command are required within the operation order. Section III provides examples of a plan summary, operation plan or order, and some appendices, tabs, etc. Examples are notional and provide a written representation of an actual operation order, appendices, tabs, etc.

## Section I. General Administrative Guidance

The arrangement of information in a basic operation order or plan will conform to the formats shown in this appendix. Paragraph and subparagraph headings indicated in the format will always appear in each plan. In operation orders, if information or instructions are not required in a particular paragraph that paragraph is noted as “not applicable” in order to show that consideration has been given to that part of the order. Further subdivisions, if required, should conform to the basic system of paragraph titles and numbering discussed below. The sequencing for naming is as follows: annex, appendix, tab, exhibit.

The basic operation order or plan and each attachment will contain, on its last page, a list of any included documents. The basic operation order or plan should refer to each annex. Information provided in the basic operation order or plan is not normally repeated in the attachments.

### 1. Paragraphing, Titling, and Numbering

Paragraph titles are upper and lower case and underlined (e.g., Situation). All subparagraphs and subtitles are upper and lower case and underlined (e.g., Concept of Operations), except forces, commands, or agencies. Forces, commands, and agencies are capitalized and underlined only in titles (e.g., SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF).

When a paragraph is subdivided, it must have at least two subdivisions. When paragraphs are subdivided, they will be numbered and lettered as follows:

1.
  - a.
    - (1)
      - 1
        - a
          - (1)
            - (a)

Subsequent lines of text for each paragraph may be flush left or equally indented at the option of the chief of staff or executive officer as long as consistency is maintained.

### Flush Left

- a. (U) Situation. Text text text text text text text text text text text text text text text.

### Equally indented.

- a. (U) Situation. Text text text text text text text text text text text text text text text.

## **2. Classification Markings**

Mark front and back covers with the overall classification of the plan. Mark the first page of plan elements (e.g., plan summary, basic plan, and each annex, appendix, tab, and exhibit) with the overall classification of the element. Unclassified plan elements are marked as such. Mark each interior page of the classified plan element with the highest classification and sensitive classified information code word of the material contained on the page. If the page does not contain classified material, mark it as unclassified. Center classification markings between the left and right margins at both the top and bottom of the page. The classification marking is written in all caps (e.g., UNCLASSIFIED).

All paragraphs will have a security classification level. Use parenthetical symbols (TS), (S), (C), and (U) to indicate the security classification level of titles, paragraphs, and subparagraphs.

## **3. Page Numbering**

Page numbers are located at the bottom of the page and centered. For example, page C-1-A-3 denotes page 3 of Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C. There is a single space between the page number and the classification marking.

## **4. Formatting Instructions**

Formatting instructions are contained on pages G-4 through G-9.

**Line 1.** Classification.

**Line 2. Changes from Oral Orders.** Used when oral orders regarding this operation were previously issued. Enclosed in parentheses. Example: “(No change from oral orders except paragraphs 3b and 3f.)” Omitted in plans and in orders when no oral orders were issued.

**Lines 3-7. Heading Data**

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ copies

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PLACE OF ISSUE

Date/time group

Message reference number

The *first line* of the heading is the copy number assigned by the issuing headquarters. A copy number is given to each copy. It is not shown on attached annexes. A log will be maintained of specific copies issued to addressees. The *second line* is the official designation of the command. It is always capitalized. Use a code name if required for security. The *third line* is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designator, or geographic location (including coordinates). The place of issue is always capitalized. The *fourth line* is the date or date/time group the plan or order is signed, issued, and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in coordinating instructions. The *fifth line* is the message reference number. It is assigned by the originator and contains letters, numbers, or a combination of the two. The message reference number has no connection with the message center numbering system. Annexes issued separately are assigned different message reference numbers. It allows acknowledgement in the clear.

**Line 8. Title.** Orders are numbered consecutively for a calendar year. Two or more orders issued on the same day are given consecutive numbers. A joint operation plan or order is so designated. The code name if any, is shown.

**Line 9.** Title

**Lines 10-13. References.** Documents (maps, charts, photo maps, standing operating procedures, etc.) necessary for understanding must be available to recipients. This entry is always included (use “References: None” when applicable). Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.


**Line 14. Time Zone.** If the time zone is the same for the place of issue and execution, and will be the same throughout execution, this entry may be omitted. If the time zone is different in the area of execution (frequently occurs in amphibious or air-transported operations), state when the indicated time zone becomes effective.

**Line 15. Task Organization.** Task organization may be shown in the following ways:

1. As an unnumbered entry before paragraph 1, Situation. Used when entire command of issuing headquarters is organized into task organizations for a particular operation, and task organizations are too complicated to be shown using other methods.
2. If there is no change to previous task organization, show as “No change.”
3. Under the proper subparagraph of paragraph 3. This is the simplest, and therefore preferred, method in continuing ground combat situation. Show as “No change except paragraph 3b . . .”
4. As an annex when lengthy; e.g., division or higher. Used in amphibious operations (permits early dissemination and assists concurrent planning). Also used where planning precedes operation by a considerable period of time.

Shown in 1 and 4 above, the organization of the issuing headquarters, including service and administrative groupings that will perform normal functions, is the first entry. Following that, each task groupment that is to receive a tactical mission is shown in the sequence in which the missions are assigned in paragraph 3.

1	CLASSIFICATION
2	(No change from oral orders)
3	Copy no. __ of __ copies
4	I MEF
5	GREENTOWN, BLUELAND
6	17 Apr 2001
7	ABD-1
8	<u>OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)</u>
9	BASIC ORDER (U)
10	(U) REFERENCES:
11	(a) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheet G-2 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND),
12	edition 12, 1:1,000,000
13	(b) USCINCPAC Planning Directive, 27 March 2001
14	(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu
15	(U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A





**Lines 17-18. General.** For plans only, describe the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan.

**Line 19. Battlespace.** Battlespace includes the higher commander's area of operation and the command's areas of interest, influence, and operations described by physical area and forces of concern.

**Line 20. Enemy Forces.** Enemy forces include information vital to the entire command or information likely to affect accomplishment of mission. It may refer to the intelligence annex, operation overlay (if enemy information is shown), intelligence summaries, etc. It contains disposition, intent, objectives, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and courses of action.

**Line 21. Friendly Forces.** Friendly forces include information on own forces having a bearing on the operation (higher, adjacent, and supporting). Artillery is listed as the first supporting unit and then others are listed alphabetically. It may reference an annex or the operation overlay.

**Lines 23-26. Paragraph 2.** Paragraph 2 is a clear concise statement of the tasks and purpose of the operation. State the who, what, when, where, why, and as much of the how as necessary. There are no subparagraphs. The mission is always stated here even if shown on an operation overlay or map.

**Line 27. Paragraph 3.** Paragraph 3 addresses execution.

**Line 28. Commander's Intent.** Commander's intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear and concise. The purpose of providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgement and initiative—to depart from the plan when the unforeseen occurs—in a way that is consistent with the higher commander's aims.

**Line 29. Concept of Operations.** The concept of operations is a summary statement of how the operation will be accomplished. It amplifies paragraph 2. It may be shown graphically or published as an appendix to annex C. Specific unit designations are not used.

**Lines 30-36. Tasks.** This subparagraph identifies tasks to subordinate elements. Each task assigned to a unit will include the purpose of the task (e.g., in order to . . .). Each unit, organic or attached, or tactical grouping that is executing a tactical task is assigned a separate, numbered subparagraph. All tactical tasks must be listed in the body of the basic order. List tasks for major subordinate elements as follows:

- Offensive order: Ground combat units (infantry first followed by artillery and combat support units numerically or alphabetically), aviation combat units or elements (aircraft units, combat support, combat service support), combat service support units or elements.
- Defensive order: Units or elements closest to the enemy are listed first. Ground and aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order followed by other units alphabetically.

Each tactical task assignment may show the assets (attached or in support) available to the unit or element for the operation first, then tasks are enumerated. Priority must be stated if missions are multiple and priority of accomplishment is desired. If all instructions to a unit are shown on the operations overlay, list the unit after proper subparagraph number and reference the operation overlay appendix.

**Line 37. Reserve.** The reserve is tasked separately from the remainder of the units. It is usually designated the main effort when committed. If there is no reserve designated, then so state.


**Line 38. Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) identify information the commander has deemed critical to maintaining his situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decisionmaking.

**Line 39. Coordinating Instructions.** This paragraph is the final subparagraph in paragraph 3. It contains instructions common to two or more units, coordinating details and control measures applicable to the command as a whole, and time or conditions when plan is to be executed. It refers to annexes or references for coordinating details when appropriate. Communications instructions are shown in paragraph 5 only.

**Line 40. Paragraph 4.** Paragraph 4 contains logistic and personnel information and instructions for the operation. It usually refers to appropriate annexes.

**Line 41.** Page number.

**Line 42.** Classification.

- 
- 16 1. (U) Situation
- 17 a. (U) General. With the failure of deterrence, Blueland forces crossed the Or-
- 18 angeland border and have been successful in their initial battles.
- 19 b. (U) Battlespace. See Appendix 18 to Annex C.
- 20 c. (U) Enemy Forces. See Annex B and current INTSUMs.
- 21 d. (U) Friendly Forces
- 22 e. (U) Attachments and Detachments
- 23 2. (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations
- 24 to defeat enemy forces in zone in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared to
- 25 continue offensive operations into Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland
- 26 offensive military capabilities.
- 27 3. (U) Execution
- 28 a. (U) Commander's Intent
- 29 b. (U) Concept of Operations. This operation will be conducted in three phases.
- 30 c. (U) Tasks
- 31 (1) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> MARINE DIVISION (Rein)
- 32 (2) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> MARINE DIVISION (-) (Rein)
- 33 (3) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
- 34 (4) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (-) (Rein)
- 35 (5) (U) SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF-B
- 36 (6) (U) REAR AREA COMMANDER
- 37 d. (U) MEF Reserve
- 38 e. (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements
- 39 f. (U) Coordinating Instructions
- 40 4. (U) Administration and Logistics

41 Page number

42 CLASSIFICATION

**Line 1.** Classification.

**Lines 2-6. Paragraph 5.** Paragraph 5 contains instructions that establish and maintain command and signal procedures.

Command Relationships. Used in a large operation, or when relationships are unusual. Otherwise omitted.

Command Posts and Headquarters. May reference operations overlay for locations.

Succession to Command. Designates the succession to command for the operation.

Signal. Usually references annex K and other communication publications such as standing operating procedures or communications-electronics operating instructions. Includes instructions or restrictions about communications-electronic such as radio restrictions or pyrotechnic signals.

Use additional subparagraphs to show location and time of opening communications centers, recognition and identification instructions, code words and names, and liaison.

**Line 7. Acknowledgement Instructions.** Acknowledgement instructions are included in every order and in separately issued portions. It ensures that recipients receive and understand the order.

**Lines 8-10. Signature and Authentication.** The basic operation order or plan and each annex are signed or authenticated by the commanding officer. Full signature blocks are used. Appropriate officers may be given authority to sign portions of the order. The commander is the only person authorized to sign (authorize) any portion of the order unless by direction authority has been granted to another individual.

Appendixes, tabs, exhibits, and maps do not require signature or authentication except when distributed separately from the basic operation order or plan.

1. Original signed by commander:


Name  
Rank and Service  
Title

2. Original signed by chief of staff/executive officer:

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL NAME

Name  
Rank and Service  
Title

1	CLASSIFICATION
2	5. (U) <u>Command and Signal</u>
3	a. (U) <u>Command Relationships</u> . See Annex J (Command Relationships).
4	b. (U) <u>Command Posts and Headquarters</u>
5	c. (U) <u>Succession to Command</u>
6	d. (U) <u>Signal</u> . See Annex K (Combat Information System).
7	ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
8	
9	GERALD C. THOMAS
10	Lieutenant General, USMC
	Commanding



**Lines 11-31. Annexes.** Annexes form a portion of the completed plan or order. They pertain to a particular concept, subject, or coordination aspect that is too voluminous, of insufficient general interest, or in an irregular form (overlays, graphs, or tables) for the body of the plan or order. They contribute to the brevity and clarity of the basic operation plan or order. Sequence and lettering must not be changed. Annexes may be omitted when not required. Annexes are amplified where necessary by appendices to annexes, tabs to appendices, and exhibits to tabs.

The annex formats and designations shown in this appendix are mandatory unless otherwise indicated. The annex title is upper and lower case. Within the body of the basic operation order or plan, the annex title is also enclosed in parentheses. When any of these annexes are not required, the annex is noted as “not used” or “not applicable” in the table of contents. Elements that will be developed later may be noted as “to be issued.” The annex format is preferred for other attachments (appendices, tabs, etc.), but it may be altered when information or instructions must be included for which no provision is made in the standard format.

Additional annexes may be added when necessary to permit distribution separate from the basic operation order or plan or when information must be included where no provision is made in standard annexes. When included, letter additional annexes consecutively, beginning with the letter “R, V, W and Y.” Do not use the letters “I” and “O” as an annex designation.

Usually annexes A through D, J, and K will be provided as part of the basic operation order or plan. Develop additional annexes and their associated appendices in an abbreviated format for those areas significantly affecting mission accomplishment.

**Line 32-36. Authentication.** Authenticated by G/S-3 when commander’s or executive officer’s signature is on the original only; G/S-3 authentication appears on all other copies.

**Line 37.** Page number.

**Line 38.** Classification.

## 11 ANNEXES:

- 12 A – Task Organization
- 13 B – Intelligence
- 14 C – Operations
- 15 D – Logistics
- 16 E – Personnel
- 17 F – Public Affairs
- 18 G – Civil Affairs
- 19 H – Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
- 20 J – Command Relationships
- 21 K – Combat Information Systems
- 22 L – Environmental Considerations
- 23 M – Geospatial Information and Services
- 24 N – Space Operations
- 25 P – Host Nation Support
- 26 Q – Medical Services
- 27 S – Special Technical Operations
- 28 U – Information Management
- 29 W – Aviation Operations
- 30 X – Execution Checklist
- 31 Z – Distribution

## 32 OFFICIAL:

33 s/

34 M.B. TWINING

35 Colonel, USMC

36 AC/S G-3

37 Page number

38 CLASSIFICATION

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## Section II. Sample Formats

Section II provides examples of a plan summary, basic operation plan or order, and some appendices and tabs. Sample formats are descriptive in nature and identify the information that needs to be placed in the appropriate paragraph. The following table of contents lists standing formats. Bold text indicates that the format is provided in this section and its page location. Bold, italic text indicates that a particular format is not used in Marine Corps plans or orders, but it is included in the list to conform to CJCSM 3122.03.

	<b>Page</b>
<b>Plan Summary</b>	<b>G-19</b>
<b>Basic Order or Plan</b>	<b>G-23</b>
<b>Annex A. Task Organization</b>	<b>G-29</b>
Appendix 1. Time-Phased Force and Deployment List	
Appendix 2. Shortfall Identification	
Appendix 3. Force Module Identification	
<b>Appendix 4. <i>Deterrent Options</i></b>	
Appendix 5. Reserve Component Requirements Summary	
<b>Annex B. Intelligence</b>	<b>G-33</b>
Appendix 1. Priority Intelligence Requirements	
Appendix 2. Signals Intelligence	
Tab A. Communications Intelligence Collection Requirements	
Tab B. Operational Electronic Intelligence Collection Requirements	
Appendix 3. Counterintelligence	
Tab A. Counterintelligence Target List	
Tab B. Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Report	
<b>Tab C. <i>Designation of Theater CI Executive Agency</i></b>	
Appendix 4. Targeting Intelligence	
Tab A. Target List (Conventional)	
Appendix 5. Human-Resource Intelligence	
<b>Tab A. <i>HUMINT Operations Cell Operations</i></b>	
Tab B. EPW/Civilian Detainees	
Appendix 6. Intelligence Support to Command and Control Warfare	
Appendix 7. Imagery Intelligence	
Appendix 8. Measurement and Signature Intelligence	
Appendix 9. Captured Enemy Equipment	
Tab A. Specific Prioritized Intelligence Collection Requirements	
Tab B. Equipment Releasable for Operational Purposes	
Appendix 10. National Intelligence Support Team	
Appendix 11. Intelligence Estimate	
Appendix 12. Intelligence Products	



	<b>Page</b>
Appendix 13. Intelligence Collection Plan	
Appendix 14. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan	
Appendix 15. Geographic Intelligence	
Appendix 16. Intelligence Operations	
Appendix 17. Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape	
<b>Annex C. Operations</b>	<b>G-39</b>
<i>Appendix 1. Nuclear Operations</i>	
Appendix 2. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations	
<b>Appendix 3. Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare</b>	<b>G-43</b>
<b>Tab A. Military Deception</b>	<b>G-47</b>
<b>Exhibit 2. Intelligence</b>	<b>G-53</b>
<b>Attachment A. Priority Intelligence Requirements</b>	<b>G-57</b>
Tab B. Electronic Warfare	
Tab C. Operations Security	
Tab D. Psychological Operations	
Tab E. Physical Destruction	
Appendix 4. Special Operations	
Appendix 5. Evasion and Recovery Operations	
Appendix 6. Rules of Engagement	
Appendix 7. Reconnaissance	
Appendix 8. Air Base Operability	
Appendix 9. Combat Camera	
Tab A. COMCAM Customer Support Requirements	
Appendix 10. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	
Appendix 11. Escape and Evasion Operations	
Appendix 12. Counterattack	
Appendix 13. Explosive Ordnance Disposal	
Appendix 14. Amphibious Operations	
Tab A. Advance Force Operations	
Tab B. Embarkation Plan	
Tab C. Landing Plan	
Tab D. Rehearsal Plan	
Tab E. CSS Control Agencies Plan	
Appendix 15. Force Protection	
Tab A. Combating Terrorism	
Tab B. Physical Security	
Tab C. Base Defense	
Appendix 16. Rear Area Operations	

	<b>Page</b>
Appendix 17. Aviation Operations (omitted when Annex W is used)	
<b>Appendix 18. Operations Overlay</b>	<b>G-59</b>
Appendix 19. Fire Support	
Tab A. Air Fire Plan	
Tab B. Artillery Fire Plan	
Tab C. Naval Surface Fire Support Plan	
Tab D. Chemical Fire Plan	
Tab E. Targeting	
Tab F. Fire Support Coordination Plan	
Appendix 20. Countermechanized Plan	
Appendix 21. Breaching Plan	
Appendix 22. Obstacle Plan	
<b>Annex D. Logistics/Combat Service Support</b>	<b>G-61</b>
Appendix 1. Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply	
Appendix 2. Mortuary Affairs	
Appendix 3. Sustainability Analysis	
Appendix 4. Mobility and Transportation	
Tab A. En Route Support Requirements	
Tab B. Reception and Onward Movement	
Appendix 5. Civil Engineering Support Plan	
Appendix 6. Nonnuclear Ammunition	
Tab A. Munitions Matrix	
Appendix 7. Supply	
Appendix 8. Services	
Appendix 9. Health Services	
Appendix 10. Aviation Logistic Support (normally in the aviation combat element plan or order)	
Appendix 11. External Support	
Appendix 12. Maintenance	
Appendix 13. General Engineering	
<b>Annex E. Personnel</b>	
Appendix 1. Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons	
Appendix 2. Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained U.S. Personnel	
Appendix 3. Finance and Disbursing	
Appendix 4. Legal	
Appendix 5. Military Postal Service	
Tab A. Aerial Mail Terminals	
Tab B. Military Post Offices	
Appendix 6. Chaplain Activities	
Tab A. Inter-Service Chaplain Support	
Tab B. Host Nation Religious Support	
Tab C. Commander-Staff Chaplain Relationships	
<b>Annex F. Public Affairs</b>	

	Page
<i>Appendix 1. Personnel Requirements for Joint Information Bureaus and Sub-Joint Information Bureaus</i>	
<i>Appendix 2. Equipment and Support Requirements for Joint Information Bureaus and Sub-Joint Information Bureaus</i>	
Appendix 3. General Ground Rules for the Media	
Appendix 4. DOD National Media Pool	
Annex G. Civil Affairs	
Annex H. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations	
<b>Annex J. Command Relationships</b>	<b>G-69</b>
<b>Appendix 1. Command Relationships Diagram</b>	<b>G-73</b>
Annex K. Combat Information Systems	
Appendix 1. Information Systems Security	
<i>Appendix 2. Defensive Information Warfare</i>	
Appendix 3. Communications Planning	
Appendix 4. Satellite Communications Planning	
Tab A. UHF SATCOM Network List	
Tab B. SHF SATCOM Network List	
Tab C. EHF SATCOM Network List	
Annex L. Environmental Considerations	
Annex M. Geospatial Information and Services	
Appendix 1. Geospatial Information and Services List	
Annex N. Space Operations	
Annex P. Host Nation Support	
Appendix 1. List of Host Nation Support Agreements	
Annex Q. Medical Services	
Appendix 1. Joint Medical Regulating System	
Appendix 2. Joint Blood Program	
Appendix 3. Hospitalization	
Appendix 4. Patient Evacuation	
Appendix 5. Returns to Duty	
Appendix 6. Medical Logistics (Class 8A) System	
Appendix 7. Preventive Medicine	
Appendix 8. Medical Communications and Information Systems	
Appendix 9. Host-Nation Medical Support	
Appendix 10. Medical Sustainability Assessment	
Appendix 11. Medical Intelligence Support to Military Operations	
<i>Appendix 12. Veterinary Medicine</i>	
Appendix 13. Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identifications	
Annex S. Special Technical Operations	
Annex U. Information Management	
Annex W. Aviation Operations	
Appendix 1. Air Defense/Anti-air Warfare	
Appendix 2. Offensive Air Support	
Appendix 3. Assault Support	
Appendix 4. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan	
Appendix 5. Supplementary Air Operations	
Appendix 6. Aircraft Armament	

	Page
Appendix 7. Air Control	
Appendix 8. Air Communications	
Appendix 9. Air Movement Plan/Flight Ferry	
Appendix 10. Aircraft Schedules	
Appendix 11. Air Tasking	
<b>Annex X. Execution Checklist</b>	<b>G-75</b>
Annex Z. Distribution	

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### Sample Format of a Plan Summary

A plan summary allows commanders, staffs, and other individuals and agencies to quickly review the envisioned activities of a command. They are particularly useful in creating situational awareness in newly assigned personnel and in higher, supporting, and adjacent commands. A plan summary is normally only prepared at higher levels of command, such as the component (Marine Corps Forces) and Marine expeditionary force, in support of a unified command plan.

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OPLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)

PLAN SUMMARY (U)

1. (U) Purpose

- a. (U) Describe the purpose to be achieved by executing the plan and the desired endstate. If this is a supporting plan, indicate what plan it supports.
- b. (U) Include a statement similar to the following: "This summary provides military decisionmakers with the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific contingency. The information contained herein must be updated before use in adopting courses of action in a particular situation."

2. (U) Conditions for Implementation/Execution

- a. (U) Politico-Military Situation. Summarize the politico-military situation in which execution of the plan should be considered.
- b. (U) Legal Considerations. Summarize any legal considerations that may affect plan implementation (status of forces, rules of engagement, international agreements, Law of Armed Conflict, etc.).

3. (U) Operations to be Conducted

- a. (U) Forces Assigned. Summarize the major forces (assigned, attached, or supporting) and augmentation required from other sources.
- b. (U) Deployment. Summarize the movements of forces necessary to place combat forces in the operational area. When applicable, include operational security measures to be carried out before full execution of the plan.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- c. (U) Employment. State the general nature of combat operations to be conducted, including amphibious operations, information operations, command and control warfare, etc., when applicable. These operations may be discussed in the phases of the operations. A mission statement, commander's intent, and concept of operations may be written for each phase. This discussion may contain a concise statement of the operation's endstate and endstate for each phase. It may include how unit dispositions at the end of each phase facilitate transition to the next phase. A discussion of the commander's estimate of the enemy's intent may also be included.
  - d. (U) Supporting Plans. List any requirements for supporting plans to be prepared by subordinate and supporting commands or agencies.
  - e. (U) Collateral Plans. List operation plans (OPLANs) that could be implemented before, during, or after the subject plan.
4. (U) Key Assumptions. List assumptions deemed essential to the success of the plan, including the degree of mobilization and mobility (sea and airlift) assumed.
  5. (U) Operational Constraints. List major factors that may impede accomplishment of the mission.
  6. (U) Time to Commence Effective Operations. If appropriate, include a table showing the required time-phased buildup of combat forces in the objective area. Indicate which forces must be available in the operational area before effective operations can begin. Show the elapsed time, following an order to implement the plan, when each significant level of combat force required by the plan could begin effective operations in the objective area. Note that the lowest level of force reported will be the smallest force increment that could initiate effective operations. List successively higher force levels up to the maximum level called for in the basic plan. List any assumptions applied in preparing the table that are not specified in the plan. In determining the time to commence effective operations, consider forces to be deployed or employed to be at normal conditions of readiness; that is, no preparations except those required for force protection. Also consider the following additional factors, as appropriate.
    - a. (U) Time required to carry out command and control warfare as specified in the relevant plans.
    - b. (U) Time for preparation and transmission of necessary orders.
    - c. (U) Reaction time, including all necessary preparations for movement and, if necessary, staging.
    - d. (U) Availability and capability of strategic transportation resources and facilities.
    - e. (U) Time en route to the operation area, using available lift and considering possible restrictions on the use of deployment routes.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- f. (U) Possible enemy action against forces in transit.
  - g. (U) Reception and throughput capabilities of overseas terminals, where appropriate.
  - h. (U) Time for marry up of forces and equipment deployed by separate movement modes, including marry up with prepositioned equipment, when appropriate.
  - i. (U) Availability and capability of transport systems within the area of operations, where required.
  - j. (U) Time required in the operation area for final preparation of forces, including movement to the objective area before employment.
7. (U) Command Relationships. Summarize the command arrangements to be employed on execution.
  8. (U) Logistic Appraisal. Provide an estimate of logistic feasibility for the plan.
  9. (U) Personnel Appraisal. Provide an estimate of personnel feasibility for this plan.
  10. (U) Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Provide a consolidated listing and impact assessment of force, movement, and support shortfalls and limiting factors that impact significantly on the conduct of operations. Identify shortfalls in joint and Service doctrine, interoperability, and training. Specify the tasks that cannot be accomplished in view of the shortfalls. Include specific documentation of each significant shortfall and limiting factor and the efforts to resolve it in the appropriate annex to the plan. Address additional forces, including combat support and combat service support, recommended by the supported commander to reduce risk but not allocated in the Plan Summary. Do not include such forces in Appendix 2 to Annex A (Task Organization) of the plan.

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## Sample Format of a Basic Order or Plan

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OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)  
TITLE (U)

REFERENCES: List any maps, charts, standing operating procedures or other documents essential to understanding the order or plan.

(U) TIME ZONE: Enter if area of operations is different than place of issue.

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. (May be omitted.) Describe the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. If applicable, state U.S. policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties and outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve U.S. policy goals and conduct effective U.S. military operations to attain U.S. military missions. Specific details are found in Annex B (Intelligence).

b. (U) Battlespace

(1) (U) Joint Operations Area/Higher Commander's Area of Operations. Describe the higher commander's area of operations. A map may also be included as an attachment.

(2) (U) Area of Interest. Describe the commander's area of interest covered by the basic operation order or plan. This description should address all air, ground, and sea areas that directly affect the operation. A map may also be included as an attachment.

(3) (U) Area of Operations. Describe the specific area covered by the operation. A map may also be included as an attachment.

c. (U) Enemy Forces. Identify the opposing forces expected on execution (location, disposition) and appraise their general capabilities (defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, delay). Limit this information to what is vital for the entire command or what is likely to affect mission accomplishment. See Annex B (Intelligence) for details. Address known or potential terrorist threats. When applicable, identify the enemy's operational and tactical center(s) of gravity.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

d. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) This paragraph provides information on nonorganic forces having a bearing on the operation. The information is presented in the following order:

(a) (U) Higher. State the mission statement and commander's intent of the higher commander.

(b) (U) Adjacent. State the mission statement or relevant tasks of adjacent commanders.

(c) (U) Supporting. State the command relationship with the supporting commanders (operational control, tactical control, tactical missions, general support, direct support, etc.), or relevant tasks of supporting commanders.

(2) (U) Identify applicable friendly centers of gravity that require support and protection for successful mission accomplishment.

(3) (U) If applicable, list the tasks of government and nongovernmental departments, agencies, and organizations associated with the operation (e.g., Department of State, Doctors Without Borders, Red Cross).

e. (U) Attachments and Detachments. List nonorganic units attached to or units detached from the issuing headquarters. If no units are attached or detached, state "None."

f. (U) Assumptions. (Omitted in orders.) List all assumptions on which the plan is based.

g. (U) Legal Considerations. List those significant legal considerations on which the plan is based (e.g., status of forces agreements, Law of Land Warfare).

2. (U) Mission. A concise statement of the tasks and purpose of the operation. State the who, what, when, where, why, and as much of the how as necessary to ensure command, control, and coordination. The who, what, when, and where are derived from the essential tasks. The why is derived from the purpose of the operation.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Commander's Intent. Commander's intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear, concise, and easily understood. It may also include how the commander envisions achieving a decision as well as the endstate or conditions, that when satisfied, accomplish the purpose.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. A description of how the operation will be conducted to accomplish the mission. It includes a narrative of the actions to be taken and a generic organization for combat (main and supporting effort, reserve, etc.). The concept of operations is the course of action approved by the commander during planning. It may be summarized here if a detailed concept of operations is

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

contained in Annex C (Operations). The concept of operations provides a basis for supporting concepts such as—

- (1) (U) Concept of Maneuver. See Annex C (Operations) and Annex W (Aviation Operations) (if applicable) for detailed description.
- (2) (U) Concept of Fires. See Annex C (Operations) and Annex W (Aviation Operations) (if applicable) for detailed description.
- (3) (U) Concept of Support. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) for detailed description.
- (4) (U) Other Concepts as Required. See appropriate annex for detailed description.

c. (U) Tasks

- (1) (U) List the tasks assigned to each subordinate commander in separate, numbered subparagraphs. Tasks are listed in order of priority or accomplishment. Tasks may be listed by phase. Designation of main effort or supporting effort is noted in tasking.
- (2) (U) Some actions are so critical that the commander may assign them as missions. These should be assigned as task and purpose (in order to . . .). Other actions are assigned simply as tasks because the purpose is understood. The commander assigns subordinate commanders tasks he deems necessary to fulfill his concept of operations.
- (3) (U) Unit or element task assignments are listed in the following order:
  - (a) (U) Offensive operations: ground combat units or elements (infantry first followed by artillery and combat support units numerically or alphabetically), aviation combat units or elements (aircraft units, combat support, combat service support), combat service support units or elements.
  - (b) (U) Defensive operations: units or elements closest to the enemy are listed first, ground and aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order, other units are then listed alphabetically.
- (4) (U) Each task assignment may begin with the assets (attached or in support) available to the unit or element.

d. (U) Reserve. List the tasks assigned to the reserve force. List all units or elements to be in reserve when the order is in effect. If the unit or element will be the reserve in the future, its current assigned tasks will be listed in paragraph 3c. If a unit or element in reserve is given a future mission or ordered to prepare plans for possible reserve missions, it is included in this subparagraph.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- e. (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements. Commander' critical information requirements identify information on friendly and enemy activities and the battlespace that the commander deems as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decisionmaking. They help the commander tailor the command and control organization and are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, flow, and use of information throughout the force.
  - f. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. They should establish the conditions for execution and provide information about the timing of execution and deployments.
4. (U) Administration and Logistics
- a. (U) Personnel. In preparing this paragraph, refer to Annex E (Personnel). Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements.
  - b. (U) Logistics. In preparing a basic operation order or plan, refer to Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support). Logistic phases are normally concurrent with operational phases. This subparagraph should address sustainment priorities and resources, base development and other civil engineering requirements, host nation support, and inter-Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. Identify strategic and theater ports for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance, and procedures for all options. Identify logistic and transportation assumptions and include them with other plan assumptions in subparagraph 1.f (Assumptions). Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings.
  - c. (U) Public Affairs. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex F (Public Affairs).
  - d. (U) Civil Affairs. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex G (Civil Affairs).
  - e. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
  - f. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

g. (U) Medical Services. In preparing the basic operation order or plan, refer to Annex Q (Medical Services). Identify planning requirements and subordinate tasks for hospitalization and evacuation. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Refer to wartime host nation support agreements or provisions to support in Annex P (Host Nation Support).

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command Relationships. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex J (Command Relationships). Indicate any changes to major commands and the time of the expected shift. Identify all existing memorandums of understanding and those that require development.

b. (U) Command Posts and Headquarters. The command post is the headquarters echelon (forward, main, rear) where the commander is located. List the designations and locations of the issuing commander's headquarters echelons and appropriate senior, adjacent, and subordinate commanders' headquarters echelons. When headquarters are to be displaced, indicate the location and time of opening of the new headquarters and closing of the old headquarters.

c. (U) Succession to Command. Designate the succession of command for the operation.

d. (U) Signal. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex K (Combat Information Systems). Provide instructions or restrictions about communications-electronics (radio restrictions), pyrotechnic signals, lasers, etc. Include a general statement concerning the scope of communications and information systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any communications and information systems or procedures requiring special emphasis.

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## ANNEXES:

- A – Task Organization
- B – Intelligence
- C – Operations
- D – Logistics/Combat Service Support
- E – Personnel
- F – Public Affairs
- G – Civil Affairs
- H – Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

J – Command Relationships  
K – Combat Information Systems  
L – Environmental Considerations  
M – Geospatial Information and Services  
N – Space Operations  
P – Host Nation Support  
Q – Medical Services  
S – Special Technical Operations  
U – Information Management  
W – Aviation Operations  
X – Execution Checklist  
Z – Distribution

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Title

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

### Sample Format of Annex A (Task Organization)

Organization for combat is a commander's visualization of how he will group organic and attached combat, combat support, and combat service support elements for employment with other supporting forces to support his scheme of maneuver, and he will group the command relationships to most effectively control his organization. It is determined after consideration of the unit's mission, missions assigned in subordinate units, terrain and enemy strength in each subordinate unit area, and the amount of combat power, including maneuver and fire support units, available to the unit commander. The organization for combat and the scheme of maneuver are developed concurrently. The purpose of Annex A (Task Organization) is to identify the command's organization for combat.

The command's task organization graphically provides the command relationships and the assignment of means for the accomplishment of the mission. The G-3/S-3 prepares the task organization after considering the recommendations of appropriate unit commanders. Its purpose is to establish groupings into which the command will be divided to accomplish its mission and to establish command relationships. These groupings may be shown, if simple, in paragraph 3 of the basic operation order or plan. If these groupings are complex, the task organization will be shown in a separate annex or just before paragraph 1 of the basic operation order or plan.

At a minimum, the task organization lists all major commands or task groupings directly subordinate to the commander issuing the basic operation order or plan. In addition, all organizations that directly support the operation are listed and designated as "support," although they are not under the command of the supported commander. Organizations to be established specifically to implement the basic operation order or plan should appear in the task organization. The level of detail in the task organization should only be that necessary to convey a clear understanding of the significant forces committed to the operation.

Underlining indicates that the unit or task grouping has an assigned mission. Successive subordinate echelons of units or task groupings are shown by indentations beneath the underlined unit or task grouping. Units or task groupings with no assigned mission, and not included in another unit or task grouping, are indented and listed immediately after the issuing headquarters.

Subordinate units or task groupings that are assigned missions are underlined and listed in appropriate sequence. This sequence depends on two factors: the type of units or task groupings being assigned missions and the type of mission (offensive or defensive). This sequence should parallel the sequence of mission assignments in paragraph 3 of the basic operation order or plan. The sequence of listing major subordinate units or task groupings is—

- Offensive Operations. Ground combat units or elements (infantry units are listed first followed by artillery and combat support units numerically or



alphabetically), aviation combat units or elements (aircraft units, combat support, combat service support), combat service support units or elements.

- **Defensive Operations.** Units or elements closest to the enemy are listed first. Ground and aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order followed by other units alphabetically.

When the commander, Marine Corps Forces prepares a supporting plan, he must include Appendix 1 (Time-Phased Force and Deployment List).

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#### ANNEX A TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE-WORD) (U)

##### TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List maps, charts, standing operating procedures or other documents essential to understanding the order or plan.

#### ORGANIZATION

##### Issuing Headquarters

The first entry is the organization of the issuing headquarters.

##### **Subordinate Unit or Task Grouping**

Units or task groupings with no assigned mission, and which are not assigned to any other grouping, are indented under issuing headquarters.

##### **Subordinate Unit or Task Grouping**

Subordinate units or task groupings with assigned missions, and which are not assigned to any other grouping, are indented under issuing headquarters.

##### **Subordinate Unit or Task Grouping**

Organic and attached units or task groupings are indented under the subordinate unit or task grouping.

Units or task groupings that are not attached but will provide support are listed under the supported unit or task grouping. The type of support (i.e., general support, direct support) is shown in parentheses.

#### COMMANDER

Indicate names of commanders of the parent organization and principal units

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

**Reserve Unit or Task Grouping**

Units or task groupings in reserve are listed last. If a unit or task grouping will be in reserve in the future it is listed under Reserve, as well as in its normal sequence.

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## APPENDIXES:

- 1 – Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
- 2 – Shortfall Identification
- 3 – Force Module Identification (Normally at the component or MAGTF level.)
- 4 – Deterrent Options (Not used in Marine Corps plans or orders. Included to conform with CJCSM 3122.03.)
- 5 – Reserve Component Requirements Summary

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Page number

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### Sample Format of Annex B (Intelligence)

The purpose of Annex B (Intelligence) is to provide detailed information and/or intelligence on the enemy and the battlespace and to provide guidance on intelligence and counterintelligence functions.

The G-2/S-2 prepares the intelligence annex, based on the previously completed intelligence estimate. This annex provides both encyclopedic data and current information on the enemy, including order of battle, location, biographical information on enemy commanders, capabilities, and intentions. One of the most important aspects covered in the enemy's intentions is the identification and discussion of his most likely and most dangerous course of action.

The battlespace also includes information such as climate, topography, geography, terrain analysis, physical infrastructure (roads, power grids, information grids), cultural considerations that affect the operation, political structure, and leadership. Much of this information may have been previously provided in intelligence estimates and in intelligence reports and summaries provided by national sources or higher headquarters. This information may be referenced in the intelligence annex to reduce the size of the basic operation order or plan.

The intelligence annex normally provides intelligence preparation of the battlespace products to help further planning and execution. They include such products as the situation template, modified combined obstacle overlay. These products are normally found in Appendix 11 (Intelligence Estimate) or in Appendix 12 (Intelligence Products).

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ANNEX B TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE-WORD) (U)  
INTELLIGENCE (U)

## (U) REFERENCES:

- (a) Maps and charts required for an understanding of this annex. Reference Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
- (b) Documents providing intelligence required for planning. Including related annexes such as Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
- (c) Appropriate publications on Marine Corps and joint intelligence doctrine.
- (d) Appropriate standing operating procedures and other documents providing guidance on intelligence operations.
- (e) The originator of the annex should ensure that the units receiving or executing the plan or order have the cited references.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Summarize the conditions of the battlespace as they may influence the operation. Describe as appropriate the physical, economic, political, medical, social, religious, and psychological aspects and conditions of the people and infrastructure in the battlespace. Do not repeat information included in the general situation paragraph of the basic operation order or plan or detailed information contained in the appendices. Include sufficient analysis of the battlespace to permit development of appropriate supporting plans. Include complete information or reference documents and reports containing required intelligence.

b. (U) Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic, and Weather

- (1) (U) Summarize the hydrographic data and amphibious considerations needed to support amphibious and logistic over-the-shore operations. Refer to Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations) and Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
- (2) (U) Address topographic aspects, including trafficability, key terrain, obstacles, cover, concealment, and avenues of approach. Reference Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
- (3) (U) Include, as appropriate, climate and weather aspects of the battlespace. Coordinate with the staff weather officer or oceanographer and refer to reference Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- c. (U) Estimate of Enemy Capabilities. Summarize the enemy's situation, capabilities, and possible courses of action (COAs). Provide the enemy order of battle, estimates of the enemy strengths and weaknesses, and, at a minimum, the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs. When summarizing the enemy situation, refer to the general situation paragraph of the basic operation order or plan or refer to documents containing the required intelligence. Outline the enemy's capability to collect, communicate to intelligence centers, process, and disseminate intelligence. Include specific intelligence cutoff dates and, when possible, identify finished intelligence products supporting these findings.
2. (U) Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations
- a. (U) Mission. State the intelligence mission based on the command's mission statement in the basic operation order or plan.
- b. (U) Concept of Intelligence Operations. Outline the purpose of intelligence operations and summarize the means and agencies used in planning, directing, collecting, processing, exploiting, producing, disseminating, and evaluating the necessary intelligence. When available and appropriate, integrate the resources of other Services and allied nations.
3. (U) Intelligence Activities. Identify intelligence resources and the intelligence planning, direction, collection, processing, production, dissemination, and evaluating efforts required to support the basic operation order or plan. Identify the required intelligence by proceeding from the PIRs, through intelligence operations and capabilities or resources planning, to tasking of intelligence elements, including the following specific areas:
- a. (U) Planning and Direction. Provide guidance for determining intelligence requirements (including those of subordinate commanders), preparing a collection plan, issuing orders and requests to information collection agencies, and monitoring the performance of collection agencies. Specify all exceptions to standard procedures.
- (1) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. List PIRs. If Annex B (Intelligence) is not published, list the PIRs and other requirements for intelligence in the coordinating instructions of the basic operation order or plan. When the PIRs and other requirements for intelligence are lengthy and detailed, place them in Appendix 1 (Priority Intelligence Requirements) of this annex.
- (2) (U) New Requirements. Provide specific guidance for new intelligence requirements during peace, crisis, and war, both before and during execution.
- b. (U) Processing and Exploitation. Provide appropriate guidance for converting information into usable form, including required provisions for document translation; imagery, signals, and technical sensor processing and interpretation; and other pertinent processing activity.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- c. (U) Production. Provide guidance on analyzing and reporting collected intelligence information by all collection sources used in support of the plan. Include guidance on multidiscipline reports that fuse information from multiple sources. Reference appropriate regulations, directives, and standing operating procedures specifying U.S.-only and multinational reporting procedures. Identify the production effort, including any intelligence and counterintelligence products, required to support the plan.
- d. (U) Dissemination. Provide necessary guidance for conveying intelligence to appropriate units. Establish procedures and criteria to satisfy expanded requirements for vertical and lateral dissemination of finished intelligence and SPOT reports. Establish alternate means to ensure that the required intelligence will be provided to combat units as well as headquarters during crises and combat operations. Cover any of the following in this subparagraph:
  - (1) (U) Intelligence reports required from units (periods covered, distribution, and time of distribution).
  - (2) (U) Formats for intelligence reports (appendixes, if required).
  - (3) (U) Distribution of intelligence studies.
  - (4) (U) Requirements for releasability to allied nations.
  - (5) (U) Requirements for secondary imagery dissemination.
- 4. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks
  - a. (U) Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Use separate, numbered subparagraphs to list detailed instructions for each unit performing intelligence functions, including the originating headquarters, separate intelligence support units, and allied or coalition forces.
  - b. (U) Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. Provide separate, numbered subparagraphs applicable to each unit not organic or attached and from which intelligence support is requested, including allied or coalition forces.
  - c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Provide any instructions necessary for coordinating collection and processing and exploitation, producing, and disseminating activities. Include—
    - (1) (U) Periodic or special conferences for intelligence officers.
    - (2) (U) Intelligence liaison, when indicated, with adjacent commanders, foreign government agencies or military forces, and host countries.
- 5. (U) Communications and Information Systems. Summarize the U.S. and non-U.S. communications and information systems and procedures to be used to carry out the intelligence function or reference the appropriate paragraphs of Annex K (Combat

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

Information System). Include comments on interoperability of these communications and information systems.

6. (U) Miscellaneous Instructions. List under separate subparagraphs required items or information not covered above or in standing operating procedures, or items that require action different from that provided in standing operating procedures. Include, as appropriate, items such as operations security, deception, disclosure of intelligence, releasability to coalition forces and public affairs, use of specialized intelligence personnel and personnel augmentation requirements, psychological operations, and exploitation of captured foreign materiel and documents.

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Name  
Rank and Service  
Title

## APPENDIXES:

- 1 – Priority Intelligence Requirements
- 2 – Signals Intelligence
- 3 – Counterintelligence
- 4 – Targeting Intelligence
- 5 – Human-Resource Intelligence
- 6 – Intelligence Support to Command and Control Warfare
- 7 – Imagery Intelligence
- 8 – Measurement and Signature Intelligence
- 9 – Captured Enemy Equipment
- 10 – National Intelligence Support Team
- 11 – Intelligence Estimate
- 12 – Intelligence Products
- 13 – Intelligence Collection Plan
- 14 – Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
- 15 – Geographic Intelligence
- 16 – Intelligence Operations
- 17 – Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

## OFFICIAL:

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Name

Rank and Service

Title

Page number

CLASSIFICATION



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### Sample Format of Annex C (Operations)

Annex C (Operations) provides substantive guidance for planning the conduct of operations. Plans for the employment of non-U.S. forces should include proposed command arrangements and, as necessary, consideration of requirements for furnishing essential combat and logistic support.

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#### ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE-WORD) (U) OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List other plans, standing operating procedures, and doctrinal guidance to be followed in the conduct of operations.

##### 1. (U) General

- a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides guidance for the conduct of operations.
- b. (U) Mission. State the mission as described in the basic operation order or plan.
- c. (U) Area of Operations. Define the area of operations encompassed by the basic order or plan to include land, sea, and air space. The annex should also define any areas where reconnaissance and surveillance operations are authorized.
- d. (U) Situation. Refer to the basic operation order or plan.

2. (U) Concept of Operations. Normally, the concept of operations is included in the basic operation order or plan; however, when lengthy and detailed, place it here. The format and content are similar to the concept of operations in the basic operation order or plan. Refer to Appendix 18 (Operations Overlay).

3. (U) Conduct of Operations. Provide any guidance required for the conduct of specific operations.

- a. (U) Aviation Operations. Refer to Annex W (Aviation Operations) or Appendix 17 (Aviation Operations) if applicable.
- b. (U) Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations. Provide the concept of maritime prepositioning force operations in the plan.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- c. (U) Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare. Refer to Appendix 3 (Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare).
- d. (U) Counterinsurgency. If applicable, refer to pertinent country internal defense plans.
- e. (U) Nuclear Operations. Not applicable.
- f. (U) NBC Defense Operations. If applicable, refer to Appendix 2 (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations).
- g. (U) Special Operations. If applicable, refer to Appendix 4 (Special Operations).
- h. (U) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel. Refer to Appendix 5 (Evasion and Recovery Operations).
- i. (U) Rules of Engagement. Refer to Appendix 6 (Rules of Engagement).
- j. (U) Reconnaissance. Refer to Appendix 7 (Reconnaissance).
- k. (U) Air Base Operability. If applicable, refer to Appendix 8 (Air Base Operability).
- l. (U) Combat Camera. If applicable, refer to Appendix 9 (Combat Camera).
- m. (U) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. If applicable, refer to Appendix 10 (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations).
- n. (U) Escape and Evasion Operations. Refer to Appendix 11 (Escape and Evasion Operations).
- o. (U) Counterattack. If applicable, refer to Appendix 12 (Counterattack).
- p. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Refer to Appendix 13 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal).
- q. (U) Amphibious Operations. If applicable, refer to Appendix 14 (Amphibious Operations).
- r. (U) Force Protection. Refer to Appendix 15 (Force Protection).
- s. (U) Rear Area Operations. Refer to Appendix 16 (Rear Area Operations).
- t. (U) Fire Support. Refer to Appendix 19 (Fire Support).
- u. (U) Countermechanized Plan. If applicable, refer to Appendix 20 (Countermechanized Plan).

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- v. (U) Breaching Plan. If applicable, refer to Appendix 21 (Breaching Plan).
  - w. (U) Obstacle Plan. If applicable, refer to Appendix 22 (Obstacle Plan).
4. (U) Operational Constraints. List any constraints to the conduct of combat operations not enumerated elsewhere; e.g., impact of deployment or employment of forces and materiel on airfield ramp space (including possible host nation support). Estimate the impact of these operational constraints and indicate how the concept of operations and tasks to subordinate commanders would be modified if these constraints were removed. State the effect of incremental removal of constraints.
5. (U) Command and Signal
- a. (U) Command. Refer to the basic operation order or plan.
  - b. (U) Signal. Refer to the basic operation order or plan or to Annex K (Combat Information Systems).

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## APPENDIXES:

- 1 – Nuclear Operations (Not used in Marine Corps plans or orders. Included to conform with CJCSM 3122.03.)
- 2 – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations
- 3 – Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare
- 4 – Special Operations
- 5 – Evasion and Recovery Operations
- 6 – Rules of Engagement
- 7 – Reconnaissance
- 8 – Air Base Operability
- 9 – Combat Camera
- 10 – Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- 11 – Escape and Evasion Operations
- 12 – Counterattack
- 13 – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- 14 – Amphibious Operations
- 15 – Force Protection
- 16 – Rear Area Operations
- 17 – Aviation Operations
- 18 – Operations Overlay

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

- 19 – Fire Support
- 20 – Countermechanized Plan
- 21 – Breaching Plan
- 22 – Obstacle Plan

OFFICIAL:

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Name

Rank and Service

Title

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

### **Sample Format of Appendix 3 (Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare) to Annex C**

Appendix 3 (Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare) should help integrate the use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical destruction, and other capabilities. Information operations (IO) and command and control warfare (C2W) can be waged in wartime both inside and outside the traditional military battlefield. It can also be waged in military operations other than war. Command and control warfare is an application of IO that specifically attacks and protects the command and control target set. The same disciplines and other capabilities employed to achieve IO objectives can be used inside the command and control target set and should be included in this appendix.

Information operations and command and control warfare planning requires extensive coordination between commands to avoid conflicts and to ensure mutual support. Additionally, IO/C2W planning must be coordinated with other operational capabilities, such as air operations and intelligence. Intelligence support is critical to successful IO/C2W. Information operations and command and control warfare planning requires information such as—

- Identification of critical information systems or processes.
- Identification of key decisionmakers and the decisionmaking process used to arrive at and disseminate a decision.
- Detailed descriptions of specific communications systems and information networks.
- Location of information and infrastructure nodes.
- Determination of the potential values of possible targets.
- Enemy threat to friendly information systems and processes.

The basic IO/C2W appendix should be a short document that clearly states the primary mission of each of the elements of IO/C2W. It should provide enough guidance to ensure that the elements are all working toward the accomplishment of the IO/C2W mission. Provide detailed execution instructions for each of the elements in the tabs to the IO/C2W appendix.

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS/COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) Any relevant plans or orders.
- (b) Required maps and charts.
- (c) Other relevant documents.

1. (U) Situation. Summarize the overall operational situation as it relates to IO/C2W.

- a. (U) Enemy. Summarize the enemy situation, force disposition, intelligence capabilities, and possible courses of action. If applicable, reference intelligence estimates or summaries. Address any specific information that bears directly on the planned IO/C2W operation.
- b. (U) Friendly. Summarize the situation of those friendly forces that may directly affect attainment of IO/C2W objectives. Address any critical limitations and any other planned IO/C2W operations.
- c. (U) Assumptions. List any assumptions made of friendly, enemy, or third-party capabilities, limitations, or courses of action. Describe the conditions that the commander believes will exist at the time the plan becomes an order. Omit in orders.

2. (U) Mission. State the IO/C2W mission in a clear, concise statement that answers the questions who, what, when, where, and why.

3. (U) Execution

- a. (U) Concept of Operations. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of IO/C2W from its beginning to its termination. Describe how the IO/C2W operation will support the command's operational mission. Summarize the concepts for supervision and termination of IO/C2W operations.

(1) (U) The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation.

(2) (U) When an operation involves various phases (e.g., peace or pre-hostilities, crisis, war, post-hostilities), the concept of operations should be prepared in subparagraphs describing the role of IO/C2W in each phase.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

(3) (U) The concepts for offensive and defensive IO/C2W may be addressed in separate subparagraphs.

b. (U) IO/C2W Tasks. Identify the major tasks for each of the five elements of IO/C2W. Note: The five elements of IO/C2W listed below are covered in tabs A through E.

(1) (U) Military deception.

(2) (U) Electronic warfare.

(3) (U) Operations security.

(4) (U) Psychological operations.

(5) (U) Physical destruction.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Address any mutual support issues relating to the elements of IO/C2W.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Address any IO/C2W administrative or logistic requirements.

5. (U) Command and Control. List any IO/C2W command and control instructions. State the command structure for IO/C2W operations. Identify any special IO/C2W communications and reporting requirements.

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## TABS:

- A – Military Deception
- B – Electronic Warfare
- C – Operations Security
- D – Psychological Operations
- E – Physical Destruction

## OFFICIAL:

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Name  
Rank and Service  
Title

Page number

CLASSIFICATION



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**Sample Format for Tab A (Military Deception) to Appendix 3 to Annex C**

Tab A (Military Deception) provides background and guidance for the preparation of the military deception tab of joint plans and orders. Chapter IV of Joint Pub 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*, establishes the process for military deception planning conducted in support of joint operations. Chapter V describes how the deception planning process relates to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System's (JOPES's) deliberate, crisis, and campaign planning processes. As a general policy, any material related to planned, ongoing, or completed military deception is accorded controlled access. Production guidelines are as follows:

- "Need-to-know," for the purposes of military deception, means limiting access to those individuals who are involved in planning, approving, or executing deceptions and they must have knowledge of the deception to perform their duties.
- The deception tab will normally be developed, published, distributed, and maintained separately from the rest of the operation plan.
- Standard administrative procedures are not used to distribute or staff the deception tab. Only positive control means, such as hand-to-hand delivery or STU-III fax, will be used to distribute deception-related material.
- Specific deception events such as unit movements may be included in the basic operation plan and its annexes if not identified as deception related.
- Deception-related documents will have cover sheets with the appropriate classification markings. They will be annotated in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01B, *Joint Military Deception*.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01B establishes the review criteria for deception concepts and plans. Deception planners must follow the specific administrative and security procedures established by that document to ensure that their plans are approved by the appropriate authority.

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN  
(Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)  
 MILITARY DECEPTION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are essential to the effective execution of military deception.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. See basic operation order or plan.

b. (U) Enemy

(1) (U) General Capabilities. Identify enemy military capabilities directly relating to the planned deception.

(2) (U) Deception Targets. Describe the political, military, or economic decisionmakers (or organizations) targeted by the deception plan. Include personalities, strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence decisions.

(3) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions. Provide information on known biases and predispositions of political, military, or economic decisionmakers (or organizations).

(4) (U) Probable Enemy Course of Action. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).

c. (U) Friendly. Summarize the friendly situation, critical limitation, and concept of operations.

d. (U) Assumptions. List all assumptions on which the deception is based.

2. (U) Mission

a. (U) Operational Mission. Extract from paragraph 2 of the basic operation order or plan.

b. (U) Deception Mission

(1) (U) Deception Goal. Describe the desired effect or the endstate a commander wishes to achieve (commander's concept for the deception operation). For example, "To cause the enemy to weight his defense in the eastern corridor, to mislead the enemy as to the time and place of forcible entry operations, to cause dissension within the enemy coalition such that . . . ."

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- (2) (U) Deception Objective(s). List the desired action or inaction by the adversary at the critical time and location.
- (3) (U) Desired Enemy Perceptions. Describe what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective.
- (4) (U) Deception Story. Outline a scenario of friendly actions or capabilities that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception. This could be an alternate course of action to the one chosen for the basic operation order or plan itself.

3. (U) Executiona. (U) Concept of the Operation

- (1) (U) General. Describe the framework for the operation. Include a brief description of the phases of the deception operation.
- (2) (U) Other Information Operations (IO)/Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Elements. Discuss the use of other IO/C2W elements in support of the deception operation. Discuss all other IO/C2W element plans and operations pertinent to the deception. Include coordination required to deconflict if necessary.
- (3) (U) Feedback and Monitoring. Provide a general statement of the type of feedback expected, if any, and how it will be collected (monitored). Include a brief statement on the impact of the absence of feedback on the plan.
- (4) (U) Means. Describe available deception assets.
- (5) (U) Tasks. Specify execution and feedback taskings to organizations participating in the execution and monitoring of the deception operation.
- (6) (U) Risks. Give a brief risk analysis in the categories given below. Rate risk as low, moderate, or high in each category. Refer to Exhibit 3 (Operations) to this tab for detailed risk analyses.

(a) (U) Deception is successful. Include likely adversary response. Describe impact on friendly forces from adversary intelligence sharing.

(b) (U) Deception fails. Describe the impact if the target ignores the deception or fails in some way to take the actions intended.

(c) (U) Deception is compromised to allies or adversaries.

- b. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Identify any tasks or instructions pertaining to two or more of the units listed in the preceding subparagraphs. List the tentative D-day and H-hour, if applicable, and any other information required to ensure coordinated action between two or more elements of the command.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. State instructions regarding administrative and logistic support procedures to be used in developing, coordinating, and implementing the deception plan. Do not include those administrative, logistic, and medical actions or ploys that are an actual part of the deception operation. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 4 (Administration and Logistics).

a. (U) Administration

(1) (U) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities.

(2) (U) Specific. Detail any special administrative measures needed to execute the deception operation.

b. (U) Logistics. Detail logistic requirements for the execution of the deception operation, such as the transportation of special material, or provision of printing equipment and materials. Do not include executions conducted by logistic elements as part of the portrayal of observables. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 4 (Administration and Logistics).

c. (U) Costs. As applicable.

5. (U) Communications and Information Systems

a. (U) Command Relationships. Use Exhibit 5 (Command Relationships) to illustrate command relationships by phase if required.

(1) (U) Approval. State approval authority for execution and termination.

(2) (U) Authority. Designate supported and supporting commanders, supporting agencies as applicable, and any caveats to Exhibit 1 (Task Organization) or Exhibit 5 (Command Relationships).

(3) (U) Oversight. Detail oversight responsibilities particularly for executions by nonorganic units or organizations outside the chain of command.

(4) (U) Coordination. Identify coordination responsibilities and requirements related to deception executions and execution feedback. Address in-theater and out-of-theater requirements.

b. (U) Communications. Detail communications means and procedures to be used by control personnel and participants in the deception operation. Include all reporting requirements.

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6. (U) Security

- a. (U) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities.
- b. (U) Specific. State access restrictions, handling instructions, and who has authority to grant access to the deception appendix or plan. Describe use of cover stories if applicable, codewords, nicknames, and procedures for planning and execution documents. If required, place access rosters and other detailed security considerations in a separate document.

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## EXHIBITS:

- 1 – Task Organization
- 2 – Intelligence
- 3 – Operations
- 4 – Administration and Logistics
- 5 – Command Relationships
- 6 – Execution Schedule
- 7 – Distribution

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Page number

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## Sample Format of Exhibit 2 (Intelligence) to Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex C

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EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER  
OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)  
INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are essential to the execution of the deception.

Note: Information and intelligence provided here must be focused and specific to the deception. Do not repeat information found in Annex B (Intelligence).

1. (U) Mission. Provide a concise statement of the deception mission. Identify the command executing the deception, the deception target, the deception objective(s), and the duration of the operation.

2. (U) Situation

a. (U) Enemy

(1) (U) Target Description. Describe the political, military, or economic decisionmakers (or organizations) targeted by the deception plan. Include personalities, strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence decisions.

(2) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions

(3) (U) Adversary Intelligence Organizations. Identify the targeted country's intelligence organizations, their missions, and their methods and capabilities for covert and clandestine operations. Include collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Specifically note those organizations most likely to provide intelligence to the targeted decisionmaker and those tasked with exposing deception.

(4) (U) Adversary Counterintelligence Organizations. Describe missions, capabilities, and operations.

(5) (U) Adversary Intelligence Sharing with Other Countries. Identify other intelligence organizations available to the targeted country, the nature of intelligence exchange, and the potential for using that relationship for the deception.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION



## CLASSIFICATION

(6) (U) Other Sources and Related Matters. Identify scientific, technical, diplomatic, or academic contacts that might act as information conduits.

(7) (U) Deception and Denial Activities. Provide an analysis of the targeted country's use of deception and denial in support of its political and military goals. Identify the target's deception and denial methods and current deception and denial activities.

(8) (U) Target Reaction. Provide an estimate of the target's reaction if the deception is successful. Also provide likely target reactions if the deception is not successful. Identify whether the adversary would use deception in response. This subparagraph provides in-depth information to document the risk assessments presented in Tab C-3-A (Military Deception) and Exhibit C-3-A-3 (Operations).

(9) (U) Third-Party Reaction. Provide an analysis of the impact of the deception on allies, neutrals, and potential adversaries and their responses. This subparagraph provides in depth information to document the risk assessments presented in Tab C-3-A (Military Deception) and Exhibit C-3-A-3 (Operations).

b. (U) Friendly. Provide information on activities by unknowing U.S. forces having an impact on the deception. Compare the time necessary to collect, process, report, and analyze intelligence (in support of deception) with the plan's operational timeline. Assess the impact here.

3. (U) Intelligence Requirements

a. (U) Priority Information Requirements. Priority information requirements associated with deception are listed in Attachment 1 (Priority Information Requirements).

b. (U) Feedback. Assess the intelligence community's ability to identify and collect plan-specific feedback information.

c. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks. Identify organizations to produce plan-specific collection requirements.

(1) (U) Service intelligence agencies and organizations.

(2) (U) Commander's intelligence organizations and assets.

(3) (U) Others.

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ATTACHMENTS:

- A – Priority Intelligence Requirements
- B – Others as needed

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Name

Rank and Service

Title

Page number

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**Sample Format of Attachment A (Priority Intelligence Requirements) to  
Exhibit 2 to Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex C**

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ATTACHMENT A TO EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO  
OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)  
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. (U) General. Identify requirements, including those of subordinate commanders, for priority intelligence requirements for pre-execution and execution phases of the planned deception operation.
2. (U) Before Implementation of the Order or Plan. List questions for which answers are needed for further planning and as a basis for decision on plan implementation.
3. (U) Upon Implementation of the Order or Plan. List the additional PIRs and other intelligence requirements that become relevant upon decision to implement the operation plan. (Use additional paragraphs if necessary to reflect differing requirements during planned phases of the operation.)

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Page number

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### Sample Format of Appendix 18 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C

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APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)

OPERATIONS OVERLAY (U)

Utilize appropriate register marks and graphics from MCRP 5-2A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, to visually depict desired aspects of the operation. The basis of the operations overlay is the approved course of action graphics sketch. It may depict—

- Main effort.
- Supporting effort.
- Reserve.
- Boundaries.
- Fire support coordinating measures.
- Assembly areas.
- Lines of departure.
- Other information as dictated by mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available (METT-T).

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Name

Rank and Service

Title

Page number

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### Sample Format of Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support)

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. It includes the provision of combat service support to forces at the tactical level of war as well as the movement and sustainment of Marine forces at the operational level of war. Logistics provides the commander with the wherewithal to conduct and win battles, campaigns, and ultimately, the war. Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) provides direction and guidance to the subordinate commanders and staffs on the provision of logistics and combat service support in support of operations described in the operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN). MCDP 4, *Logistics*, provides the theory and philosophy of logistics as practiced by the Marine Corps. Appendix Q of Joint Pub 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, Planning Policy and Procedures*, lists pertinent logistic references. MCWP 4-11, *Tactical-Level Logistics*, provides detailed information on combat service support as well as amplifying instructions on the preparation of logistic planning documents.

The command and control of logistic and combat service support organizations, to include command relationships and command and control support requirements, should be addressed in Annex D. It provides a general discussion of how the operation will be supported and is fully integrated with other critical concepts such as the concept of maneuver, fires, and force protection. It should be in only as much depth as is necessary to ensure understanding of envisioned logistic combat service support operations by subordinate commanders and staffs. The G-4/S-4 is normally responsible for the preparation of Annex D. However, the combat service support element should be involved in the planning process. Phasing and significant anticipated changes in mission or tasks should be reflected in the concept of support. Detailed or specialized information should be provided in other subparagraphs or in appendices of Annex D. Discuss or refer to aviation-specific logistic functions such as supply and maintenance in Appendix 1 (Supply) or in the aviation combat element OPORD or OPLAN.



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 Message reference number

ANNEX D TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE-WORD) (U)

LOGISTICS/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (U)

(U) REFERENCES: Cite references necessary for a complete understanding of this annex.

1. (U) Situation

- a. (U) Enemy. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). Provide available information on enemy actions or intent to conduct actions to disrupt or degrade envisioned friendly logistic and combat service support operations. Include information on enemy capabilities or assets that can augment friendly logistic and combat service support operations.
- b. (U) Friendly. List supporting logistic or combat service support organizations not subordinate to the force and the specific missions and tasks assigned to each.
- c. (U) Infrastructure. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). Provide information on existing infrastructure, such as ports, factories, fuel and water sources, and lines of communications (LOCs) that can be used to support friendly logistic and combat service support operations.
- d. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization). List other Service and nation logistic and combat service support units attached to the force. List all Marine Corps logistic and combat service support units detached to support other friendly forces.
- e. (U) Assumptions. State realistic assumptions and consider the effect of current operations on logistic capabilities. Omitted in orders.
- f. (U) Resource Availability. Identify significant competing demands for logistic resources where expected requirements may exceed resources. Include recommended solutions within resource levels available for planning, if any, and reasonably assured host nation support.
- g. (U) Planning Factors. Refer to and use approved planning factors and formulas, except when experience or local conditions dictate otherwise. When deviating from planning factors, identify the factors and the reason.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

2. (U) Mission. State in a clear and concise manner the mission of the logistic and combat service support forces and the logistic objectives that support accomplishment of the command's purpose and tasks.
3. (U) Execution
  - a. (U) Concept of Logistics and Combat Service Support. State the concept for logistic and combat service support operations necessary to implement the order or plan. Describe how the logistic and combat service support assets will be organized and positioned to execute the mission. The concept may include planned employment of other Service and nation logistic and combat service support forces, host nation support logistic capabilities, or operation of the LOCs.
  - b. (U) Tasks
    - (1) (U) Assign logistic and combat service support responsibilities to subordinate logistic organizations.
    - (2) (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support required from other commands, Services, or nations.
    - (3) (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support required for forces assigned or attached from other commands, Services, or nations.
    - (4) (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support required for Marine Corps forces assigned or attached to other commands, Services, or nations.
    - (5) (U) Assign responsibilities to support joint boards and committees, such as transportation and procurement, and other Services or nations providing services.
4. (U) Administration and Logistics
  - a. (U) Logistics and Combat Service Support
    - (1) (U) Supply. Refer to Appendix 7 (Supply). Summarize the following, in coordination with supporting commanders and Service component commanders, if different from standard planning factors. Place detailed discussions in the appendices and listings of supply depots, terminals, and LOCs in tabs or the appropriate appendixes.
      - (a) (U) Distribution and Allocation
        - 1 (U) Purpose, location, and projected displacement of main and alternate supply depots or points and supporting terminals and ports to be used or considered.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

2 (U) Prepositioned logistic resource allocation.

3 (U) Existing terminals and LOCs and the known or estimated throughput capability. Indicate the time-phased expansion necessary to support the plan.

(b) (U) Level of Supply

1 (U) Indicate the time-phased operating and safety levels required to support the plan.

2 (U) Indicate the prepositioned war reserve materiel requirements to support the time-phased deployments pending resupply.

3 (U) Specify significant special arrangements required for materiel support beyond normal supply procedures.

4 (U) Indicate anticipated shortfalls.

5 (U) Indicate common user logistic supply support responsibilities and arrangements.

(c) (U) Salvage. Provide instructions for, and identify the logistic impact of, the collection, classification, and disposition of salvage.

(d) (U) Captured Enemy Materiel. Provide instructions for the collection, classification, and disposition of enemy materiel. See Annex B (Intelligence) for further guidance. See Appendix 10 to Annex B (Intelligence) for specific instructions for the disposition of captured enemy cryptographic equipment.

(e) (U) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. See Joint Pub 4-01 and the current version of DOD Instruction 3020.37.

1 (U) Identify acquisition of goods and services in the following categories:

a (U) The general categories of materiel and services that are available and contemplated as a supplement to regular sources.

b (U) Those that may be used as emergency acquisition sources.

2 (U) Make a statement concerning the dependability of the local acquisition or labor source in each of the above categories and the joint or Service element that will obtain or manage these resources.

3 (U) State that all essential contractor services, to include new and existing contracts, have been reviewed to determine which services will be essential to OPLAN execution. Make a statement concerning

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

the existence of contingency plans to ensure the continuation of these essential services.

(f) (U) Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants. Refer to Appendix 1 (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply).

(2) (U) External Support. Refer to Appendix 11 (External Support). Provide the required planning information including type and quantity of support and instructions where inter-Service and cross-Service arrangements for common supply and service support are appropriate.

(a) (U) Summarize major support arrangements that are presently in effect or that will be executed in support of the plan.

(b) (U) Include significant inter-Service and cross-Service support arrangements. Refer to appropriate annexes or appendixes.

(c) (U) Include foreign and host nation support.

(3) (U) Maintenance

(a) (U) General. Refer to Appendix 12 (Maintenance).

(b) (U) Specific Guidance

1 (U) Include sufficient detail to determine the requirements for maintenance facilities needed to support the plan.

2 (U) Indicate the level of maintenance to be performed and where it is to occur, including host nation or contractor facilities, if applicable.

(4) (U) Transportation

(a) (U) General. Refer to Appendix 4 (Mobility and Transportation). Provide general planning or execution guidance to subordinate and supporting organizations to facilitate transportation of the force and its sustainment. This can include movement and use priorities.

(b) (U) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis. Provide an estimate of the mobility support and movement feasibility of the plan. Include in the analysis any appropriate remarks affecting mobility and transportation tasks. Consider the availability of adequate lift resources for movements of personnel and equipment, airfield reception capabilities, seaport and aerial port terminal capabilities, and port throughput capabilities. Also, consider any features that will adversely affect movement operations, such as the effect of deployment or employment of forces and materiel on airfield ramp space (to include possible host nation support).

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

(5) (U) General Engineering Support Plan. Refer to Appendix 13 (General Engineering). State the rationale if Appendix 5 (Civil Engineering Support Plan) is not prepared. Indicate the general engineering support activities applicable to the basic operation order or plan and the policies for providing these services.

(6) (U) Health Services. Refer to Appendix 9 (Health Services).

(7) (U) Services. Refer to Appendix 8 (Services).

(8) (U) Mortuary Affairs. Refer to Appendix 2 (Mortuary Affairs) or, if not used, indicate the mortuary affairs activities applicable to the OPOD or OPLAN and policy for providing these affairs.

(9) (U) Ammunition. Refer to Appendix 6 (Nonnuclear Ammunition) or if not used, discuss any critical ammunition issues that may affect the ability of the force to accomplish the mission.

(10) (U) Aviation Logistic Support. Refer to Appendix 10 (Aviation Logistic Support) or Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) of the aviation combat element OPOD or OPLAN. Critical aviation logistic and combat service support issues may be discussed if they affect the ability of the force to accomplish the mission.

(11) (U) OPSEC Planning Guidance for Logistics. Refer to Tab C (Operations Security) to Appendix 3 (Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare) to Annex C (Operations). Provide comprehensive operations security planning guidance for planning, preparing, and executing logistic and combat service support activities. At a minimum, address base, facility, installation, logistic stocks, physical, and LOC security. Provide guidance to ensure that logistic and combat service support activities promote essential secrecy for operational intentions, capabilities that will be committed to specific missions, and current preparatory operational activities.

b. (U) Administration. Include general administrative guidance to support logistic and combat service support operations for the basic operation order or plan. If reports are required, specify formats for preparation, time, methods, and classification of submission.

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command Relationships. Refer to Annex J (Command Relationships) for command relationships external to logistic units. Provide support relationships.

b. (U) Communications and Information Systems. Refer to Annex K (Combat Information System) for detailed communications and information systems requirements. Provide a general statement of the scope and type of communications required.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

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## APPENDIXES:

- 1 – Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply
- 2 – Mortuary Affairs
- 3 – Sustainability Analysis
- 4 – Mobility and Transportation
- 5 – Civil Engineering Support Plan
- 6 – Nonnuclear Ammunition
- 7 – Supply
- 8 – Services
- 9 – Health Services
- 10 – Aviation Logistic Support (Normally provided in the aviation combat element plan or order.)
- 11 – External Support
- 12 – Maintenance
- 13 – General Engineering

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Rank and Service

Title

Page number

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### Sample Format of Annex J (Command Relationships)

Command relationships are the interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. Unity of effort is, in large part, achieved through the application of flexible range of command relationships. The joint force commander exercises command during joint operations according to the provisions of Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; MCWP 0-1, *Marine Corps Operations*; and MCWP 0-1.1, *Componency*, describe possible command relationships between the joint force commander, the Marine Corps component commander, the MAGTF commander, and subordinate commanders of assigned or attached Marine forces. This annex will discuss—

- Requirements to coordinate support between forces in the same or adjacent areas according to Joint Pub 0-2 and the common higher headquarters operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN).
- Planning for succession of command and change of command location (i.e., alternate command and control procedures). Refer to paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the OPORD or OPLAN or Annex K.
- DOD Directive 3025.14, *Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad*, as amended by changes 1 and 2, which delineates the responsibilities for protection of U.S. citizens abroad. In support of this directive, give special attention to cooperation and coordination between U.S. diplomatic and military activities during periods of tension and hostilities.
- Command relationships between the United States Information Agency and the U.S. Armed Forces in the conduct of psychological operations.

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ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)

(Operation CODEWORD) (U)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List documents that provide necessary guidance on the command relationships of forces concerned.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION



## CLASSIFICATION

1. (U) General

e. (U) Purpose. To establish the relationships between—

- (1) (U) Combatant commands.
- (2) (U) International commands and organizations.
- (3) (U) Commander, U.S. Forces country.
- (4) (U) Service and functional component commanders.
- (5) (U) Major subordinate commanders.
- (6) (U) Coordinating authorities.
- (7) (U) Other subordinate military activities.
- (8) (U) U.S. diplomatic missions.
- (9) (U) Government departments or agencies that support the operations.
- (10) (U) Forces and agencies of other nations.

a. (U) Scope. Specify the scope and applicability of the command relationships established in this annex for specific military operations or functions within an assigned geographic area; or for specific military operations or functions not limited to a geographic area, and the times or circumstances when the relationships become effective.

2. (U) Command Lines

a. (U) Service and Functional Components. Indicate the command lines to Service and functional components of the force and to subordinate elements, as appropriate.

b. (U) Other Subordinate Commands. Indicate the established command lines to subordinate commanders for conducting this operation and the conditions under which forces will be transferred to their operational control.

c. (U) Augmentation Forces. Indicate the purpose, time, and approximate duration of the attachment and the degree of authority over and responsibility for the augmentation forces.

d. (U) Alternate Procedures. Discuss procedures for succession of command and change of command location (alternate command and control procedures).

3. (U) Support and Coordination Relationships

a. (U) Supporting Military Forces. Indicate established relationships with military organizations operating in support of the originating command.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION

## CLASSIFICATION

- b. (U) Coordinating Authorities. As necessary, assign a commander or another person the responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities.
  - c. (U) Supporting Agencies. Indicate the relationships between the elements of the force and any supporting agencies, such as United States Information Agency. (Refer to other annexes or appendixes, as appropriate.)
  - d. (U) Inter-Service Support Arrangements. Refer to Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support), subparagraph 2b(7), Inter-Service Logistic Support.
  - e. (U) Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies. Indicate any requirement for coordination with chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions that is not included elsewhere in the plan and who are responsible for such coordination.
- 4. (U) Relationships With International and Foreign Commands and Organizations. Indicate established command arrangements or relations with international commands and organizations, foreign military commands, or guerrilla organizations. Also indicate the conditions under which such relations would become effective.
  - 5. (U) Planning Relationships. Specify established relationships between military commands for developing supporting plans. Include any requirements for coordination with other-nation commands and nonmilitary agencies.

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## APPENDIX:

## 1 – Command Relationships Diagram

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### Sample Format of Appendix 1 (Command Relationships Diagram) to Annex J

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM (U)

This appendix graphically portrays the command relationships. Show all specific relationships, i.e., operational control, tactical control, administrative control.

Graphic

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Page number

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### Sample Format of Annex X (Execution Checklist)

Annex X (Execution Checklist) provides a convenient and useful listing of key events and tasks that must be conducted by the force to accomplish the mission. The execution checklist allows subordinate commands and supporting and adjacent forces to coordinate their actions and maintain situational awareness. Only critical events and tasks requiring participation by multiple organizations should be included in the execution checklist. Events and tasks should be listed in order of envisioned execution.

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#### ANNEX X TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)

(Operation CODEWORD) (U)

EXECUTION CHECKLIST (U)

(U) Emphasize, primarily for headquarters and agencies external to the originating command, the actions that each must take to ensure the coordinated initiation of the operation. Additional information could include communication nets, brevity codes, reporting requirements, maneuver control measures, decision points, named areas of interest, tactical areas of interest, and any fragmentary orders in support of a branch plan.

ACTION	HEADQUARTERS AND AGENCY	TIMING	CONDITIONS

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## Section III. Examples

Section III provides examples of a plan summary, basic operation plan or order, and some appendices and tabs. Examples are notional and provide a written representation of an actual operation order, appendix, etc. The following table of contents lists standing formats. Bold text indicates that the format is provided in this section and its page location. Bold, italic text indicates that a particular format is not used in Marine Corps plans or orders, but it is included in the list to conform to CJCSM 3122.03.

	Page
<b>Plan Summary</b>	<b>G-81</b>
<b>Basic Order or Plan</b>	<b>G-89</b>
<b>Annex A. Task Organization</b>	<b>G-111</b>
Appendix 1. Time-Phased Force and Deployment	
Appendix 2. Shortfall Identification	
Appendix 3. Force Module Identification	
<b>Appendix 4. <i>Deterrent Options</i></b>	
Appendix 5. Reserve Component Requirements Summary	
<b>Annex B. Intelligence</b>	<b>G-115</b>
Appendix 1. Priority Intelligence Requirements	
Appendix 2. Signals Intelligence 37	
Tab A. Communications Intelligence Collection Requirements	
Tab B. Operational Electronic Intelligence Collection Requirements	
Appendix 3. Counterintelligence	
Tab A. Counterintelligence Target List	
Tab B. Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Report	
<b>Tab C. <i>Designation of Theater CI Executive Agency</i></b>	
Appendix 4. Targeting Intelligence	
Tab A. Target List (Conventional)	
Appendix 5. Human-Resource Intelligence	
<b>Tab A. <i>HUMINT Operations Cell Operations</i></b>	
Tab B. EPW/Civilian Detainees	
Appendix 6. Intelligence Support to Command and Control Warfare	
Appendix 7. Imagery Intelligence	
Appendix 8. Measurement and Signature Intelligence	
Appendix 9. Captured Enemy Equipment	
Tab A. Specific Prioritized Intelligence Collection Requirements	
Tab B. Equipment Releasable for Operational Purposes	
Appendix 10. National Intelligence Support Team	
Appendix 11. Intelligence Estimate	
Appendix 12. Intelligence Products	
Appendix 13. Intelligence Collection Plan	
Appendix 14. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan	



	<b>Page</b>
Appendix 15. Geographic Intelligence	
Appendix 16. Intelligence Operations	
Appendix 17. Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape	
<b>Annex C. Operations</b>	<b>G-129</b>
<i>Appendix 1. Nuclear Operations</i>	
Appendix 2. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations	
<b>Appendix 3. Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare</b>	<b>G-137</b>
<b>Tab A. Military Deception</b>	<b>G-141</b>
<b>Exhibit 2. Intelligence</b>	<b>G-149</b>
<b>Attachment A. Priority Intelligence Requirements</b>	<b>G-155</b>
Tab B. Electronic Warfare	
Tab C. Operations Security	
Tab D. Psychological Operations	
Tab E. Physical Destruction	
Appendix 4. Special Operations	
Appendix 5. Evasion and Recovery Operations	
Appendix 6. Rules of Engagement	
Appendix 7. Reconnaissance	
Appendix 8. Air Base Operability	
Appendix 9. Combat Camera	
Tab A. COMCAM Customer Support Requirements	
Appendix 10. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	
Appendix 11. Escape and Evasion Operations	
Appendix 12. Counterattack	
Appendix 13. Explosive Ordnance Disposal	
Appendix 14. Amphibious Operations	
Tab A. Advance Force Operations	
Tab B. Embarkation Plan	
Tab C. Landing Plan	
Tab D. Rehearsal Plan	
Tab E. CSS Control Agencies Plan	
Appendix 15. Force Protection	
Tab A. Combating Terrorism	
Tab B. Physical Security	
Tab C. Base Defense	
Appendix 16. Rear Area Operations	
Appendix 17. Aviation Operations (omitted when Annex W is used)	
<b>Appendix 18. Operations Overlay</b>	<b>G-157</b>
Appendix 19. Fire Support	
Tab A. Air Fire Plan	
Tab B. Artillery Fire Plan	
Tab C. Naval Surface Fire Support Plan	
Tab D. Chemical Fire Plan	

	<b>Page</b>
Tab E. Targeting	
Tab F. Fire Support Coordination Plan	
Appendix 20. Countermechanized Plan	
Appendix 21. Breaching Plan	
Appendix 22. Obstacle Plan	
<b>Annex D. Logistics/Combat Service Support</b>	<b>G-159</b>
Appendix 1. Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply	
Appendix 2. Mortuary Affairs	
Appendix 3. Sustainability Analysis	
Appendix 4. Mobility and Transportation	
Tab A. En Route Support Requirements	
Tab B. Reception and Onward Movement	
Appendix 5. Civil Engineering Support Plan	
Appendix 6. Nonnuclear Ammunition	
Tab A. Munitions Matrix	
Appendix 7. Supply	
Appendix 8. Services	
Appendix 9. Health Services	
Appendix 10. Aviation Logistic Support (normally in the aviation combat element plan or order)	
Appendix 11. External Support	
Appendix 12. Maintenance	
Appendix 13. General Engineering	
<b>Annex E. Personnel</b>	
Appendix 1. Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons	
Appendix 2. Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained U.S. Personnel	
Appendix 3. Finance and Disbursing	
Appendix 4. Legal	
Appendix 5. Military Postal Service	
Tab A. Aerial Mail Terminals	
Tab B. Military Post Offices	
Appendix 6. Chaplain Activities	
Tab A. Inter-Service Chaplain Support	
Tab B. Host Nation Religious Support	
Tab C. Commander-Staff Chaplain Relationships	
<b>Annex F. Public Affairs</b>	
<b>Appendix 1. Personnel Requirements for Joint Information Bureaus and Sub-Joint Information Bureaus</b>	
<b>Appendix 2. Equipment and Support Requirements for Joint Information Bureaus and Sub-Joint Information Bureaus</b>	
Appendix 3. General Ground Rules for the Media	
Appendix 4. DOD National Media Pool	
<b>Annex G. Civil Affairs</b>	
<b>Annex H. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations</b>	

	<b>Page</b>
<b>Annex J. Command Relationships</b>	<b>G-171</b>
<b>Appendix 1. Command Relationships Diagram</b>	<b>G-175</b>
Annex K. Combat Information System	
Appendix 1. Information Systems Security	
<b>Appendix 2. Defensive Information Warfare</b>	
Appendix 3. Communications Planning	
Appendix 4. Satellite Communications Planning	
Tab A. UHF SATCOM Network List	
Tab B. SHF SATCOM Network List	
Tab C. EHF SATCOM Network List	
Annex L. Environmental Considerations	
Annex M. Geospatial Information and Services	
Appendix 1. Geospatial Information and Services List	
Annex N. Space Operations	
Annex P. Host Nation Support	
Appendix 1. List of Host Nation Support Agreements	
Annex Q. Medical Services	
Appendix 1. Joint Medical Regulating System	
Appendix 2. Joint Blood Program	
Appendix 3. Hospitalization	
Appendix 4. Patient Evacuation	
Appendix 5. Returns to Duty	
Appendix 6. Medical Logistics (Class 8A) System	
Appendix 7. Preventive Medicine	
Appendix 8. Medical Communications and Information Systems	
Appendix 9. Host-Nation Medical Support	
<b>Appendix 12. Veterinary Medicine</b>	
Appendix 13. Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identifications	
Annex S. Special Technical Operations	
Annex U. Information Management	
Annex W. Aviation Operations	
Appendix 1. Air Defense/Anti-air Warfare	
Appendix 2. Offensive Air Support	
Appendix 3. Assault Support	
Appendix 4. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan	
Appendix 5. Supplementary Air Operations	
Appendix 6. Aircraft Armament	
Appendix 7. Air Control	
Appendix 8. Air Communications	
Appendix 9. Air Movement Plan/Flight Ferry	
Appendix 10. Aircraft Schedules	
Appendix 11. Air Tasking	
<b>Annex X. Execution Checklist</b>	<b>G-177</b>
Annex Z. Distribution	

## Example of a Plan Summary

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I MEF

GREENTOWN, BLUELAND

1 February 2001

ABD-1

SUPPORTING PLAN 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)  
PLAN SUMMARY (U)

TIME ZONE: Zulu

1. (U) Purpose

a. (U) The purpose of Operation Sharp Sword is to restore the Orangeland/Blueland border by defeating the Orangeland forces that have invaded Blueland and to position U.S. forces to continue combat operations within Orangeland, if required.

b. (U) This plan summary provides major subordinate commander (MSC) commanders with a brief recapitulation of the major aspects of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) supporting plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific situation. If the Marine Forces-B (MARFOR-B) plan is executed, the I MEF Supporting Plan 0002-01 will serve as the basis for the I MEF Operation Order for Operation Sharp Sword. The information contained herein must be updated before use in adopting MSC courses of action (COAs).

2. (U) Conditions for Implementation/Execution

a. (U) Politico-Military Situation

(1) (U) General. The nation of Orangeland has been pressing territorial claims against the nation of Blueland for over 5 years. During the past 6 months, tensions have increased with border skirmishes. Diplomatic and economic efforts failed when Orangeland's Northern Operational Group (NOG) crossed the border and invaded Blueland. The NOG has been successful in its initial operations against an uncoordinated Blueland defense. The U.S. began a series of military deployments in conjunction with renewed

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diplomatic and economic efforts to seek the withdrawal of Orangeland forces from Blueland. In the event these actions fail, Joint Task Force-Blueland (JTF-B) will commence offensive operations to restore the sovereignty of Blueland. The other nations of the region have universally condemned Orangeland's invasion of Blueland, and have offered support to Blueland and the U.S.

(2) (U) Higher Headquarters(a) (U) JOINT TASK FORCE-BLUELAND (JTF-B)

1 (U) JTF-B Mission. When directed, conduct offensive operations within the joint area of operations (JAO) and defeat Orangeland forces in order to restore Blueland's international borders.

2 (U) JTF-B Commander's Intent. We will restore the original Orangeland/Blueland border by defeating the Orangeland operational center of gravity (COG), the NOG. Endstate is Orangeland forces defeated, the border restored, and JTF-B forces prepared to conduct offensive operations in Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities, if required.

(b) (U) MARINE FORCES-BLUELAND (MARFOR-B)

1 (U) MARFOR-B Mission. On order, as the main effort, MARFOR-B conducts offensive operations in zone and defeats Orangeland forces in order to restore Blueland's international borders. Be prepared to conduct offensive operations in Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

2 (U) MARFOR-B Commander's Intent. The purpose of the operation is to restore the Orangeland/Blueland border. We will conduct fast-paced offensive operations in order to defeat the NOG, destroy the NOG's tactical COG (its armored brigades), and restore the borders of Blueland. I will focus the combat power of the MEF, supported by the

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Marine Logistics Command (MLC), to attack and defeat the NOG. The endstate is Orangeland forces within Blueland defeated, the restoration of the international border, and MARFOR-B forces prepared to conduct offensive operations in Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities, if required.

b. (U) Legal Considerations. The U.S.-Blueland Status of Forces Agreement will permit the free deployment of U.S. forces into Blueland. Accordingly, there are no legal obstructions to normal military operations with the usual exception of promulgated rules of engagement and the existing Law of Armed Conflict.

3. (U) Operations to be Conducted

a. (U) Forces Assigned

- (1) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division
- (2) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> Marine Division
- (3) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> Marine Aircraft Wing
- (4) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> Force Service Support Group
- (5) (U) 24<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment
- (6) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> Naval Construction Regiment (operational control [OPCON])

b. (U) Deployment. Deployment of MEF forces is projected to be complete no later than C+35. See Appendix 1 (Time-Phased Force and Deployment List) to Annex A to MARFOR-B Supporting Plan 0002-14.

c. (U) Employment

- (1) (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations in zone and defeats enemy forces in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared to continue offensive operations in Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

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(2) (U) Commander's Intent

(a) (U) Purpose. Restore the Blueland border.

(b) (U) Method. Maneuver through existing or created gaps to bring our combined-arms combat power to bear against the Orangeland armored brigades and the artillery regiments.

(c) (U) Endstate. The NOG defeated. Our forces positioned along the Orangeland/Blueland border are prepared to continue offensive operations in Orangeland, if ordered.

(3) (U) Combat Operations. Combat operations will be conducted in three phases:

(a) (U) Phase I. The MEF forms a special purpose MAGTF-Blueland (SPMAGTF-B) that CHOPs to Navy Forces-Blueland (NAVFOR-B) to conduct amphibious operations in Phase II. The aircraft wing, as the main effort, attacks NOG artillery and armor command and control capabilities and logistic facilities to shape the battlespace for subsequent offensive operations. It provides an aviation combat element (ACE) to the SPMAGTF. Air operations will continue for the duration of the operation. Two divisions conduct security operations, move to attack positions, and prepare to attack in zone. A division(-) (Rein) provides a command element and a regimental landing team (RLT) to the SPMAGTF, designates one regiment (-) (Rein) as the MEF reserve, and one infantry battalion as the MEF tactical combat force (TCF). The force service support group (FSSG) continues to build combat power by stockpiling and positioning supplies and services to support subsequent offensive operations. It provides a combat service support element (CSSE) to the SPMAGTF. Phase I concludes when Orangeland forces are unable to coordinate actions between brigades, mass artillery fires above the battalion level, and provide ammunition and fuel resupply at the brigade level.

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(b) (U) Phase II. This phase consists of two stages:

1 (U) Stage A. A division (Rein), as the main effort, attacks in zone to form the western shoulder of the penetration and defeats enemy forces north of Gray City. A division (-) (Rein) attacks in zone to form the eastern shoulder of the penetration, fixes enemy forces west of Tealton, and conducts a link up with Blueland forces in Tealton. The aircraft wing isolates the MEF battlespace from enemy reinforcement from the south, attacks to neutralize the artillery brigades, and disrupts the armored brigades. The FSSG continues general support to the MEF and prepares to establish the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) and/or airport of debarkation (APOD) in the vicinity of Gray City and forward combat service support areas (CSSAs). One infantry regiment remains the MEF reserve. NAVFOR-B conducts an amphibious assault in support of I MEF south of Gray City to fix enemy forces. The first stage concludes with the penetration of the enemy defenses, the artillery brigades neutralized, the armored brigades disrupted, the main effort located south of phase line (PL) Black, and the shift of the MEF forward boundary.

2 (U) Stage B. A division (Rein), as the main effort, continues the attack to defeat enemy forces. A division (-) (Rein) conducts a link up with SPMAGTF-B (which then CHOPs back to I MEF) and consolidates the area around Gray City. The aircraft wing continues to isolate the MEF area of operations from enemy reinforcement and interdicts enemy forces. The FSSG continues general support to the MEF, on order establishes a secondary SPOD and/or APOD at Gray City, and on order establishes forward CSSAs to support future operations. One infantry regiment remains the MEF reserve. I MEF disestablishes SPMAGTF-B after CHOP.



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The second stage, and this phase, concludes with the defeat of enemy forces in Blueland and restoration of the Orangeland/Blueland border.

(c) (U) Phase III. The FSSG, as the main effort, rearms, refits, and resupplies the MEF for potential offensive operations in Orangeland. The aircraft wing pursues enemy forces withdrawing into Orangeland. A division (Rein), as the supporting effort, conducts defensive and security operations in zone and prepares for possible offensive operations in Orangeland. A division (-) (Rein) is designated MEF reserve. The third phase ends with MEF forces prepared for offensive operations in Orangeland.

(4) (U) Enemy Commander's Intent. Current assessment of NOG operations indicates that MajGen Dobhan intends to delay the U.S. advance, inflict the maximum number of casualties, avoid decisive engagement with U.S. forces, and stretch out the conflict to weaken U.S. resolve and terminate the war on Orangeland's terms.

d. (U) Supporting Plans. MSCs will prepare supporting plans.

e. (U) Collateral Plans

(1) (U) Deployment. I MEF Supporting Plan 0001-01 (Operation Sharp Sword).

(2) (U) Redeployment. I MEF Supporting Plan 0003-01 (Operation Sharp Sword).

4. (U) Key Assumptions

a. (U) I MEF forces will not become involved in refugee operations.

b. (U) The deception plan will confuse the enemy as to the true location of the MEF's main effort.

c. (U) Terrorist threat to U.S.-controlled airbases will not significantly interfere with air operations.

d. (U) Blueland will provide host nation support to U.S. operations.

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e. (U) JTF-B will have sea and air superiority in the joint operations area.

5. (U) Operational Constraints

a. (U) Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) will be used in the vicinity of Blueland's religious shrines.

b. (U) The SPOD at Gray City must be able to throughput 500 short tons per day no later than D+15.

c. (U) Provide MEF liaison team to Blueland Self-Defense Force in Tealton before link up.

6. (U) Time to Commence Effective Operations

a. (U) Deception Plan. Seven days are required to implement the deception plan in order for Orangeland to collect and analyze the indicators.

b. (U) Collection of Intelligence. Six days are required to plan, rehearse, and execute initial stages of the ground reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

c. (U) Logistics. Five days are required to complete forward movement of supplies and services.

d. (U) Shaping. Four days of air operations are required to shape the armored brigades and the artillery regiments prior to initiation of ground operations.

7. (U) Command Relationships. A SPMAGTF will CHOP to NAVFOR-B to conduct amphibious operations in support of I MEF.

8. (U) Logistic Appraisal. The plan is logistically supportable. There are certain ammunition constraints, and the projected expansion of the area of operation to the Orangeland/Blueland border will stretch the MEF movement and line haul capabilities. However, these issues have been addressed, plans have been developed to address them, and they will be closely monitored. There should be no logistical culminating point before completion of the three phases of this plan.

9. (U) Personnel Appraisal. Projected casualty estimates are acceptable under this plan. An assault against prepared positions (enemy most dangerous COA) is a matter of concern. However, the concept of operations, deception plan,

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and shaping actions should reduce the enemy's flexibility and force him to adopt his most likely COA.

10. (U) Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors

a. (U) Blueland has a limited logistical infrastructure: lack of port facility stevedores, roads subject to degradation under heavy usage, shortage of skilled labor. MARFOR-B has requested additional engineering personnel and assets to overcome these problems.

b. (U) The MEF does not have adequate psychological operations or civil affairs assets to control large numbers of Blueland civilians. The plan mitigates the problem by avoiding Blueland cities and using Blueland forces to retake and control large Blueland population centers. Should Blueland forces be unable to complete this mission, the MEF will require significant augmentation before accepting the attendant responsibilities.

c. (U) Due to limited PGMs and family of scatterable mines (FASCAM), Commander, Joint Task Force-Blueland (CJTF-B) has placed limits on their expenditure. The plan is designed to force the NOG to move out of its prepared defensive positions and maneuver to avoid destruction. This will leave it vulnerable to conventional munitions and should mitigate the shortage of PGMs.

d. (U) Line haul capability is a concern, but a judicious use of truck and heavy equipment transport assets, as well as amphibious shipping and host nation support lighterage should overcome the deficiency.

## ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GERALD C. THOMAS  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:  
s/  
M. Jennings  
Colonel, USMC  
AC/S G-5

viii

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## Example of a Basic Order or Plan

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Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ copies  
I MEF  
GREENTOWN, BLUELAND  
17 April 2001  
ABD-1

OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)  
BASIC ORDER (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGE-LAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND, 1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10 (GREENTOWN, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-15 (SPRUCELAND, BLUELAND) 1:250,000.
- (b) USCINCPAC Planning Directive, 27 March 2001
- (c) USJTF BlueLand OPORD 0002-01, 10 April 2001
- (d) USJTF BlueLand Amphibious Operations Initiating Directive, 10 Apr 2001
- (e) MARFOR BlueLand OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (f) Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
- (g) Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*
- (h) Joint Pub 1-03, *Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions*
- (i) Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*
- (j) Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
- (k) MCWP 0-1.1, *Componentency*
- (l) MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*
- (m) I MEF TACSOP, 17 Jan 2000

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. With the failure of diplomatic efforts and deterrence options, Orangeland forces continue to occupy BlueLand. Elements of the Orangeland NOG are located north of Gray City. The NOG is in an operational pause, resupplying and re-equipping its units. Contact is being maintained with fleeing BlueLand forces, but

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the NOG lacks the logistic capability to sustain an aggressive pursuit.

b. (U) Battlespace

(1) (U) Joint Operations Area/Higher Commander's Area of Operations. The CJTF-B's joint area of operations is a 480 by 325 nautical mile (nm) rectangle, which includes the entire country of Blueland, the portion of Orangeland within 125 nm of the Orangeland/Blueland border, and the air and sea area 50 nm off the coast of Blueland.

(2) (U) Area of Interest. Enemy forces of concern include all Orangeland forces to the immediate south. Of special note is the Orangeland SA-5s located within Orangeland but capable of attacking the MEF aircraft south of Tealton. The terrorist threat inside Blueland borders as well as the threat to MEF forces en route to Blueland must be monitored for force protection. The MEF area of interest (AOI) includes the CJTF-B's JAO, that area of Blueland under the SA-5 umbrella, and the airbases in Europe and the Pacific through which MEF forces will travel.

(3) (U) Area of Operations. The MEF area of operation (AO) is a 150 by 90 nm rectangle encompassing the coastal area between Purpletown and Gray City. The AO is projected to expand southward to accommodate the forward movement of MEF units. To keep the AO a manageable size, the northern portion of the AO will be turned over to CJTF-B at the same time.

c. (U) Enemy Forces

(1) (U) Composition, Location, Disposition and Movements. Annex B (Intelligence) and CJTF-B intelligence summaries (INTSUMS).

(2) (U) Orangeland

(a) (U) Strategic Concept. The nation of Orangeland intends to take possession of the Jesara oil fields through a combination of diplomatic and military means. On the diplomatic front, Orangeland will attempt to pursue negotiations in the United Nations and enlist the aid of its neighbors to support its complaint

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against Blueland. Militarily, Orangeland will secure the approaches to the Jesara oil fields and attempt to establish an in depth defense of captured territory. Orangeland believes U.S. and coalition public support for Operation Sharp Sword is weak. They also believe an Orangeland victory on the battlefield, or an engagement that results in heavy U.S. casualties, could coalesce antiwar sentiment in the U.S. and perhaps force withdrawal of CJTF-B from Blueland or at least a political settlement.

(b) (U) Orangeland Objectives

1 (U) Consolidation of territorial gains in Blueland.

2 (U) Capture of the Jesara oilfields and offshore platforms.

3 (U) Enhancement of Orangeland's leadership position in the region.

4 (U) Defense of the homeland and prevention of an U.S. invasion of Orangeland.

(c) (U) Operational and Sustainment Capabilities. The Orangeland advance to the Orangeland/Blueland border has stretched its sustainment capabilities. However, the Orangeland forces are continuing to resupply and refit as operations permit. They are currently capable of attacking with multiple brigades with limited fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters support.

(d) (U) Orangeland Vulnerabilities. Orangeland logistic capabilities are severely taxed by the distances from the present NOG positions to the supply depots in Orangeland. Lines of communication (LOCs) between the NOG and Orangeland are exposed and susceptible to interdiction. See Annex B (Intelligence).

(e) (U) Orangeland Strategic Center of Gravity. Orangeland's *de facto* one-man rule and lack of formal governmental structure has focused power in the hands of Field Marshal Chilmand

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Sondo, the leader of Orangeland. There are no legal political parties. Opposition groups are for the most part in exile. The Army represents a latent political bloc inside the country, as does the Orangeland religious and tribal order and other tribal groups. Sondo has encouraged in-fighting among his potential political and military successors to reduce internal threats to his power.

(f) (U) Orangeland Operational Center of Gravity. The NOG is the operational COG of Orangeland forces. It is composed of eight separate brigades and two artillery regiments. The NOG has the personal sponsorship of Sondo and is allowed to recruit personnel from the remainder of Orangeland's armed forces. As a result, the quality of personnel and equipment within this unit is without equal within Orangeland's armed forces.

(g) (U) Orangeland Tactical Center of Gravity. The 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades are the tactical centers of gravity (COGs) for the NOG. These are the best-equipped (only T-72 equipped units), most effectively led units within the NOG. In both exercises and in recent operations, the NOG has used the armored striking force of these brigades as its counterattack and exploitation force.

(h) (U) Orangeland Courses of Action

1 (U) Most Likely COA. The NOG will attack to secure the Jesara oil fields. The first echelon, one armored and three mechanized infantry brigades supported by an artillery regiment, will move north and occupy the Jesara oil fields and the suburban areas of Tealton to the east, forcing the MEF to conduct military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). The first echelon will have too much terrain to cover with too few forces. The NOG will be challenged to control the north-south mobility corridors leading into Tealton and Jesara. The second

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echelon will establish a hasty line of defense south of Gray City with one armored and three mechanized infantry brigades, supported by an artillery regiment. The second echelon will exploit the coastal salt marshes, rugged inland mountains, and narrow coastal plains to funnel MEF forces into selected chokepoints. Although this COA exposes the NOG to the prospect of defeat in detail, it is attractive because it seizes the Jesara oil fields and forces the MEF into a MOUT environment with the potential of high casualties.

2 (U) Most Dangerous COA. Orangeland forces will establish a deliberate defense south of Tealton. The first echelon will establish prepared defenses in depth in the vicinity of Gray City. By not pressing north to Jesara and Tealton, the first echelon will be able to spend more time establishing defensive positions and building disruptive minefields to block the restrictive approaches to Gray City. The NOG will be able to control the mobility corridors leading to the Gray City chokepoint. The second echelon will consolidate the coastal regions and secure the LOCs southward toward the border. Supply lines will be shorter, and defenses will be better prepared. The NOG would have a greater chance of holding onto its territorial gains while inflicting high U.S. casualties.

d. (U) Friendly Forces

(1) (U) Higher

(a) (U) JOINT TASK FORCE-BLUELAND (JTF-B)

1 (U) JTF-B Mission. When directed, conduct offensive operations within the JAO and defeat Orangeland forces in order to restore Blueland's international borders.



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2 (U) JTF-B Commander's Intent. We will restore the original Orangeland/Blueland border by defeating the Orangeland operational COG, the NOG. Endstate is Orangeland forces defeated, the border restored, and JTF-B forces prepared to conduct offensive operations in Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities, if required.

(b) (U) MARINE FORCES-BLUELAND (MARFOR-B)

1 (U) MARFOR-B Mission. On order, as the main effort, MARFOR-B conducts offensive operations in zone and defeats Orangeland forces in order to restore Blueland's international borders. Be prepared to conduct offensive operations in Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

2 (U) MARFOR-B's Commander's Intent. The purpose of the operation is to restore the Orangeland/Blueland border. We will conduct fast-paced offensive operations in order to defeat the NOG, destroy the NOG's tactical COG (the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades), and restore the borders of Blueland. I will focus the combat power of the MEF, supported by the MLC, to attack and defeat the NOG. The endstate is Orangeland forces within Blueland defeated, the restoration of the international border, and MARFOR-B forces prepared to conduct offensive operations in Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities, if required.

(2) (U) Adjacent

(a) (U) ARMY FORCES-BLUELAND (ARFOR-B) (3<sup>d</sup> ARMY). On order, conduct operations to defeat enemy forces in zone in order to restore the Blueland border, guard the western avenues of approach into Blueland, and be prepared to continue operations into Orangeland.

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(b) (U) NAVAL FORCES-BLUELAND (NAVFOR-B) (7<sup>th</sup> FLEET). Maintain sea superiority within the JAO. On order, conduct amphibious operations in support of the main effort to fix and isolate Orangeland forces in eastern BlueLand. Conduct air operations as directed to include reconnaissance and surveillance flights. Provide naval surface fire support (NSFS) as directed. Continue to support Joint Special Operations Task Force-BlueLand (JSOTF-B) as directed. When directed, CHOP SPMAGTF to MARFOR-B.

(c) (U) AIR FORCE FORCES (AFFOR-B) (7<sup>th</sup> AIR FORCE). Maintain air superiority within the JAO. Continue the conduct of offensive air operations to disrupt, delay, and defeat Orangeland forces in the JAO. Designated as joint force air component commander (JFACC) to control execution of joint air operations as specified by CJTF-B and coordinate JAO with operations of other component commanders. Also designated area air defense commander (AADC) and airspace control authority (ACA).

(d) (U) JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE-BLUELAND (JSOTF-B). Conduct special reconnaissance and direct action missions in support of JTF-B operations in the JAO.

(e) (U) BLUELAND SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (BSDF). Conduct defensive operations and provide internal security for critical facilities and LOCs. Provide host nation support for JTF-B. BSDF 311<sup>th</sup> Brigade defends Tealton and conducts a linkup with 3<sup>d</sup> Marine Division (MARDIV) (-) (Rein).

(3) (U) Supporting. The MLC provides logistic support via prepositioned supplies, host nation support, and theater resupply. Priority of support is the MEF.

(4) (U) Friendly COGs. The MEF's COG is the 3<sup>d</sup> Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). Associated critical vulnerabilities are its command and control, combat service support capabilities (fuel, ammunition, and long-haul assets), and airfields required for

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combined-arms operations. The defense of these critical vulnerabilities must drive the force protection effort.

(5) (U) Attachments and Detachments. None.

(6) (U) Legal Considerations. U.S.-Blueland Status of Forces Agreement of 1 April 2001.

2. (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations in zone and defeats enemy forces in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared to continue offensive operations into Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Commander's Intent

(1) (U) Purpose. Restore the Blueland border.

(2) (U) Method. Maneuver through existing or created gaps to bring our combined-arms combat power to bear against the Orangeland 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades and the 401<sup>st</sup> and 402<sup>d</sup> Artillery Regiments.

(3) (U) Endstate. The NOG defeated. Our forces positioned along the Orangeland/Blueland border prepared to continue offensive operations in Orangeland, if directed.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. This operation will be conducted in three phases.

(1) (U) Phase I. I MEF forms SPMAGTF-B CJTF-B directs I MEF to CHOP SPMAGTF-B to NAVFOR-B to conduct amphibious operations in Phase II. The 3<sup>d</sup> MAW, as the main effort, attacks NOG artillery, armor, command and control, and logistic facilities to shape the battlespace for subsequent offensive operations. It provides an ACE to SPMAGTF-B. The 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIVs conduct security operations, occupy attack positions, and prepare to attack in zone. The 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV provides a command element and a RLT to SPMAGTF-B, designates a second regiment (-) (Rein) as the MEF reserve, and provides one infantry battalion as the MEF TCF. The 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG provides combat service support to the MEF and continues to

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build combat power by stockpiling and positioning supplies and services to support subsequent offensive operations. It provides mobile combat service support detachments (CSSDs) to 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIVs and a CSSE to SPMAGTF-B. Phase I concludes when Orange-land forces are unable to coordinate actions between brigades, mass artillery fires above the battalion level, and provide ammunition and fuel resupply at the brigade level.

(2) (U) Phase II

(a) (U) Stage A. The 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV, as the main effort, attacks in zone to form the western shoulder of the penetration and defeats enemy forces north of Gray City. The 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV attacks in zone to form the eastern shoulder of the penetration, fixes enemy forces west of Tealton, and conducts a link up with Blue-land forces in Tealton. The 3<sup>d</sup> MAF isolates the MEF battlespace from enemy reinforcement from the south, attacks to neutralize the 401<sup>st</sup> and 402<sup>d</sup> Artillery Brigades, and disrupt the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades. The 1st FSSG continues general support to the MEF and prepares to establish SPOD and/or APOD in vicinity of Gray City and forward combat service support areas (CSSAs). One infantry regiment remains the MEF reserve. NAVFOR-B conducts an amphibious assault in support of I MEF south of Gray City to fix enemy forces. The first stage concludes with the penetration of the enemy defenses, the 401<sup>st</sup> and 402<sup>d</sup> Artillery Brigades neutralized, the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades disrupted, the main effort south of PL Black, and the shift of the MEF forward boundary.

(b) (U) Stage B. The 1st MARDIV, as the main effort, continues the attack to defeat enemy forces. The 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV conducts a link up with SPMAGTF-B (which then CHOPs back to I MEF) and consolidates the area around Gray City. The 3<sup>d</sup> MAF continues to isolate the MEF area of operation from enemy reinforcement and interdicts enemy forces. The 1st FSSG continues general support to the MEF, on order establishes a

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secondary SPOD and/or APOD at Gray City, and on order establishes forward CSSAs to support future operations. One infantry regiment remains the MEF reserve. The I MEF disestablishes SPMAGTF-B after CHOP. The second stage, and this phase, concludes with the defeat of enemy forces in Blueand and restoration of the Orangeland/Blueand border.

(3) (U) Phase III. The 1st FSSG, as the main effort, rearms, refits, and resupplies the MEF for potential offensive operations in Orangeland. The 3<sup>d</sup> MAW conducts a pursuit of retreating Orangeland forces. The 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV conducts defensive operations at the border and prepares for possible offensive operations into Orangeland. The 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV becomes the MEF reserve. The third phase concludes with MEF forces prepared for offensive operations in Orangeland.

## c. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> MARINE DIVISION (REIN)(a) (U) Phase I

1 (U) Conduct security operations in zone in order to deny the enemy's ability to conduct reconnaissance operations.

2 (U) Occupy attack positions NLT D-2.

3 (U) Prepare to attack in zone.

(b) (U) Phase II (Main Effort)

1 (U) Stage A. Attack in zone in order to penetrate and defeat enemy forces north of Gray City.

2 (U) Stage B

a (U) Continue the attack in zone in order to defeat the Orangeland 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades.

b (U) On order, defeat remaining enemy forces in zone in order to restore the Blueand border.

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(c) (U) Phase III

1 (U) Conduct defensive and security operations in zone along the Blueland border.

2 (U) Rearm and refit forces.

3 (U) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations into Orangeland in order to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

(2) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN)(a) (U) Phase I

1 Conduct security operations in zone in order to deny the enemy's ability to conduct reconnaissance operations.

2 (U) Occupy attack positions NLT D-2.

3 (U) Prepare to attack in zone.

4 (U) Provide the assistant division commander as Commander, SPMAGTF-B.

5 (U) Provide command element for SPMAGTF-B.

6 (U) Provide one RLT to SPMAGTF-B as the ground combat element (GCE).

7 (U) Designate one infantry regiment (-) (rein) as MEF reserve for phases I and II.

8 (U) Designate one infantry battalion (rein) as MEF TCF for the duration of the operation.

(b) (U) Phase II1 (U) Stage A

a (U) As supporting effort, attack in zone in order to form the eastern shoulder of the penetration and fix enemy forces.

b (U) Conduct link up with Blueland forces in Tealton in order to prevent the enemy from isolating the city.

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2 (U) Stage B

a (U) Conduct link up with SPMAGTF-B.

b (U) Reassume command of command element and RLT upon CHOP of SPMAGTF-B from NAVFOR-B.

c (U) Consolidate the area vicinity of Gray City.

(c) (U) Phase III

1 (U) Assume the mission as MEF reserve.

2 (U) Rearm and refit forces.

3 (U) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations into Orangeland in order to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

(3) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> MARINE AIRCRAFT WING(a) (U) Phase I (Main Effort)

1 (U) Attack the command and control capabilities and logistic facilities of the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades in order to reduce their ability to coordinate actions between the brigades and to provide ammunition and fuel resupply.

2 (U) Attack the command and control capabilities and logistic facilities of the 401<sup>st</sup> and 402<sup>d</sup> Artillery Regiments in order to reduce their ability to mass fires above the battalion level and provide ammunition and fuel resupply.

3 (U) Gain and maintain air superiority within the MEF AO.

4 (U) Provide an ACE to the SPMAGTF-B.

5 (U) Operate and maintain the airfield at Greentown for the duration of the operation.

6 (U) Assume responsibilities as sector anti-air warfare coordinator in the MEF AO.

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7 (U) Be prepared to provide close air support (CAS) and assault support to the MEF reserve for the duration of the operation.

8 (U) Be prepared to provide CAS and assault support to the MEF Rear Area Commander for the duration of the operation.

(b) (U) Phase II1 (U) Stage A

a (U) Isolate the MEF AO in order to prevent enemy reinforcement from Orangeland.

b (U) Interdict enemy forces south of PL Black in order to prevent enemy reinforcement in the south.

c (U) Be prepared to provide CAS and assault support to NAVFOR-B in order to support SPMAGTF-B.

2 (U) Stage B

a (U) Continue to isolate the MEF AO in order to prevent enemy reinforcement from Orangeland.

b (U) Be prepared to assume follow and support force to the main effort in order to defeat bypassed units and secure LOCs.

c (U) Continue to interdict enemy south of PL Black in order to prevent enemy reinforcement in the south.

d (U) Reassume command of the ACE upon CHOP of SPMAGTF-B from NAVFOR-B.

(c) (U) Phase III

1 (U) Provide assault support to the 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG (main effort) in order to assist in movement of supplies and services forward.



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2 (U) Pursue enemy forces withdrawing to Orangeland in order to secure the Blueland border.

3 (U) Rearm and refit forces.

4 (U) Be prepared to conduct offensive operations into Orangeland.

(4) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (-) (REIN)

(a) (U) Phase I

1 (U) Provide combat service support to the MEF for the duration of the operation.

2 (U) Provide mobile CSSDs to support 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIVs for the duration of the operation.

3 (U) Provide a CSSE to SPMAGTF-B.

4 (U) Provide a CSSE in order to support security operations, to include the TCF, in the MEF rear area.

5 (U) Coordinate with MLC in order to ensure required support is provided for the duration of the operation.

(b) (U) Phase II

1 (U) Stage A

a (U) Prepare to establish SPOD and/or APOD at Gray City.

b (U) Prepare to establish forward CSSAs in order to support operations.

2 (U) Stage B

a (U) On order, establish a secondary SPOD and/or APOD at Gray City.

b (U) On order, establish forward CSSAs in order to support operations.

c (U) Reassume command of the CSSE upon CHOP of SPMAGTF-B from NAVFOR-B.

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(c) (U) Phase III (Main Effort)

1 (U) Rearm, refit, and resupply the MEF to conduct potential offensive operations in Orangeland.

2 (U) Establish CSSAs in vicinity of the Blueand/Orangeland border in order to support potential offensive operations in Orangeland.

(5) (U) SPMAGTF-B(a) (U) Phase I

1 (U) Receive forces from 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV, 3<sup>d</sup> MAW, and 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG.

2 (U) On order CHOP to NAVFOR-B in order to conduct amphibious operations in support of I MEF.

(b) (U) Phase II, Stage B

1 (U) On order, CHOP to MARFOR-B.

2 (U) On order, disestablish SPMAGTF-B.

(6) (U) REAR AREA COMMANDER. (All phases.)

(a) (U) Establish a rear area command post (RACP).

(b) (U) Coordinate security of facilities within the rear area.

(c) (U) Coordinate host nation security forces in order to provide security for main supply routes, LOCs, and critical infrastructure in zone.

(d) (U) Conduct area management in the MEF rear area.

(e) (U) Conduct movement control in the MEF rear area in conjunction with 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG.

(f) (U) Assume OPCON of TCF.

(g) (U) Coordinate with MSCs for support of the TCF.

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(h) (U) Coordinate turnover of rear area with MARFOR-B.

d. (U) MEF RESERVE

(1) (U) Phase I (Infantry Regiment [-] [Rein]). Be prepared to conduct counterattack operations and support the rear area commander.

(2) (U) Phase II (Infantry Regiment [-] [Rein]). Be prepared to conduct operations in order to exploit success of main effort.

(3) (U) Phase III (3<sup>d</sup> MARINE DIVISION [-] [Rein]). Be prepared to conduct offensive operations in Orangeland.

e. (U) Commander's Critical Information Requirements

(1) (U) Where are the exploitable gaps in Orangeland's first echelon through which the MEF can maneuver?

(2) (U) When will I have enough logistic capability to support a two-division attack to the Orangeland/Blueland border without an operational pause?

(3) (U) Are there indications that the enemy first echelon is withdrawing toward Gray City prior to D-Day?

(4) (U) Any indications of increased terrorist activity in our rear area?

(5) (U) What is the trafficability of the terrain west of Tealton for armored vehicles?

f. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) D-Day, H-Hour. On order.

(2) (U) Geographic Description of the Operations Area. See Annex C (Operations).

(3) (U) Rules of Engagement. Appendix 6 to Annex C (Operations).

(4) (U) Fire Support Coordinating Measures. See Appendix 19 to Annex C (Operations).

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(5) (U) Direct Liaison Authorized. Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with supporting commands is authorized.

(6) (U) Mission-Oriented Protective Posture. Mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level: 0.

(7) (U) Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons. MSC commanders are responsible for handling enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), detainees, displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees in their area of operations prior to release to 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG. The FSSG will then hand over EPWs, detainees, and displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees to the MLC for further processing. See Appendix 1 to Annex E (Personnel).

(8) (U) Information Warfare. See Appendix 3 to Annex C (Operations).

(9) (U) Evasion & Recovery Operations. See Appendixes 5 and 11 to Annex C (Operations).

(10) (U) Changes. Submit recommended changes to published maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures to this headquarters (G-3).

(11) (U) Host Nation Support and Infrastructure Development. Host nation support and infrastructure development will be coordinated by the MLC.

(12) (U) Measures of Effectiveness

(a) (U) The 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades are defeated. Measure of effectiveness (MOE) assessment criteria: cannot coordinate defensive and/or counterattack operations above battalion level.

(b) (U) The 401<sup>st</sup> and 402<sup>d</sup> Artillery Regiments neutralized. MOE assessment criteria: cannot mass fire above battalion level; destroyed 155mm howitzer capability.

#### 4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Personnel. MSC commanders are responsible for implementing internal force reconstitution; morale, welfare, and recreation; postal; administration;

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disbursing; and ecclesiastical programs. See Annex E (Personnel).

b. (U) Logistics. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).

(1) (U) Logistics in the JAO is primarily an individual Service responsibility. CJTF-B has established common, cross-Service, and joint servicing agreements that provide economies and efficiencies in certain functional logistic areas that alters the individual Service's logistic concept. The MLC will provide logistic support via prepositioned supplies, host nation supply, and theater resupply.

(2) (U) (U) MARFOR-B will participate in joint boards, offices, and centers that facilitate logistic resource prioritization and allocation decision-making. MSCs provide requirements to the MEF G-4 as input to MARFOR-B for the following boards:

(a) (U) Theater Sub-Area Petroleum Office.

(b) (U) Joint Civil Military Engineer Board.

(a) (U) Joint Facilities/Installation Utilization Board.

(b) (U) Joint Medical Regulating Office.

(c) (U) Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.

(d) (U) Joint Blood Program Office.

(3) (U) Coordinate with MEF G-4 for host nation support in the following areas:

(a) (U) Line haul and bulk liquid transportation.

(b) (U) Water supply.

(c) (U) Port and terminal support and services.

(d) (U) Materiel handling equipment.

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- c. (U) Public Affairs. See Annex F (Public Affairs).
  - d. (U) Civil Affairs. MSC commanders will be thoroughly familiar with the applicable provisions of international law, treaties, and agreements as they relate to Blue-land and neighboring countries. The MEF civil affairs activities will be governed by CJTF-B policies regarding noncombatant evacuation, use of indigenous labor, and coordination with local civil law enforcement organizations. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
  - e. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. See Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
  - f. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. Geospatial information and services and products will be ordered and delivered in accordance with the procedures contained in Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
  - g. (U) Medical Services. Echelons I and II of health service support are provided in the MEF area of operation with additional support provided by the amphibious ships, the U.S.S. Mercy, and the fleet hospital located in the communications zone. All MEF casualties, both battle and nonbattle, who are not expected to return to full duty within 7 days of wounding or onset of illness, will be evacuated from theater via U.S. Air Force airlift.
5. (U) Command and Signal
- a. (U) Command Relationships. Annex J (Command Relationships).
  - b. (U) Command Posts and Headquarters
    - (1) (U) USCINCPAC, Camp H. M. Smith, HI.
    - (2) (U) JTF-B: Purpletown (NJ 32-14/525390), Blue-land.
    - (3) (U) ARFOR-B: Jade City (NJ 32-11/498441), Blue-land.
    - (4) (U) NAVFOR-B: LCC-20, Afloat.
    - (5) (U) AFFOR-B: Purpletown (NJ 32-14/525390), Blue-land.

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(6) (U) MARFOR-B: Greentown (NI 32-10/566281),  
Blueland.

(7) (U) JSOTF-B: Purpletown (NJ 32-14/525390),  
Blueland.

(8) (U) CG, I MEF (Main): Greentown (NI 32-10/  
596276), Blueland. I MEF (Forward): in trace of main  
effort.

(9) (U) CG, 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV: Brownburg (NI 32-11/543968),  
Blueland.

(10) (U) CG, 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV: Greentown (NI 32-10/566281),  
Blueland.

(11) (U) CG, 3<sup>d</sup> MAW: Silverton (NI 32-10/560781),  
Blueland.

(12) (U) CG, 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG: Golden Bay (NI 32-10/576981),  
Blueland.

(13) (U) Rear Area Commander: Golden Heights (NI 32-  
10/573987), Blueland.

c. (U) Succession to Command

(1) (U) DCG, I MEF.

(2) (U) CG, 3<sup>d</sup> MAW 1.

(3) (U) CG, 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV.

(4) (U) CG, 3<sup>d</sup> FSSG.

(5) (U) CG, 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV.

d. (U) Signal. CJTF-B will provide local telephone,  
data, and teletype switching at Headquarters, JTF-B.  
CJTF-B will also provide HF and UHF single-channel  
voice satellite and SHF multichannel satellite telecom-  
munications links among JTF-B and joint task force com-  
ponents utilizing existing communications means and  
Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) assets  
while deployed to theater. The MSCs and supporting com-  
mands are responsible for all internal communications.  
Communication, operations, and intelligence liaison of-  
ficers will be exchanged with CJTF-B. Air messenger  
service will be available on request from AFFOR-B. All

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major subordinate commands will use tactical combat operations (TCO) systems to facilitate dissemination of information.

## ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GERALD C. THOMAS  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Commanding

## ANNEXES:

A - Task Organization  
B - Intelligence  
C - Operations  
D - Logistics/Combat Service Support  
E - Personnel (TBI)  
F - Public Affairs  
G - Civil Affairs  
H - Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations (TBI)  
J - Command Relationships  
K - Combat Information Systems  
L - Environmental Considerations  
M - Geospatial Information and Services  
N - Space Operations (Omitted)  
P - Host Nation Support  
Q - Medical Services  
S - Special Technical Operations (Omitted)  
U - Information Management  
W - Aviation Operations  
x - Execution Checklist  
Z - Distribution

## OFFICIAL:

s/

M.B. TWINING  
Colonel, USMC  
AC/S G-3



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### Example of Annex A (Task Organization)

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GREENTOWN, BLUELAND

17 April 2001

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ANNEX A TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD)(U)

TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

(U) REFERENCES: None

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

(All attachments effective 170001Z Apr 2001)

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

LtGen THOMAS

HqSvc Bn, I MEF

Command Element, I MEF

Headquarters Group, I MEF

7<sup>th</sup> Comm Bn (-), I MEF1<sup>st</sup> Intel and EW Bn (-), I MEF1<sup>st</sup> Intelligence Bn, I MEF1<sup>st</sup> Radio Bn (-), I MEF1<sup>st</sup> Force Reconnaissance Co (-), I MEFDet, 3<sup>d</sup> Civil Affairs Group, MARFORRES1<sup>st</sup> MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

MajGen VANDEGRIFT

Headquarters Battalion (-)

1<sup>st</sup> Marine Regiment5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment11<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment (rein)1<sup>st</sup> Tank Battalion4<sup>th</sup> Tank Battalion (-)1<sup>st</sup> Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion3<sup>d</sup> Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-)3<sup>d</sup> Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) 1st Combat

Engineer Battalion

1<sup>st</sup> Reconnaissance Battalion3<sup>d</sup> MARINE DIVISION (-) (REIN)

BGen HENDERSON

Headquarters Battalion (-)

3<sup>d</sup> Marine Regiment4<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment

A-1

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24<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment  
 12<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment (-)  
 8<sup>th</sup> Tank Battalion (-)  
 4<sup>th</sup> Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-)  
 4<sup>th</sup> Assault Amphibian Battalion (-)  
 1<sup>st</sup> Combat Assault Battalion

3<sup>d</sup> MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

MajGen GEIGER

MWHS-3  
 MAG-11  
     MALS-11  
     VMFA-232  
     VMFA-314  
     VMFA-323  
     VMGR-352  
     VMFA(AW)-121  
     VMFA(AW)-242  
     VMFA(AW)-225  
 MAG-12  
     MALS-12  
     VMA-231  
     VMFA-212  
     VMFA-251  
     VMFA(AW)-332  
     VMAQ-1  
 MAG-13  
     MALS-13  
     VMA-211  
     VMA-214  
     VMA-311  
     VMA-513  
     VMU-1  
 MAG-16  
     MALS-16  
     HMM-161  
     HMM-163  
     HMM-164  
     HMH-361  
     HMH-462  
     HMH-465  
     HMH-466  
 MAG-39  
     MALS-39  
     HMLA-169  
     HMLA-267

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HMLA-367  
 HMLA-369  
 HMM-165  
 HMM-166  
 HMM-268  
 HMM-364  
 MACG-38  
 3<sup>d</sup> LAAD  
 MACS-1  
 MASS-3  
 MWCS-38  
 MTACS-38  
 MWSG-37  
 MWSS-371  
 MWSS-372  
 MWSS-373  
 MWSS-374

1<sup>st</sup> FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP (-) (REIN)

BGen PATE

H&S Battalion (-)  
 1<sup>st</sup> Maintenance Battalion (-)  
 1<sup>st</sup> Medical Services Battalion (-)  
 1<sup>st</sup> Dental Battalion  
 1<sup>st</sup> Supply Battalion (-)  
 9<sup>th</sup> Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Rein)  
 7<sup>th</sup> Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Rein)  
 3<sup>d</sup> Naval Construction Regiment (OPCON)

MEF RESERVE

TBD

SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF-B

BGen Carlson

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS

EDWARD SNEDECKER  
 Brigadier General, USMC  
 Deputy Commander

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## APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (Omitted)
- 2 - Shortfall Identification
- 3 - Force Module Identification (Omitted)
- 4 - Deterrent Options (Not used in Marine Corps plans or orders. Included to conform with CJCSM 3122.03.)
- 5 - Reserve Component Requirements Summary (TBI)

## OFFICIAL:

s/

M.B. TWINING

Colonel, USMC

AC/S G-3

### Example of Annex B (Intelligence)

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17 April 2001  
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ANNEX B TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION  
SHARP SWORD) (U)  
INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) CJTF-Blueland OPORD 0002-01, 10 April
- (b) MARFOR Blueland OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (c) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGE-  
LAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND),  
1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10 (GREENTOWN,  
BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY, BLUELAND),  
edition 2; NJ 32-15 (PURPLETOWN, BLUELAND) 1:250,000.
- (d) Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Sup-  
port to Operations*
- (e) Joint Pub 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Mili-  
tary Operations*
- (f) Joint Pub 2-02, *National Intelligence Support to  
Joint Operations*
- (g) MCDP 2, *Intelligence*
- (h) MCWP 2-1, *Intelligence Operations*
- (i) FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A, *Intelligence Preparation of  
the Battlefield*
- (j) I MEF Intelligence Standing Operating Procedures

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. See  
reference (a).

b. (U) Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic, and  
Weather

(1) (U) Terrain. With a total land area of 63,378  
square miles (about the size of Missouri or Flori-  
da), Blueland is the smallest of the countries in  
the region. It is bounded by Orangeland on the

B-1

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southeast, Berinab on the south, and the Westphala Sea on the north and east. Topographically, three mountain ranges dominate Blueland, all eastern extensions of the Moarbak Chain. The Longara Mountain Range divides Blueland into a well-watered north and semiarid south. The northern zone has three subregions: the northwest, with extensive forests; the north central, with extensive grasslands; and the northeast (from Cohanab to Cape Donakan), which boasts of extensive livestock, citrus groves, and produce. South of these areas is the central plateau region of Jesara and the oil fields. Moving farther south towards Beydle, the land becomes increasingly arid, with date palm oases and salt marshes (the largest stretches almost the full width of the country west of Gray City). At the southern extreme of Blueland, this arid area merges into the Greater Hobetab Desert. During the period covered by this operation plan, it is anticipated that these salt marshes will be flooded and impassable.

(2) (U) Weather. Except for the coastal strip, Blueland has a desert climate characterized by little cloudiness, light and irregular precipitation, and very high summer temperatures (June through August). The coastal strip has a moderate climate with mild, cloudy, wet winters (early December through February) and hot, dry summers. Mean annual precipitation ranges from 60 inches on the northwestern coastal slopes to less than 4 inches in the central southern desert sections. Most rainfall occurs from October through March. The annual frequency of thunderstorms is low, the maximum being about 20 days per year in the coastal and mountain regions. Temperatures range from 38 degrees Fahrenheit to above 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the interior. Two phenomena common to Blueland are the sirocco (a persistent, oppressively hot, dry, dust-laden wind that blows northward from the southern desert in the summer) and sandstorms (which may occur during the dry season). During the dry season, clouds of dust raised by vehicles will increase detection capabilities in the desert regions. In the north, during the wet season, flooding and the exceptionally soft mud will hinder movement and resupply.

B-2

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c. (U) Estimate of Enemy Capabilities

(1) (U) Situation. The NOG is currently in an operational pause while it resupplies and re-equips its units. The resupply process is anticipated to take 2 to 4 days due to lack of transportation assets. It appears that elements of the 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade and the 202<sup>d</sup> Mechanized Brigade are pursuing the BlueLand 311<sup>th</sup> Brigade as it withdraws toward Tealton. Contact is being maintained, but apparently the NOG lacks the logistics to maintain an aggressive pursuit. All Orangeland and BlueLand minefields and barriers established prior to and during the battle of Gray City appear to have been cleared and no longer present an obstacle to movement. Although not detected, a reconnaissance screen can be assumed to be out even farther to the north-northeast of Tealton. Other NOG brigades have crossed the Orangeland border and have now assumed control of the region south of Gray City.

(2) (U) Capabilities. The Orangeland NOG remains capable of conducting multiple brigade operations. They are also capable of occupying and defending the Jesara oil fields with four brigades supported with an artillery regiment within 24 hours. They can also withdraw, but would experience problems due to the restrictive nature of the LOCs. The NOG also has the capability to reinforce its leading brigades within 48 hours with four additional brigades or can defend along the coastal highway. Although Orangeland does not have the capability to gain or maintain air superiority, it can conduct limited air attacks and possible missile strikes in support of NOG operations. If lucrative coalition targets are located by Orangeland forces, their high performance aircraft may attack coalition targets. THREAT LEVEL 2 will continue to be in effect since terrorist activity against U.S. bases and rear areas in BlueLand is likely. Activities have been detected that indicate Orangeland is conducting operational training in a chemical environment—the possibility exists that Orangeland will use chemical weapons to defend the continued existence of the regime. Other Orangeland forces continue to be located in the vicinity of the eastern border with Cheryan. Due to ongoing tensions



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with the Cheryan government, Orangeland forces are not expected to be committed elsewhere.

(3) (U) Vulnerabilities

(a) (U) Transportation and Logistics. The scarcity and uneven distribution of transportation facilities and routes in southern Blueland will restrict avenues of attack. While overland travel is feasible, increased maintenance problems for his mechanized forces due to the rough terrain and greatly reduced movement rates will necessitate use of the road system whenever possible. Existing logistical support capabilities severely limit the enemy's ability to extend operations.

(b) (U) Leadership. Orangeland's *de facto* one-man rule and lack of formal governmental structure has isolated its leadership making it vulnerable to dislocation. There is also a possible vulnerability inherent in the conflicting values of the leadership and large sections of the population that could be exploited.

(c) (U) Economy. Orangeland's total dependence upon the oil industry and lack of an indigenous arms industry makes it particularly vulnerable to a strategic attack or embargo.

(d) (U) Air Force. The competence of Orangeland pilots is considered to be fair; however, they are not known to fly at night or during instrument meteorological conditions. These more challenging missions are often flown by contract, foreign national pilots. Orangeland has a relatively unsophisticated integrated air defense system (IADS), centering on a single, SA-5 system located in the capital. Maintenance personnel often lack the technical skills necessary to maintain sophisticated air and air defense systems. Their air force formerly relied upon Eastern European technicians for maintenance and technical assistance. The current availability of these expatriates is unknown.

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(e) (U) Land Force. Orangeland army groups are vulnerable to air attack because they lack a robust air defense capability. Each group has an air defense brigade with one SA-6 battalion (used to protect group headquarters, the artillery regiments, and logistic sites) and two battalions of antiaircraft artillery of varying caliber. These assets, while adequate when the NOG attacked Blueland, will not suffice against the modern air threat posed by the MEF.

(f) (U) Command and Control. Command and control limitations and lack of training degrade the enemy's ability to smoothly execute combined-arms operations. The inferiority of Orangeland's training reduces the effectiveness of their more sophisticated weapons systems.

(g) (U) Navy. The competence of the Orangeland navy is considered to be good; however, they are littoral in nature and unlikely to venture outside their antilanding and IADS envelopes. They present a formidable mining and cruise missile threat to amphibious and naval gunfire (NGF) ships operating within 50 nm of the coast.

(4) (U) Military Personalities

(a) (U) Field Marshal Chilmand A. Sondo. Field Marshal Sondo, the revolutionary leader, exercises all power through the General People's Congress (GPC). The GPC members are elected by local Popular committees. However, only candidates approved by the Revolutionary committees can run for election. The Revolutionary committees are in turn controlled by the general secretariat, which is personally run by Sondo.

(b) (U) Major General Arey R. Dobhan. MajGen Dobhan is an aggressive, brilliant, and confident commander. He received his undergraduate education in the United States and attended all levels of military schools within the former Soviet Union. Thus far, his leadership of the NOG has been flawless. During military operations, he has displayed his flair for surprise, innovation, and aggressiveness. Dobhan is the

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key operational commander in the Orangeland Armed Forces and is, by far, the most talented.

(c) (U) Brigadier General Sand D. Bakken.

Bakken is the commander of the 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade, and he currently enjoys "most favored" status with Sondo. Extensively trained in the former Soviet Union, Bakken is firmly convinced that the successful commander must properly coordinate his supporting arms assets to ensure synchronization and unity of effort. He has assembled a highly competent staff and demands extremely detailed planning for the simplest of operations. Considered to be the most competent armored force commander in the region, he is contemptuous of the Orangeland air force and its inability to prevent foreign air strikes against his country.

(d) (U) Brigadier General Mann E. Teay.

Teay is the commander of 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade, and he is currently out of favor with Sondo. Reliable reports indicate that a recent black market scandal within his brigade's supply and maintenance management program, along with his subsequent inability to conceal this scandal, resulted in a personal reprimand from Sondo. Teay's initial training was in Sudbania, followed by advanced studies in Kanistan. He is assessed to be a very competent and aggressive commander who has surrounded himself with equally aggressive staff officers and subordinate commanders.

(5) (U) Commanders' Idiosyncrasies and Doctrinal Patterns

(a) (U) Commanders' Idiosyncrasies. Although Orangeland's central government maintains ultimate control of all military operations, they have shown favor towards individual leaders within the military. The military hierarchy is firmly dominated by Field Marshal Sondo who personally approves all command appointments. Initiative is perceived as risky, and military tactics tend to be conservative. One of the few

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exceptions is MajGen Dobhan, who is a risk taker and prefers the offensive whenever possible.

(b) (U) Doctrinal Patterns. Orangeland continues to follow a modified Soviet doctrinal style with only those modifications required due to a predominately illiterate population, effects of terrain, and restrictions placed upon acquisition of high technology equipment.

(6) (U) Orangeland Centers of Gravity

(a) (U) Orangeland Operational Centers of Gravity. The NOG is the operational COG, composed of eight separate brigades and two artillery regiments. The NOG has the personal sponsorship of Sondo and is allowed to recruit personnel from the remainder of the Orangeland armed forces. As a result, the quality of personnel and equipment within this unit is without equal within Orangeland's armed forces. The nucleus of the command element of the NOG has been together for approximately 1 year and has conducted numerous command post exercises and small-scale field exercises.

(b) (U) NOG Tactical Center of Gravity. The core of the NOG is the armored striking power of the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades. Supported by their respective artillery regiments, these two brigades have historically been used to exploit success or conduct counterattacks. They have been the decisive factor in the previous success of the NOG against Blueland forces. The NOG can be expected to husband these forces until the critical point of the battle.

(7) (U) Orangeland Courses of Action

(a) (U) Most Likely COA. The NOG will conduct an attack to occupy the Jesara oil fields. The lead echelon, with one armored brigade (102<sup>d</sup>), and three mechanized brigades (201<sup>st</sup>, 202<sup>d</sup>, 203<sup>d</sup>) supported by one artillery regiment (401<sup>st</sup>), will attack and occupy the Jesara oil fields and the suburban areas of Tealton to the

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east, trying to force us to conduct MOUT operations. Elements of the NOG (201<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Brigade) will probably occupy positions around and to the north of Jesara oil fields in the next 24 to 48 hours. The 202<sup>d</sup> Mechanized Brigade is expected to occupy positions to the west. The 203<sup>d</sup> Mechanized Brigade will move to the southeast of the oil fields. After taking the oil fields, expect NOG engineers to establish brigade-sized defensive positions, supported by extensive minefields and barriers. The 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade and 401<sup>st</sup> Artillery Regiment are expected to occupy reserve positions south of the oil fields and provide fires for the lead elements of the NOG. Although not likely, reinforcements from the second echelon could arrive within 24 hours. The second echelon will establish a hasty line of defense south of Gray City and will consist of one armored brigade (103<sup>d</sup>) and three mechanized brigades (204<sup>th</sup>, 205<sup>th</sup>, 206<sup>th</sup>), supported by an artillery regiment (402<sup>d</sup>). The second echelon will exploit the coastal salt marshes, rugged inland mountains, and narrow coastal plains to funnel MEF forces into selected chokepoints. Second echelon primary tasks will include the security of the main supply route (Route 1) for supply of the NOG, facilitating the movement of supplies forward to NOG brigades, and the establishment of an in depth defense. It is expected that the NOG will delegate operational control of the forward deployed brigades to the commander of the 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade, and the rear brigades near Gray City will be under the operational control of the commander of the 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade. NOG rear elements will continue to be responsible for defense of the coast from the border to the oil fields (approximately 150 miles), but large gaps will most likely exist. Orangeland helicopters will operate from forward bases or forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) to support the NOG's effort to occupy and defend the Jesara oil fields. Advance NOG forces will be supported by organic antiaircraft

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artillery (AAA), SA-7s, artillery, and occasional fixed- and rotary-wing close air support. Although this COA exposes the NOG to the prospect of defeat in detail, it is attractive because it seizes the Jesara oil fields and forces the U.S. to the potential of high casualty in a MOUT environment.

(b) (U) Most Dangerous COA. Orangeland forces will establish a deliberate defense south of Tealton. The first echelon will establish prepared defenses in depth in the vicinity of Gray City. By not pressing north to Jesara and Tealton, the first echelon will be able to spend more time establishing defensive positions and building disruptive minefields to block the restrictive approaches to Gray City. The NOG will be able to control the mobility corridors leading to the Gray City chokepoint. The NOG would have a greater chance of holding onto its territorial gains while inflicting high U.S. casualties. The 203<sup>d</sup> Mechanized Brigade will establish defensive positions northeast of Gray City. The 201<sup>st</sup> Mechanized Brigade is expected to occupy positions to the west. The 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade serves as the NOG counterattack force. The 401<sup>st</sup> Artillery Regiment provides fires to lead elements of the NOG. The second echelon will consolidate the coastal regions and secure lines of communication southward towards the border. Supply lines will be shorter; defenses will be better prepared. The NOG headquarters will remain well south of Gray City. It is expected that the NOG commander will place the forward brigades under OPCON of the 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade commander and the rear brigades vicinity Gray City under OPCON of the 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade commander.

2. (U) Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations

a. (U) Mission. Provide predictive, timely, mission-specific, all-source intelligence in order to support planning and execution of offensive operations against forces in the MEF area of operation.

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b. (U) Concept of Intelligence Operations

(1) (U) The MEF G-2 exercises primary staff responsibility for all intelligence operations. Intelligence operations will integrate all-source national, theater, and organic MEF intelligence capabilities to—

(a) (U) Provide early warning and assessment of enemy threats to MEF operations.

(b) (U) Assess enemy capabilities and determine his most likely and most dangerous response to MEF operations.

(c) (U) Detect exploitable weaknesses in enemy military forces.

(d) (U) Identify enemy responses to ongoing psychological operations (PSYOP).

(2) (U) The MEF G-2 will provide intelligence support to all MSCs with priority to the main effort and its intelligence requirements. Intelligence that would assist the conduct of the amphibious operation will be provided expeditiously to NAVFOR-B and the landing force. Other MSC requirements will be prioritized and satisfied as resources permit. The concept of intelligence will remain consistent throughout all stages of the operation while reflecting the differing priorities inherent in the change of main effort. The collection plan will most closely reflect the changes required for each stage. See Appendix 2 (Signals Intelligence), Appendix 5 (Human-Resource Intelligence), and Appendix 7 (Imagery Intelligence).

(3) (U) MSCs will continually review and identify gaps in intelligence and participate in intelligence collection efforts.

3. (U) Intelligence Activities

a. (U) Planning and Direction. The MEF G-2 will ensure adequate intelligence is provided to support operations at all levels of command. National and theater support will be coordinated by the G-2 through the JTF-B J-2. Requests for information (RFIs) from MSC will be

B-10

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forwarded to the MEF G-2. Requests for theater and national intelligence support will specify information required, not means of collection. The MEF G-2 will be the sole authority to pass RFIs forward for action by higher headquarters. The National Intelligence Support Team will be the vehicle by which RFIs are passed to CJTF-B for resolution. RFIs will be prioritized by each requesting subordinate command and will include required update interval and preferred mode of response. The MEF will publish an RFI status report daily by electrical message. MSC are responsible for the intelligence support of their subordinate units.

(1) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) will be the focus of the MEF collection and analysis effort. See Appendix 1 (Priority Intelligence Requirements) for PIRs supporting all three stages of this operation. Additional limited distribution PIRs that support the deception plan and the knowledge of which would compromise the deception plan are contained in Attachment A to Exhibit 2 to Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex C (Operations).

(2) (U) New Requirements. As new intelligence requirements are identified, they will be forwarded via the chain of command to the G-2. Validated requirements will be disseminated electronically throughout the MEF and forwarded as appropriate for theater- and national-level intelligence support.

b. (U) Processing and Exploitation. TBD.

c. (U) Production. The MEF will establish a combat information center (CIC). The production core of the CIC will come from the all-source fusion center (AFC), augmented as required by the MSCs. The AFC will conduct the bulk of intelligence production for the MEF; those production requirements beyond its capability will be forwarded to CJTF-B for resolution.

d. (U) Dissemination

(1) (U) Intelligence reports to the MEF G-2 will be event-driven in the case of indication and warning (I&W) or other critical intelligence information. Notification to major subordinate commands by the



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MEF G-2 of significant events will occur as rapidly as possible via the most expeditious means.

(2) (U) Each MSC will submit INTSUMS to the MEF G-2. These INTSUMS will cover a 24-hour period. The MEF will produce and disseminate an INTSUM to the MSC and CJTF-B.

(3) (U) Intelligence report formats will be in accordance with the I MEF Intelligence Standing Operating Procedures.

(4) (U) Intelligence studies will be distributed via the MEF SIPRNET web-site.

(5) (U) CJTF-B will determine the standards for the release of information to allies.

(6) (U) Imagery will be disseminated to MSCs via SIPRNET. Dissemination by MSCs to their subordinate commands will be by hardcopy.

4. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks

a. (U) Orders to Subordinate Commands and Attached Units

(1) (U) Establish an intelligence collection plan, ensuring incorporation of the PIRs contained in Appendix 1 (Priority Intelligence Requirements) of this annex and all subsequent published intelligence requirements.

(2) (U) Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) procedures, to include numbering system for named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs), will be in references (g) and (h).

(3) (U) Report all incidents of loss of organic collection capability (unmanned aerial vehicle crashed, signals intelligence support team capture, reconnaissance patrol lost, etc.) to the MEF G-2 immediately.

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b. (U) Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units

(1) (U) Provide theater and National Intelligence Agency support as requested, to include a National Intelligence Support Team. See Appendix 10 (National Intelligence Support Team).

(2) (U) Disseminate time-sensitive information collected by national, theater, or adjacent intelligence agencies by the most expeditious means available.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) DIRLAUTH between subordinate and attached commands.

(2) (U) Requests for intelligence support will be submitted to the MEF G-2.

(3) (U) Intelligence liaison officers to be provided by the MEF G-2 to the CJTF-B Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE), NAVFOR-B, ARFOR-B, and AFFOR-B.

5. (U) Communications and Information Systems. See Annex K (Combat Information System).

6. (U) Miscellaneous Instructions. None.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GERALD C. THOMAS  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Commanding

## APPENDIXES:

- 1 – Priority Intelligence Requirements
- 2 – Signals Intelligence
- 3 – Counterintelligence
- 4 – Targeting Intelligence
- 5 – Human-Resource Intelligence
- 6 – Intelligence Support to Command and Control Warfare
- 7 – Imagery Intelligence
- 8 – Measurement and Signature Intelligence

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- 9 – Captured Enemy Equipment
- 10– National Intelligence Support Team
- 11– Intelligence Estimate
- 12– Intelligence Products
- 13– Intelligence Collection Plan
- 14– Reconnaissance and Surveillance plan
- 15– Geographic Intelligence
- 16– Intelligence Operations
- 17– Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

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s/

D. DONAHUE

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AC/S, G-2

### Example of Annex C (Operations)

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17 April 2001

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ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION  
SHARP SWORD) (U)  
OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) CJTF-BlueLand OPORD 0002-01, 10 April
- (b) MARFOR BlueLand OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (c) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGE-LAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUE-LAND), edition 3, 1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10 (GREENTOWN, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-15 (PURPLETOWN, BLUELAND) 1:250,000.
- (d) Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
- (e) Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*
- (f) Joint Pub 3-50, *National Search and Rescue Manual Volume I: National Search and Rescue System*
- (g) Joint Pub 3-50.1, *National Search and Rescue Manual Volume II: Planning Handbook*
- (h) Joint Pub 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue*
- (i) Joint Pub 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*
- (j) Joint Pub 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*
- (k) Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*
- (l) CJCSM 3122.03, 1 Jun 96
- (m) MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*
- (n) MCWP 0-1, *Marine Corps Operations*
- (o) MCWP 0-1.1, *Componency*
- (p) MCWP 3-25.4, *Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook*
- (q) MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

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1. (U) General

a. (U) Purpose. To provide details and guidance for the MEF's conduct of operations in support of CJTF-B Phase III combat operations.

b. (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations in zone and defeats enemy forces in order to restore the Blue-land border. Be prepared to continue offensive operations into Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

c. (U) Area of Operations. The MEF area of operation is a 150 by 90 nm mile rectangle that encompasses the coastal area between Purpletown and Gray City. The area of operation is projected to expand further southward to accommodate the forward movement of MEF units. To keep the area of operation to a manageable size as the area of operation expands to the south, the northern portion of the area of operation will be turned over to CJTF-B.

d. (U) Situation. See Basic Order and I MEF INTSUMs.

2. (U) Concept of Operations. See Basic Order.3. (U) Conduct of Operations

a. (U) Aviation Operations. See Annex W (Aviation Operations) or Appendix 17 (Aviation Operations) if applicable.

(1) (U) The CG, 3<sup>d</sup> MAW is designated as tactical air commander and will coordinate air operations in the MEF area of operations.

(2) (U) The 3<sup>d</sup> MAW, together with other I MEF forces, will attack NOG air defenses to achieve the necessary air superiority. During Phase I, 3<sup>d</sup> MAW, as the main effort, shapes the battlespace by attacking NOG artillery and armor command and control and logistic facilities. In Phase II, 3<sup>d</sup> MAW isolates the battlespace and attacks the NOG COG. In Phase III, 3<sup>d</sup> MAW pursues retreating Orangeland forces.

(3) (U) The 3<sup>d</sup> MAW supports the 1st FSSG logistic build-up.

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(4) (U) All targeting and air tasking order (ATO) preparations will be coordinated with the JTF-B targeting process.

b. (U) Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations. Maritime prepositioning force (MPF) offload operations have been completed. MPF backload will be conducted upon termination of the operation. Maritime prepositioning ships (MPSS) and literage will support CJTF-B operations.

c. (U) Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare. See Appendix 3 (Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare).

d. (U) Counterinsurgency. Not applicable.

e. (U) Nuclear Operations. Not applicable.

f. (U) Nuclear Defense Operations. There is a potential for Orangeland use of chemical weapons. Intelligence reports indicate that should the Orangeland regime perceive a threat to their survival, they may feel they would have nothing to lose by the use of weapons of mass destruction. See Appendix 2 (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations).

g. (U) Special Operations. JSOTF-B will conduct strategic reconnaissance (SR) and direct action operations in support of operations within the JAO. Priority is to SR.

(1) (U) Position Special Forces and SEAL SR teams to observe Orangeland coastal LOCs, locate weapons of mass destruction, detect command posts, and find resupply depots.

(2) (U) Be prepared to conduct direct action missions to destroy command post and key logistic facilities, interdict LOCs at vulnerable points, and seize key terrain to facilitate operations, in priority.

(3) (U) DIRLAUTH has been authorized between JSOTF-B and I MEF.

h. (U) Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel. See Appendix 5 (Evasion and Recovery Operations).

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- i. (U) Rules of Engagement. See Appendix 6 (Rules of Engagement).
- j. (U) Reconnaissance
  - (1) (U) Ten JSOTF-B reconnaissance teams are currently operating in or adjacent to the MEF area of operation to cover CJTF-B TAIs and NAIs. CJTF-B has established restricted fire areas (RFAs), defined as a 1,000-meter radius, around each team. See Appendix 7 (Reconnaissance).
  - (2) (U) CG, I MEF is responsible for the planning and conduct of reconnaissance operations supporting MARFOR-B operations. All reconnaissance requirements will be submitted to the MEF, G-2. See Appendix 7 (Reconnaissance).
- k. (U) Air Base Operability. All MEF aircraft are ashore at airfields in Greentown, Silverton, and Golden Heights, Blueland. See Appendix 8 (Air Base Operability).
- l. (U) Combat Camera. See Appendix 9 (Combat Camera).
- m. (U) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. See Appendix 10 (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations).
- n. (U) Evasion and Recovery Operations
  - (1) (U) CJTF-B will exercise primary combat search and rescue (CSAR) command authority through the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) collocated with the Joint Air Operations Center.
  - (2) (U) The JSRC coordinates all CSAR operations within the JAO.
  - (3) (U) The MEF has primary CSAR responsibility for its own forces within its area of operation. The MEF will establish a rescue coordination center (RCC) to coordinate rescue operations within the area of operation. See Appendix 11 (Escape and Evasion Operations).
- o. (U) Counterattack. See Appendix 12 (Counterattack).
- p. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal. See Appendix 13 (Explosive Ordnance Disposal).

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q. (U) Amphibious Operations. On order, NAVFOR-B conducts amphibious operations in support of MARFOR-B operations ashore.

r. (U) Force Protection. See Appendix 15 (Force Protection).

s. (U) Rear Area Operations. See Appendix 16 (Rear Area Operations).

t. (U) Fire Support. See Appendix 19 (Fire Support).

(1) (U) Targeting Cycle. The targeting cycle will be conducted on a 72-hour cycle in accordance with reference (j). To avoid confusion among numerous events and products, each 24-hour period is designated by a sequential phonetic letter.

(2) (U) Joint Targeting. The JTF-B J-3 will direct the JTF-B targeting process through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCCB). The JTCCB will assist the JTF-B in setting priorities, providing targeting guidance, and determining overall weight of effort.

(a) (U) MARFOR-B will participate on the JTCCB.

(b) (U) The JTCCB will meet daily to review and validate targeting guidance.

(c) (U) CG, I MEF prioritized target nominations will be forwarded to JTF-B/J-3 and JFACC representatives at the JTCCB via MARFOR-B by the most expeditious means available using the target information report (TGTINFOREP) format. Nominations received by 0600 will be considered for inclusion in the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) approved that same day. Targets above the cut line will be scheduled for attack on the next ATO cycle.

(d) (U) Targeting Guidance

1 (U) Target Priorities

a (U) Command and control facilities (battalion level and higher).



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b (U) Fire support means (battalion level and higher).

c (U) Logistic facilities (brigade level and higher).

d (U) Armored units (battalion level and higher).

e (U) Air defense weapons and units.

2 (U) Target Restrictions

a (U) See Appendix 6 (Rules of Engagement) of Annex C (Operations).

b (U) With the exception of reconnaissance operations, no ground cross border operations will be permitted into Orangeland without CJTF-B approval.

c (U) Every effort will be made to limit damage to the Gray City pipeline and its associated support facilities.

(3) (U) Laser Guided Weapons Employment. CJTF-B will assign specific blocks of laser pulse repetition frequency (PRF) codes to facilitate employment of laser-guided munitions. Assignment: To be issued (TBI).

(4) (U) FASCAM Employment

(a) (U) MSC commanders have authority for employment of short duration scatterable mines.

(b) (U) MSC commanders may plan for use of long duration scatterable mines but will not employ them without CG, I MEF approval.

(c) (U) MSC commanders will report the location of all air and artillery FASCAM minefields to the MEF combat operation center (COC).

(5) (U) Fire Support Coordinating Measures (FSCM). Fire support coordination line (FSCL) 1 is currently in effect. FSCL 2 will become effective on H-Hour. MSCs will submit planned FSCMs as developed, to include overlays, to the MEF COC. See Appendix 19 (Fire Support).

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- u. (U) Countermechanized Operations. See Appendix 20 (Countermechanized Plan).
- v. (U) Breaching Operations. See Appendix 21 (Breaching Plan).
- w. (U) Obstacles. See Appendix 22 (Obstacle Plan).
- 4. (U) Operational Constraints
  - a. (U) Ground forces will not cross the Orangeland/Blueland border without CJTF-B approval. CG, I MEF may approve the positioning of ground reconnaissance elements across the border.
  - b. (U) JAO airspace is defined as the airspace from surface to 70,000 feet mean sea level (MSL).
- 5. (U) Command and Signal
  - a. (U) Command. See Basic Order.
  - b. (U) Signal. See Annex K (Combat Information System).

## ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GERALD C. THOMAS  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
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## APPENDIXES:

- 1 – Nuclear Operations (Not used in Marine Corps plans or orders. Included to conform with CJCSM 3122.03.)
- 2 – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations
- 3 – Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare
- 4 – Special Operations
- 5 – Evasion and Recovery Operations
- 6 – Rules of Engagement
- 7 – Reconnaissance
- 8 – Air Base Operability
- 9 – Combat Camera
- 10 – Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- 11 – Escape and Evasion Operations
- 12 – Counterattack
- 13 – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- 14 – Amphibious Operations

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- 15– Force Protection
- 16– Rear Area Operations
- 17– Aviation Operations
- 18– Operations Overlay
- 19– Fire Support
- 20– Countermechanized Plan
- 21– Breaching Plan
- 22– Obstacle Plan

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s/

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### Example of Appendix 3 (Information Operations/Command and Control Warfare) to Annex C

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#### APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS/COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (U)

#### (U) REFERENCES:

- (a) CJTF-BlueLand OPORD 0002-01, 10 April
- (b) MARFOR BlueLand OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (c) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND), 1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10 (GREENTOWN, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-15 (PURPLETOWN, BLUELAND) 1:250,000.
- (d) Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
- (e) Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*
- (f) Joint Pub 3-13.1, *Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)*

#### (U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

1. (U) Situation. See Annex B (Intelligence) and I MEF INTSUMS. As the MEF is now involved in combat operations, information operations (IO) will focus on command and control warfare (C2W).

a. (U) Enemy. The primary IO/C2W threat to MEF forces comes from Orangeland's intense propaganda campaign directed at the region. Their campaign depicts U.S. operations as another example of Western imperialism and colonialism. Orangeland is expected to continue state-sponsored acts of terrorism.

b. (U) Friendly. See Basic Order. The MEF possesses significant forces and technological advantages for C2W. The MEF will coordinate C2W activities via the I MEF IO Cell and the I MEF Targeting Board. U.S. forces have extensive PSYOP and public affairs (PA) assets to

C-3-1

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counter the Orangeland psychological and propaganda efforts. Electronic warfare (EW) and physical destruction will be used in combination to destroy, disrupt, delay, and degrade enemy command and control.

c. (U) Assumptions. None.

2. (U) Mission. I MEF conducts C2W operations in support of JTF-B IO against Orangeland in order to protect U.S. forces and ensure the defeat of Orangeland forces within the MEF area of operation.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Operations. C2W, supported by intelligence (see Appendix 6 to Annex B [Intelligence]), will support the MEF through the synchronized use of deception, physical destruction, EW, OPSEC, PSYOP, PA, and civil affairs. C2W will be conducted throughout the operation by shaping and influencing the local populace, internally displaced persons, and regional actors, and by deterring potential dissent groups who might otherwise seek to interfere with MEF operations. The primary operational offensive C2W effort is directed at degrading NOG C2 systems. The I MEF IO Cell will coordinate the C2W activities within the area of operation, closely integrating the C2W effort into the MEF targeting process through participation on the I MEF Targeting Board. MEF C2W objectives will be accomplished in the following phases, in accordance with the Basic Order phases:

(1) (U) Phase I. MEF C2W actions to be taken during Phase I have five objectives: degrade enemy command and control communications, support PSYOP operations, protect friendly forces, support the deception plan, and support maneuver with physical destruction.

(2) (U) Phase II. MEF C2W actions to be taken during Phase II have five objectives: degrade enemy command and control communications, support PSYOP operations, protect friendly forces, continue support to the deception plan, and support maneuver with physical destruction.

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(3) (U) Phase III. MEF C2W actions to be taken during Phase III have two objectives: support PSYOP operations and protect friendly forces.

(4) (U) MOEs for each C2W objective are contained in the appropriate tab to this appendix.

b. (U) IO/C2W Tasks

(1) (U) Military Deception. The MEF conducts deception operations targeting the NOG commander and his staff. Any tasking for support or synchronized deception operations will be promulgated by this headquarters. Any tactical deception operations planned by MSCs must be coordinated with the I MEF IO Cell.

(2) (U) Electronic Warfare. EW assets available to the MEF are limited. Therefore, tactical jamming assets will be directed at the battalions of the 401<sup>st</sup> and 402<sup>d</sup> Artillery Regiments. Theater assets will generally be directed at brigade-sized units and larger. Keys to successful EW include coordination and deconfliction with adjacent forces and theater assets, pooling of EW assets in theater, and retargeting as necessary.

(3) (U) Operations Security. The MEF's first OPSEC priority is to protect MEF forces in the area of operation. Large-scale logistic operations, the presence of the media, a potentially hostile populace, and the threat of terrorism pose special challenges in addition to the traditional challenges presented by conventional Orangeland forces.

(4) (U) Psychological Operations. The MEF has dissemination authority for approved PSYOP products and approval authority for new products tailored for local conditions that stay within the purview of the PSYOP plan. Recommendations for new themes and products must be submitted by the MEF through MARFOR-B for review and approval.

(5) (U) Physical Destruction. The command and control capabilities of Orangeland's artillery units, brigade and higher units, and intelligence centers will be targeted for physical destruction. Gain and

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loss assessments must be completed before the decision is made to destroy or degrade any command and control target.

(6) (U) Assessment criteria for each C2W task are contained in the appropriate tab to this appendix.

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. All C2W operations must be synchronized with the JTF-B concept of IO/C2W.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics. MSCs must submit daily reports outlining information required for consolidation in the I MEF C2W situation report (SITREP). Information cut off time is 2400Z and must be received by the IO Cell by 0100Z.

5. (U) Command and Control. All communications for C2W planning and execution will be over a secure means.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

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## TABS:

- A - Military Deception
- B - Electronic Warfare
- C - Operations Security
- D - Psychological Operations
- E - Physical Destruction

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s/  
M.B. TWINING  
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AC/S, G-3

## Example of Tab A (Military Deception) to Appendix 3 to Annex C

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01  
(OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)  
 MILITARY DECEPTION (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) CJTF-Blueland OPORD 0002-01, 10 April
- (b) MARFOR Blueland OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (c) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGE LAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUE LAND), 1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10 (GREENTOWN, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-15 (PURPLETOWN, BLUELAND) 1:250,000.
- (d) Joint Pub 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. See Annex B (Intelligence) and I MEF INTSUMS. The MEF is preparing to conduct offensive operations to restore the border of Blueland and will conduct a deception operation to deceive the enemy as to the location of the MEF main effort. The MEF's deception effort is in support of JTF-B deception plan. The unclassified cover term for the MEF's deception is "Wooden Horse."

b. (U) Enemy

(1) (U) General Capabilities. Orangeland has limited technological capabilities but a very robust human intelligence (HUMINT) capability that can be expected to detect or respond to a deception plan. A brief synopsis of the enemy's intelligence capabilities are provided in the table on the following page.

C-3-A-1

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INTEL TYPE	CAPABILITY	REMARKS
HUMINT	Excellent	Agents, sympathizers
SIGINT	Limited	Fixed sites; airborne assets
MASINT	None	
ELINT	Limited	Fixed sites
IMINT	Limited	Tactical reconnaissance

(2) (U) Deception Targets. MajGen Dobhan, commander of the NOG, and his staff are the object of the MEF deception plan.

(3) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions

(a) (U) Aggressive, innovative, and confident. Flair for surprise.

(b) (U) Anti-U.S., pro-regime.

(c) (U) Educated in the former Soviet Union and U.S.

(4) (U) Probable Enemy Courses of Action. See Annex B (Intelligence) and Basic Order.

c. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) JTF-B Deception Story. The most direct avenue of approach to the border of Orangeland runs along the coast. NAVFOR-B in support of the JTF-B main effort will conduct an amphibious operation along the coast behind Orangeland lines. NAVFOR-B will link up with MARFOR-B and attack south to rapidly defeat Orangeland forces and restore the Orangeland/Blue land border.

(2) (U) Critical Limitations. Limiting factors are time and availability of resources due to ongoing JTF-B operations.

(3) (U) I MEF Concept of Operations. The 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV, as the main effort, attacks in zone to penetrate and defeat enemy forces northwest of Gray City. The 3<sup>d</sup>

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MAW, 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV to the east and an amphibious landing to the southeast supports the main effort. The deception will deceive the NOG commander as to the location of the JTF-B main effort.

d. (U) Assumptions. The NOG commander is uncertain whether the JTF-B main effort will come from the west, the east, or from the sea.

2. (U) Mission

a. (U) Operational Mission. See Basic Order.

b. (U) Deception Mission

(1) (U) Deception Goals

(a) (U) Premature commitment of the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades.

(b) (U) Commitment of the 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade against the supporting effort.

(c) (U) Withdrawal of the first echelon.

(2) (U) Deception Objective. To cause the NOG commander to perceive that the MEF main effort will come directly down the east coast or from the sea. The NOG will reorient defenses toward the northeast and prematurely commit reserves against the supporting attack. The amphibious landing will freeze the second echelon and force the withdrawal of the first echelon before it is cut off by the amphibious landing.

(3) (U) Desired Enemy Perceptions

(a) (U) That the NOG commander believes that the eastern attack is the main attack.

(b) (U) That there is a significant amphibious assault threat to his LOCs along the coast.

(4) (U) Deception Story. The most direct avenue of approach to the border of Orangeland runs along the coast. The 3<sup>d</sup> Marine Division, assisted by NAVFOR-B amphibious landings along the coast, will attack

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along this avenue of approach to rapidly defeat the NOG and restore the Orangeland/Blueland border.

3. (U) Executiona. (U) Concept of the Operation

(1) (U) General. The MEF will portray a series of events to the NOG commander that will lead him to conclude that the MEF main effort will attack along the eastern coast road, link up with amphibious assault forces, and attack directly towards the border. Numerous indicators of preparations of an impending amphibious assault and reinforcement of the 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV will be initiated. Care will be taken to avoid compromising the actual location of NAVFOR-B's amphibious assault. Activities will include obvious reconnaissance of probable landing sites, stepped-up extensive patrolling, heavier air operations, leaflet drops, and employment of deceptive communications.

(2) (U) Other IO/C2W Elements

(a) (U) EW/Command and Control (Tab B). Deliberate OPSEC violations conducted over unsecured communications, logistic requests, etc., will be transmitted. Degradation of the NOG command and control capability.

(b) (U) OPSEC (Tab C). Set increased terrorist threat condition (THREATCON) level throughout area of operation. Strict enforcement of operations security (OPSEC) and emission control (EMCON) conditions, particularly in the actual main effort's zone.

(c) (U) PSYOP (Tab D). Distribute leaflets along the coast instructing the indigenous population not to interfere with U.S. forces in the area and that U.S. forces have no fight with the civilians.

(d) (U) Physical Destruction (Tab E). Target C2 nodes that provide potential information of deception to the NOG, particularly reconnaissance elements in the west.

C-3-A-4

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(e) (U) Intelligence Support to C2W (Appendix 6 to Annex B). Alert IO Cell when Orangeland aerial reconnaissance missions are active. Increase obvious reconnaissance and surveillance activity around probable amphibious landing sites. Provide initial feedback on success of deception plan to IO Cell.

(f) (U) Liaison. Establish close coordination with all organizations required to support the deception plan, especially NAVFOR-B.

(3) (U) Feedback and Monitoring

(a) (U) Direct feedback will be conducted by coordinating all available intelligence collection assets to monitor the effectiveness of deception operations (see Appendix 6 to Annex B [Intelligence]). National and theater assets should provide indications of NOG units reacting to the deception.

(b) (U) The following MOEs will be used to monitor the degree to which the NOG is deceived by the deception operations.

1 (U) Physical reorientation of the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades to the northeast.

2 (U) Orangeland detection of U.S. amphibious reconnaissance activities along likely landing sites.

3 (U) Interception of Orangeland communications indicating receipt of deceptive MEF message traffic.

4 (U) Destruction of Orangeland reconnaissance elements forward of the actual main effort.

(c) (U) Information concerning the MOE will be reported immediately to the I MEF IO Cell for assessment.

(4) (U) Means. Execution of the deception plan will begin immediately, using all available MEF and JTF-B assets to support the operation.

C-3-A-5

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(5) (U) Tasks

(a) (U) I MEF IO Cell. Request reconnaissance and special operations forces support for the deception plan through MARFOR-B.

(b) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> MAW. On order, provide aviation assets in order to conduct airborne reconnaissance and insert SOF, force reconnaissance, and radio reconnaissance teams along the coast. Provide aviation assets to protect and extract reconnaissance teams from deception locations.

(c) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG. Promulgate deceptive logistic message traffic as directed by the IO Cell.

(6) (U) Risks

(a) (U) Deception is Successful. Risk is low. The NOG reserve is frozen in place to protect against the threat to the coast. The 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades reorient to the northeast against the supporting effort. The main effort penetrates from the west and forces the NOG to abandon its prepared defensive positions and retreat to the border.

(b) (U) Deception Fails. Risk is moderate. The NOG reserve is available to support defensive operations. The 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades move to attempt to counter the main effort penetration.

(c) (U) Deception is Compromised to Allies or Adversaries. Risk is moderate. Orangeland government uses the deception plan in its propaganda campaign; no political impact in BlueLand. The NOG reserve is available to support defensive operations. The 102<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade moves to attempt to counter the main effort penetration. The 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigade attacks the NAVFOR-B landing force before it can be firmly established ashore.

b. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) Coordinate leaflet drops with JSOTF-B and JFACC.

C-3-A-6

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(2) (U) Coordinate with ARFOR-B to ensure timing and OPSEC of deception activities.

(3) (U) Exhibit 6 (Execution Schedule) provides detailed coordinating actions, timelines, and responsible units for the deception operation.

(4) (U) All deception activities will be closely coordinated with JTF-B.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Administration

(1) (U) General. Aviation and ground reconnaissance activities within the deception objection area will be limited to those that specifically contribute to the success of the deception plan.

(2) (U) Specific. The IO Cell will coordinate all movement within the deception objective area.

b. (U) Logistics. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).

5. (U) Communications and Information Systems

a. (U) Command Relationships

(1) (U) Approval. CG, I MEF is approval authority for execution and termination of Wooden Horse.

(2) (U) Authority. CJTF-B is the supported commander for deception. CG, I MEF is a supporting commander.

(3) (U) Oversight. The IO Cell retains oversight responsibility for coordinating theater deception operations.

(4) (U) Coordination. DIRLAUTH granted between those units participating in Operation Wooden Horse. Inform the IO Cell on all matters pertaining to the planning, execution, and logistics associated with this operation. The IO Cell will coordinate and ensure OPSEC and security compliance for external commands.

C-3-A-7

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b. (U) Communications. All communications for deception planning and execution will be over a secure means.

6. (U) Security

a. (U) General. Security is paramount to the success of this deception operation. Violations, no matter how small or seemingly irrelevant, will be reported immediately to the I MEF IO Cell via secure means.

b. (U) Specific. The MEF IO Cell will establish a deception operations security control officer to ensure strict need to know control of security measures associated with this deception operation. Additionally, this appendix will be a limited distribution to only those units tasked to conduct the deception and those units whose operations may be affected by enemy reaction to the deception.

## ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GERALD C. THOMAS  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Commanding

## EXHIBITS:

- 1 - Task Organization
- 2 - Intelligence
- 3 - Operations
- 4 - Administration and Logistics
- 5 - Command Relationships
- 6 - Execution Schedule
- 7 - Distribution

## OFFICIAL:

s/  
M.B. TWINING  
Col., USMC  
AC/S, G-3

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## Example of Exhibit 2 (Intelligence) to Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex C

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17 April 2001

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EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION  
ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)  
 INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) CJTF-BlueLand OPORD 0002-01, 10 April
- (b) MARFOR BlueLand OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (c) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGE-LAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND), 1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10 (GREENTOWN, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-15 (PURPLETOWN, BLUELAND) 1:250,000.
- (d) Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

1. (U) Mission. Conduct deception operations in support of the JTF-B deception story against the NOG commander in order to cause the NOG commander to perceive that the MEF main effort will come directly down the east coast.

2. (U) Situation

a. (U) Enemy

(1) (U) Target Description. The target of the deception plan is MajGen Dobhan, NOG commander, and his staff.

(2) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions

(a) (U) Aggressive, innovative, and confident due to easy victories over BlueLand forces. Flair for surprise maneuvers.

(b) (U) Anti-U.S., pro-regime.

C-3-A-2-1

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(c) (U) Educated in former Soviet Union and U.S. Trained in both U.S. and Soviet tactics.

(3) (U) Adversary Intelligence Organizations. The NOG intelligence capability is limited in both collection and analytical capability. It is mainly a HUMINT-oriented organization, with limited airborne reconnaissance assets. Although it has adequately supported the NOG during the initial battles with Blue-land, the volume of information that will be generated by fast-paced combat operations with the MEF could overwhelm the NOG G-2. It has a minimal capability to detect the MEF deception.

(4) (U) Adversary Counterintelligence Organizations. The NOG G-2 has a strong counterintelligence capability, but is oriented towards ensuring the loyalty of NOG officers and detecting foreign agent activities. The counterintelligence effort is closely controlled at the NOG, with counterintelligence officers down to brigade level.

(5) (U) Adversary Intelligence Sharing with Other Countries. Orangeland intelligence exchanges are limited to open-source information gathered by diplomats and military attaches. Its primary partner in intelligence exchange is Thrace. This source is a potential target of the MEF deception plan.

(6) (U) Other Sources and Related Matters. Orangeland's international intelligence collection capability is limited and heavily reliant on the news media. Judicious use of the media might be a viable information conduit to Orangeland. There are no other known sources that are likely to affect the NOG in sufficient time to support the MEF deception plan.

(7) (U) Deception and Denial Activities. Orangeland deception activities are relatively unsophisticated and limited to diplomatic and low-level tactical actions. The Orangeland denial capability has historically been excellent in controlling foreign agent operations and preventing information leaks through HUMINT sources.

C-3-A-2-2

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(8) (U) Target Reaction. If the deception is successful, and MajGen Dobhan believes the MEF main effort is coming down the coastline in the east and from the sea, then he will probably react rapidly and forcefully. He will reorient his defenses toward the northeast and commit his reserves against the supporting attack. By moving his forces forward and while attempting to secure and defend the Jesara oil fields (most likely COA), he will focus his efforts in an attempt to cause the maximum number of U.S. casualties. The NAVFOR-B amphibious assault will cut his LOC to Orangeland and force him to withdraw his first echelon forces. If the deception is unsuccessful, then MajGen Dobhan will shorten his LOCs, conduct a strong defense in depth south of Tealton. He will have those reserve forces not committed by the deception plan at his disposal to use to strengthen his defensive lines at both positions (most dangerous COA). MOE to assist in the assessment of the effectiveness of the deception are contained in Tab A to Appendix C (Military Deception).

(9) (U) Third-Party Reaction. Blue-land forces might feel slighted if they are not briefed on the deception plan prior to execution. Otherwise, no adverse impact is foreseen.

b. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) Impact by Unknowing U.S. Forces. Actions by U.S. forces outside of the theater will have no impact on the deception plan. NAVFOR-B and AFFOR-B supporting actions are crucial to the success of the deception. Uncontrolled operations may confuse the clarity of the deceptive indicators fed to the NOG, hinder their analytical recognition of what the deception plan is trying to portray, and compromise the location of the actual amphibious operation.

(2) (U) Timing. The NOG will require sufficient time for its HUMINT network to pick up the indicators and pass the information to the G-2. The MEF rear area actions should begin 7 days prior to execution of the operation. The NOG will require less time to detect and analyze tactical indicators within its own area of operation. Reconnaissance and

C-3-A-2-3

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targeting actions should begin 3 days prior to execution of the operation.

## 3. (U) Intelligence Requirements

a. (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. See Attachment 1 (Priority Intelligence Requirements).

b. (U) Feedback. Direct feedback will be conducted by coordinating all available intelligence collection assets to monitor the effectiveness of deception operations. National and theater assets should provide indications of NOG units reacting to the deception.

c. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks

(1) (U) Service Intelligence Agencies and Organizations. The JTF-B JISE will coordinate the collection and analysis of intelligence by theater and national intelligence organizations to support the MEF deception plan.

(2) (U) Commander's Intelligence Organizations and Assets

(a) (U) MEF G-2. Coordinate the collection and analysis of tactical intelligence within the MEF area of operation to support the IO Cell and the deception plan.

(b) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> Intel and EW Bn. Provide personnel and equipment to employ deceptive communications and conduct reconnaissance activities as directed by the IO Cell.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GERALD C. THOMAS  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Commanding

C-3-A-2-4

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ATTACHMENTS:

- A – Priority Intelligence Requirements
- B – Biographic Sketch of MajGen Dobhan

OFFICIAL:

s/

M.B. TWINING

Col., USMC

AC/S, G-3

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**Example of Attachment A (Priority Intelligence Requirements) to Exhibit 2  
to Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex C**

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17 April 2001

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ATTACHMENT A TO EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C  
TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)  
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. (U) General. All commands participating in the deception plan are requested to submit PIRs required for planning and execution of the MEF deception plan in sufficient time to permit tasking of the collection agency. Those deception plan PIRs that would compromise the existence of the deception plan itself, will not be repeated in Appendix 1 to Annex B (Intelligence) and will be kept at a limited distribution.

2. (U) Before Implementation of the Order

a. (U) What are the critical enemy command and control nodes and communications nodes, links, and sensors that should not be targeted in order for Orangeland to collect and analyze the deception plan indicators?

b. (U) What is the Orangeland HUMINT capability in the MEF rear area?

3. (U) Upon Implementation of the Order

a. (U) What is the disposition of the 102<sup>d</sup> and 103<sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades?

b. (U) What is the status of NOG communications links that are not being targeted due to deception plan requirements?

c. (U) What deception plan information is being passed to the NOG from Orangeland?

d. (U) Where is the NOG commander located?

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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

GERALD C. THOMAS  
Lieutenant General, USMC  
Commanding

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s/  
M.B. TWINING  
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
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APPENDIX 18 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)  
OPERATIONS OVERLAY (U)



(Note: Enemy units and locations are shown for illustration purposes only. Normally these are provided on an intelligence overlay.)

C-18-1

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### Example of Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support)

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17 April 2001  
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ANNEX D TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP  
SWORD) (U)  
LOGISTICS/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) CJTF-BlueLand OPORD 0002-01, 10 April
- (b) MARFOR BlueLand OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (c) MLC BlueLand OPORD 0001-02, 15 Apr 2001
- (d) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGE-  
LAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUE-  
LAND), 1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10  
(GREENTOWN, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY,  
BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-15 (PURPLETOWN, BLUELAND)  
1:250,000.
- (e) Joint Pub 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense  
Transportation System*
- (f) Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Opera-  
tions*
- (g) DoD Directive 4000.19, *Defense Regional Inter-  
Service Support Regulation*
- (h) DoD Directive 4410.6, *Uniform Material Movement and  
Issue Priority System (UMMIPS)*
- (i) DoD 4140.25M, *Procedures for the Management of  
Petroleum Products*
- (j) OPNAVINST 4740.2, *Salvage and Recovery System*
- (k) MCDP 4, *Logistics*
- (l) MCWP 0-1, *Marine Corps Operations*
- (m) MCWP 0-1.1, *Componenty*
- (n) MCWP 4-1, *Logistics Operations*
- (o) MCWP 4-11.6, *Bulk Liquids Operations*

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

1. (U) Situation

- a. (U) Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. (U) Friendly. See Basic Order and Annex A (Task Or-  
ganization).

D-1

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c. (U) Infrastructure. See Annex B (Intelligence). Infrastructure within the AOR will be limited due to the relative lack of modernization within BlueLand. Host nation support will include water; A-rations; APOD and/or SPOD support; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POLs); transportation; limited construction equipment and supplies; and skilled and unskilled labor. BlueLand will also provide assistance with EPWs, detainees, and refugee issues.

d. (U) Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

e. (U) Assumptions. Limited host nation support will be made available, to include SPODS, APODS, bulk liquids, limited transportation, and services. Force deployment will be incremental and significant strategic prepositioned assets will be committed to this operation.

f. (U) Resource Availability

(1) (U) All MSCs will notify this headquarters (AC/S G-4) immediately whenever resources are found to be inadequate to support operations. The report will state the degree of support that can be provided and recommend appropriate alternatives.

(2) (U) Water. Processed, medically-certified water will be provided by BlueLand. Distribution assets are not available from BlueLand. Water will be issued at APOD and/or SPOD and other distribution points as they are established.

(3) (U) A-rations. Annex P (Host Nation Support).

(4) (U) APOD/SPOD Support. Annex P (Host Nation Support).

(5) (U) POL. Host nation POL is available in limited quantities. Annex P (Host Nation Support).

(6) (U) Transportation. Adequate transportation assets are available throughout BlueLand, to include road networks, rail lines, and a developed trucking industry. Due to expected enemy infiltration of special operations forces within BlueLand, some disruption of the transportation network can be expected.

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(7) (U) Construction. The construction industry in BlueLand is moderately developed. However, some production facilities have been sabotaged by terrorists. The remaining construction assets are limited.

(8) (U) Labor. The majority of the skilled labor has been contracted and is currently committed. Unskilled labor is readily available and can be requested through the MEF G-4.

(9) (U) MSR Maintenance. The host nation will provide the majority of MSR road maintenance repairs and minor bridge repairs required between APOD and/or SPOD and operations areas, but not MSR repair within the forward operations area. The MEF is responsible for road maintenance within its area of operation.

(10) (U) Runway Repair. The host nation will provide limited deliberate runway repair at existing air bases. See Appendix 5 (Civil Engineering Support Plan) to Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).

(11) (U) Ports. Eighty percent (80%) of port infrastructure capabilities will be available to support U.S. forces. Host nation personnel will be available to support port operations, and they will conduct those port operations not in support of movement of military cargo.

(12) (U) Ammunition Constraints. CSR will be published for major ground weapon systems and for aviation ordnance.

g. (U) Planning Factors. Use approved planning factors and formulas, except when theater experience or local conditions dictate otherwise. When deviating from routine planning factors, identify the factors used and the reason for such use.

2. (U) Mission. Provide timely and responsive logistics and combat service support to I MEF forces in order to conduct offensive operations and defeat enemy forces in zone.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Logistics and Combat Service Support. Logistics and combat service support will be

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provided in accordance with the operation's concept of operations.

(1) (U) Phase I. Prior to the commencement of ground operations, the MEF will conduct shaping operations to set the conditions for combat operations. Maneuver units will maintain one day of supply (DOS)/day of ammunition (DOA). During shaping, critical supplies (I, III, and V) will be prepositioned at a forward CSSA in the vicinity of 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV rear. Priority of support is to 3<sup>d</sup> MAW.

(2) (U) Phase II

(a) (U) Stage A. Logistic support will continue to be pushed into the area of operation by the MLC. Direct combat service support will be pushed forward to the mobile CSSDs and the forward CSSA. The 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG will continue to push combat service support south and form a second forward CSSA. Priority of CSS is to 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV.

(b) (U) Stage B. The 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG will begin establishing a third CSSA, while general combat service support flows primarily through the first two CSSAs. Priority of CSS is to 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV.

(3) (U) Phase III. 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG efforts to rearm, refit, and resupply the MEF becomes the MEF main effort. CSS will flow primarily through the CSSAs. Priority of support is to 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV.

b. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG

(a) (U) Task organize units to provide general and direct combat service support, as appropriate, to MEF units during all three phases.

(b) (U) Provide a CSSE to SPMAGTF-B for amphibious operations.

(c) (U) Provide CSS element to support security operations, to include the TCF, in the MEF rear area.

(d) (U) Establish the logistic movement control center (LMCC).

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(e) (U) Be prepared to accept EPWs from other MEF units.

(f) (U) Be prepared to construct and maintain temporary EPW, enemy deserters, civilian internees, and detainees facilities. ARFOR-B is assigned theater responsibility for nontemporary facilities and as rapidly as possible these personnel will be transferred to MLC holding facilities.

(g) (U) Be prepared to provide limited logistical support to military civic action in the area of operation.

(h) (U) Be prepared to provide mortuary affairs support as specified in Appendix 8 (Services).

(i) (U) Ensure Marine CSSDs maintain two DOS/DOA in selected classes of supply. The CSSAs will maintain three DOS/DOA.

(j) (U) Develop and submit a concept for bulk POL distribution to the MEF (G-4).

(2) (U) 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV and 3<sup>d</sup> MARDIV. Through employment of organic capabilities, maintain self-sufficiency in all CSS functional areas to the maximum extent possible. Coordinate resupply/support requirements with 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG as required. Ensure sufficient mobility for CSS trains. Ensure one DOS/DOA is available via organic combat service support capabilities.

(3) (U) 3<sup>d</sup> MAW. Maintain self-sufficiency in all combat service support functional areas, to include aviation peculiar logistic support, through employment of organic capabilities. Conduct intermediate-level aviation maintenance support operations aboard assigned T-AVB in support of aircraft logistic support requirements. Coordinate resupply and support requirements via established aviation logistic support channels or MLC as appropriate. Closely monitor stock of PGMs. Be prepared to establish and maintain

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FARPs and forward operating bases to support offensive operations.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Logistics and Combat Service Support

(1) (U) Supply. The concept of support is built upon organic resupply from CSSAs via task-organized Marine CSSDs following in trace of the maneuver elements. The CSSAs will be supported from the MLC via NAVFOR-B and host nation support barges and literature, as well as line haul resupply.

(a) (U) Distribution and Allocation

1 (U) APODs and/or SPODs are established in the communications zone.

2 (U) APODs and/or SPODs will be established in the vicinity of the second and third CSSAs.

3 (U) Current logistic policies and directives remain in effect.

4 (U) Interservice and interdepartmental agency agreements will be used in accordance with applicable regulations.

5 (U) Organic resupply will be obtained from 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG in the CSSA.

6 (U) Transportation priority of effort is for classes I, III, V, and MEDEVACs.

(b) (U) Level of Supply

1 (U) Forces will deploy with required individual equipment and supplies.

2 (U) Requisitioning and resupply will be sourced through the MLC. All commanders will observe the Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS). See reference (f).

3 (U) Critical items of supply have been identified below. MSCs will maintain usage data and stock levels of these critical

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items which include Class I, III (JP-8), V, VII, and blood products.

- (U) Class I. Water
- (U) Class III. JP-8
- (U) Class V(G).

A974	CTG, 25MM APDS-T LINKED
A975	CTG, 25MM HEI-T LINKED
B542	CTG, 40MM HEDP LINKED FOR MK 19
CIS80	CTG, 120MM APFSDS-T
C791	CTG, 120MM HEAT-MP-T (AA)
D501	PROJ, 155MM APERS ADAM-L
D502	PROJ, 155MM APERS ADAM-S
D510	PROJ, 155MM COPPERHEAD
D514	PROJ, 155MM RAAM-S
D515	PROJ, 155MM RAAM-L
J143	ROCKET MOTOR, 5-INCH
M913	CHARGE, DEMO LINEAR HE
N659	FUZE, CONCRETE-PIERCING
PL87	GUIDED MISSILE, STINGER
PV47	GUIDED MISSILE, TOW IIA

- (U) Class V(A).

A990	CTG 25MM PGU-32/U, SAPHEI-T
E509	BOMB GP, MK-83 MD 4, 1000 LBS
F278	BOMB GP, MK 84 MD 6, 2000 LBS
PB69	GM, AGM-65E (LASER) MAVERICK
PD63	GM, AGM-65F (IIR) MAVERICK
PV30	AGM-114K, HELLFIRE
PV89	AIM-9M-8 SIDEWINDER
PU06	AGM088C-1 HARM

- (U) Class VII. All combat vehicles, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and howitzers are critical items.
- (U) Class VIII. Blood and blood plasma products. See Annex Q (Medical Services).

(c) (U) Salvage. Salvage efforts are a MSC responsibility to the salvage collection points in the area of operation. General guidance is contained in reference (e).

(d) (U) Captured Enemy Material. Collection, classification, and disposition of captured



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enemy material is a MEF responsibility. See Annex B (Intelligence).

(e) (U) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. See reference (b) and Defense Acquisition Regulations.

1 (U) Local acquisition has been of mixed reliability, both in desired quality and quantities. Unskilled labor is available, but JTF-B is concerned about the prospects of Orangeland infiltrators.

2 (U) All essential contractor services, to include new and existing contracts, will be reviewed to determine which services are essential to execution. Contingency plans are under development to ensure the continuation of these services should the rear area situation deteriorate.

(f) (U) POL. See Appendix 1 (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply).

(2) (U) External Support

(a) (U) General guidance on inter-Service logistic support is contained in references (b) and (d). Inter-Service support agreements shall be governed by reference (e).

(b) (U) Support Agreement (DD Form 1144) will be initiated by the supporting service as required.

(c) (U) Agreements will be negotiated at the lowest level possible. One copy of each agreement completed or forwarded to another service for action will be forwarded to JTF-B J-4 by the MEF G-4.

(3) (U) Maintenance

(a) (U) General. Commanders are responsible for all organizational preventive and corrective maintenance of organic ground equipment. The 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG will task organize to provide

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intermediate maintenance support in all commodities. Repairs will be performed as far forward as possible via maintenance contact teams (MCT) and/or maintenance support teams (MST). Maximum use of the maintenance float block for on-site exchange, vice repair, is encouraged. All maintenance and maintenance management will be performed per applicable technical manuals. The 3<sup>d</sup> MAW's organizational- and intermediate-level aircraft maintenance, support, and maintenance management will be performed in accordance with Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) and Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program (MAL-SP) directives and technical publications. See Appendix 12 (Maintenance).

(b) (U) Specific Guidance

1 (U) Receiving units will conduct limited technical inspections (LTIs) and SL-3 inventories on all replacement equipment. Commanders will ensure that sufficient technical personnel are assigned to perform LTIs. Equipment will be operationally ready and SL-3 complete to the maximum extent possible.

2 (U) Recovery of immobile, inoperative, or abandoned material is the responsibility of the using unit.

3 (U) Cannibalization and selective interchange is authorized for any combat-essential equipment that is in category red.

(4) (U) Transportation

(a) (U) General. The MEF will establish a force movement control center (FMCC) to ensure transportation movement per operational requirements and priorities established by the MEF COC.

(b) (U) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis. The MEF has sufficient lift resources to execute the required movement

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and transportation tasks. An analysis of redeployment requirements is currently underway.

(5) (U) General Engineering Support Plan. See Appendix 13 (General Engineering).

(6) (U) Health Services. ARFOR-B is the single item manager for theater Class VIII support. See Appendix 9 (Health Services).

(7) (U) Services. See Appendix 8 (Services).

(8) (U) Mortuary Affairs. See Appendix 2 (Mortuary Affairs).

(9) (U) Ammunition. See Appendix 6 (Nonnuclear Ammunition).

(10) (U) Aviation Logistic Support. See Appendix 10 (Aviation Logistic Support).

(11) (U) OPSEC Planning Guidance for Logistics. Maintaining OPSEC in the planning, preparation, and execution of combat service support is critical to the success of our mission. Ensure that all logistic activities promote essential secrecy for operational intentions, capabilities that will be committed to specific missions, and preparatory activities. Our logistic facilities and installations, as well as our resupply LOCs, must be securely maintained. Accordingly, MSC commanders will take measures to ensure logistic activities provide essential secrecy of operational intentions.

b. (U) Administration

(1) (U) MSC logistic reports will be incorporated into the daily SITREP.

(2) (U) Use the following daily SITREP format/instructions for daily logistic reporting. Provide logistic status comments in each category shown below:

G = green, operationally capable

A = amber, operationally capable with significant limitation (remarks required)

R = red, not operationally capable (remarks required)

N = not applicable

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Status=current status

Day X= projected status by day

Category/status/day 1/day 2/day 3/day 4/days 5-7/

days 8-15/days 16-30/

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships) for command and control relationships external to logistical units.

b. (U) Communications and Information Systems. See Annex K (Combat Information Systems) for detailed CIS requirements.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

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APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply
- 2 - Mortuary Affairs
- 3 - Sustainability Analysis
- 4 - Mobility and Transportation
- 5 - Civil Engineering Support Plan
- 6 - Nonnuclear Ammunition
- 7 - Supply
- 8 - Services
- 9 - Health Services
- 10 - Aviation Logistic Support (Normally provided in the aviation combat example plan or order.
- 11 - External Support
- 12 - Maintenance
- 13 - General Engineering

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## Example of Annex J (Command Relationships)

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ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION  
SHARP SWORD) (U)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- (a) CJTF-BlueLand OPORD 0002-01, 10 April
- (b) MARFOR BlueLand OPORD 0004-03, 13 Apr 2001
- (c) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheets G-2 (ORANGE-  
LAND, BLUELAND), edition 12; G-3 (ORANGELAND, BLUE-  
LAND), 1:1,000,000; Series 1501A, sheets NJ 32-10  
(GREENTOWN, BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-11 (JADE CITY,  
BLUELAND), edition 2; NJ 32-15 (PURPLETOWN, BLUELAND)  
1:250,000.
- (d) Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
- (e) Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
- (f) Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Opera-  
tions*
- (g) MCWP 0-1, *Marine Corps Operations*
- (h) MCWP 0-1.1, *Componenty*
- (i) MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

1. (U) General

- a. (U) Purpose. To establish the command relationships between CG, I MEF and supported and supporting commands in accordance with references (a) and (b).
- b. (U) Scope. This annex is applicable only for the duration of Operation Sharp Sword operations as directed by reference (a). The command relationships contained in this annex are effective immediately.

2. (U) Command Lines

- a. (U) Service and Functional Components

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(1) (U) MARFOR-B maintains operational command of all assigned Marine Corps units through the commanders of the MEF and the MLC.

(2) (U) MARFOR-B maintains administrative control of all Marine forces in theater, including SPMAGTF-B, and 15<sup>th</sup> MEU (SOC).

(3) (U) CG, I MEF is designated MARFOR-B executive agent for air operations planning and execution, DIRLAUTH JFACC. Commander, MLC will submit and coordinate air support requests via CG, I MEF.

b. (U) Other Subordinate Commands. See Annex A (Task Organization).

c. (U) Augmentation Forces. None.

d. (U) Alternate Procedures. In the event that CG, I MEF is incapable of carrying out the responsibilities of command, DCG, I MEF will assume command. In the event of that the MEF COC cannot command and control combat operations, the 3<sup>d</sup> MAW COC will be utilized by the MEF commander as the interim MEF COC.

3. (U) Support and Coordination Relationships

a. (U) Supporting Military Forces

(1) (U) ARFOR-B

(2) (U) NAVFOR-B

(3) (U) AFFOR-B

(4) (U) MARFORPAC

(5) (U) MARFORRES

b. (U) Coordinating Authorities. MARFOR-B will conduct necessary coordination with the following authorities:

(1) (U) The JTF-B Joint Rear Area Coordinator is the coordinating authority for force protection and operations in the communications zone.

(2) (U) ARFOR-B has been designated executive agent for rear area operations in the COMMZ. ARFOR-B exercises this responsibility through the Commander, 213<sup>th</sup> Theater Support Command.

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(3) (U) AFFOR-B has been designated as JFACC, AADC, ACA, MDC, and JSRC. AFFOR-B is responsible for air base operations in theater.

(4) (U) NAVFOR-B is responsible for all naval activities in the JOA.

(5) (U) JFPOCC is responsible for theater-wide planning, coordination, and execution of PSYOP.

(6) (U) CG, MLC is responsible for operational logistics sustainment of MARFOR-B forces.

(7) (U) The MEF rear area commander is responsible for all MEF rear area operations.

c. (U) Supporting Agencies. See references (a) and (b).

d. (U) Inter-Service Support Arrangements. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).

e. (U) Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies. Coordination with the Blueand Chief of Mission and military attaches will be done through CJTF-B in accordance with reference (a).

4. (U) Relationships with International and Foreign Commands and Organizations. MARFOR-B will exchange liaison with appropriate Blueand force organizations.

5. (U) Planning Relationships

a. (U) JTF-B JTCTB. MARFOR-B will participate in the JTCTB. I MEF will submit its target nominations to MARFOR-B.

b. (U) ARFOR-B. I MEF has DIRLAUTH for coordination of cross boundary fires and maneuver and logistical support of Army units.

c. (U) NAVFOR-B. I MEF has DIRLAUTH for NSFS, embarked aircraft operations, and amphibious operations planning. SPMAGTF-B has DIRLAUTH for amphibious planning with NAVFOR-B.

d. (U) AFFOR-B. I MEF has DIRLAUTH for ATO planning and execution, airspace control, air defense, SAR, and air-base operations.



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e. (U) JSOTF-B. I MEF has DIRLAUTH for placement and support of search and rescue teams in or adjacent to the MEF AO and aviation support.

f. (U) JFPOCC. I MEF has DIRLAUTH for PSYOP planning and execution.

## ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

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## APPENDIX:

1 - Command Relationships Diagram

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### Example of Appendix 1 (Command Relationships Diagram) to Annex J

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
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#### APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)

#### COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM (U)



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J-1-2

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### Example of Annex X (Execution Checklist)

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ANNEX X TO OPERATION ORDER 0002-01 (OPERATION  
SHARP SWORD) (U)  
EXECUTION CHECKLIST (U)

TIME ZONE: Zulu

ACTION	HEADQUARTERS	TIMING	CONDITIONS
C2W attack against selected NOG command and control nodes	3 <sup>d</sup> MAW	Phase I through Phase II	102 <sup>d</sup> and 103 <sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades and 401 <sup>st</sup> and 402 <sup>d</sup> Artillery Regiments unable to pass information to NOG COC.
Isolate MEF battlespace from reinforcement from the south	3 <sup>d</sup> MAW	D-Day - D+2, Phase II	Units larger than battalion unable to move north.
Main attack	1 <sup>st</sup> MARDIV	D+2, Phase II, Stage A	Orangeland reconnaissance screen destroyed, first echelon engaged.
Supporting attack	3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV	D+2-Hour, Phase II	Shaping operations completed, initial barriers breached, Phaseline Green reached.
Establishment of forward CSSA	1 <sup>st</sup> FSSG	D+4, Phase II, Stage A	4 DOS of required classes of supply on hand.
Link-up with BlueLand forces in Tealton	3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV	Phase II, Stage B	Physical link up at battalion level.
Defeat of the 102 <sup>d</sup> and 103 <sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades	1 <sup>st</sup> MAW	Phase II Stage B	102 <sup>d</sup> and 103 <sup>d</sup> Armored Brigades unable to conduct operations at battalion or higher level.

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<b>ACTION</b>	<b>HEADQUARTERS</b>	<b>TIMING</b>	<b>CONDITIONS</b>
Opening of SPOD and/or APOD at Gray City (FRAGO 3 for branch plan CONDOR applies)	1 <sup>st</sup> FSSG	On order, Phase II, Stage B	SPOD and/or APOD able to handle throughput of 3 DOS per day.
Link up with SPMAGTF-B in vicinity of Gray City	3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV	On order, Phase II, Stage B	Physical link up at the battalion level.
Pursuit operations to destroy withdrawing enemy forces	3 <sup>d</sup> MAW	Phase III	NOG unable to conduct operations at battalion or higher level.
Restoration of the border	1 <sup>st</sup> MARDIV; 3 <sup>d</sup> MARDIV	Phase III	NOG units larger than platoon size unable to cross the border, reconnaissance screen in place, and border posts turned over to Blue Land authorities.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

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## Appendix H

# Glossary

### Section I. Acronyms

#### A

AAA .....	antiaircraft artillery
AADC .....	area air defense commander
ACA .....	airspace control authority
ACE .....	aviation combat element
AFC .....	all-source fusion center
AFFOR-B .....	Air Force Forces-Blueland
AO .....	area of operations
AOI .....	area of interest
APOD .....	aerial port of debarkation
ARFOR-B .....	Army Forces-Blueland
ATO .....	air tasking order

#### B

bn .....	battalion
BSDF .....	Blueland Self-Defense Forces

#### C

C2 .....	command and control
C2W .....	command and control warfare
CAS .....	close air support
CBAE .....	commander's battlespace area evaluation
CCIR .....	commander's critical information requirements
CG .....	commanding general
CHOP .....	change of operational control
CIC .....	combat information center
CJCSM .....	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF-B .....	Commander, Joint Task Force-Blueland
COA .....	course of action
COC .....	combat operations center
COG .....	center of gravity
CONPLAN .....	operations plan in concept format
CSAR .....	combat search and rescue
CSR .....	controlled supply rate
CSS .....	combat service support
CSSA .....	combat service support area
CSSD .....	combat service support detachment
CSSE .....	combat service support element

**D**

DCG .....deputy commanding general  
 det..... detachment  
 DIRLAUTH .....direct liaison authorized  
 DOA ..... day of ammunition  
 DOS .....day of supply

**E**

ELINT .....electronics intelligence  
 EMCON .....emission control  
 EPW ..... enemy prisoner of war  
 EW .....electronic warfare

**F**

FARP .....forward arming and refueling points  
 FASCAM ..... family of scatterable mines  
 FMCC ..... force movement control center  
 FMFM ..... Fleet Marine Force manual  
 FRAGO .....fragmentary order  
 FSCL .....fire support coordination line  
 FSCM ..... fire support coordination measure  
 FSSG .....force service support group

**G**

GCE .....ground combat element

**H**

HF ..... high frequency  
 HQMC .....Headquarters, United States Marine Corps  
 HMM .....Marine heavy helicopter squadron  
 HML/A..... Marine light/attack helicopter squadron  
 HMM ..... Marine medium helicopter squadron  
 HUMINT .....human intelligence

**I**

I&W .....indication and warning  
 IADS ..... integrated air defense system  
 IMINT .....imagery intelligence  
 INTSUM .....intelligence summary  
 IO .....information operations  
 IPB .....intelligence preparation of the battlespace

JAO .....joint area of operations  
JCSE..... Joint Communications Support Element  
JFACC .....joint force air component commander  
JIPTL ..... Joint Integrated and Prioritized Target List  
JISE .....Joint Intelligence Support Element  
JOPES .....Joint Operation Planning and Execution System  
JSOTF-B .....Joint Special Operations Task Force-Blueland  
JSRC .....Joint Search and Rescue Center  
JTF-B .....Joint Task Force-Blueland

LAAD ..... low altitude air defense  
LMCC ..... logistic movement control center  
LOC ..... lines of communications  
LTI ..... limited technical inspection

MACG .....	Marine air control group
MACS .....	Marine air control squadron
MAG .....	Marine aircraft group
MAGTF .....	Marine air-ground task force
MALS .....	Marine aviation logistics squadron
MALSP .....	Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program
MARDIV .....	Marine division
MARFOR-B .....	Marine Forces-Blueland
MARFORRES .....	Marine Corps Forces Reserve
MASINT .....	measurement and signature intelligence
MAW .....	Marine aircraft wing
MCDP .....	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCO .....	Marine Corps order
MCPM .....	Marine Corps Planner's Manual
MCPP .....	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCRP .....	Marine Corps reference publication
MCT .....	maintenance contact team
MCWP .....	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEF .....	Marine expeditionary force
METT-T .....	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available
MLC .....	Marine Logistics Command
MOE .....	measure of effectiveness
MOPP .....	mission-oriented protective posture
MOUT .....	military operations on urban terrain
MPF .....	maritime prepositioning force
MPS .....	maritime prepositioning ship
MSC .....	major subordinate command



MSL ..... mean sea level  
 MST ..... maintenance support team  
 MTACS ..... Marine tactical air command squadron  
 MWCS ..... Marine wing communications squadron  
 MWHS ..... Marine wing headquarters squadron  
 MWSG ..... Marine wing support group  
 MWSS ..... Marine wing support squadron

## N

NAI ..... named area of interest  
 NAMP ..... Naval Aviation Maintenance Program  
 NAVFOR-B ..... Navy Forces-Blueland  
 NLT ..... not later than  
 nm ..... nautical mile  
 NOG ..... Northern Operational Group  
 NSFS ..... naval surface fire support

## O

OPCON ..... operational control  
 OPLAN ..... operation plan  
 OPOD ..... operation order  
 OPSEC ..... operations security

## P

PA ..... public affairs  
 PDE&A ..... planning, decision, execution, and assessment  
 PGM ..... precision-guided munitions  
 PIR ..... priority intelligence requirement  
 PL ..... phase line  
 POL ..... petroleum, oils, and lubricants  
 PRF ..... pulse repetition frequency  
 PSYOP ..... psychological operation

## R

RACP ..... rear area command post  
 RCC ..... rescue coordination center  
 RCT ..... regimental landing team  
 RFA ..... restricted fire area  
 RFI ..... request for information  
 RLT ..... regimental landing team

## S

SHF ..... super-high frequency  
 SIGINT ..... signals intelligence  
 SIPRNET ..... secret internet protocol router network

SITREP .....situation report  
 SOP .....standing operating procedure  
 SPMAGTF-B .....special purpose MAGTF-Blueand  
 SPOD .....seaport of debarkation  
 SR.....strategic reconnaissance

**T**

TAI .....targeted area of interest  
 TCF .....tactical combat force  
 TCO .....tactical combat operations  
 TGTINFOREP .....target information report  
 THREATCON .....terrorist threat condition  
 TPFDD.....time-phased force and deployment data

**U**

UHF .....ultra high frequency  
 UMMIPS.....Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System  
 USCINCPAC .....United States, Commander in Chief, Pacific  
 Command

**V**

VMA .....Marine attack squadron  
 VMAQ .....Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron  
 VMFA.....Marine fighter/attack squadron  
 VMFA(AW).....Marine fighter/attack (all weather) squadron  
 VMGR .....Marine aerial refueler transport squadron  
 VMU .....Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadron

**X**

XO..... executive officer

## Section II. Definitions

### A

**acceptability**—Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and militarily and politically supportable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**alert order—1.** A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. **2.** A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of influence**—A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of interest**—That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of operations**—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**assumption**—A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**avenue of approach**—An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## B

**battlespace—1.** All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C) **2.** The environment factors and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (proposed for Joint Pub 1-02)

**branch(es)—**A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

## C

**campaign—**A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**centers of gravity—**Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**collection plan—**A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**commander's critical information requirements—**Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called **CCIR**. **Note:** CCIRs are normally divided into three primary subcategories: priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information. (MCRP 5-12C)

**commander's estimate of the situation—**A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**commander's intent—**A commander's clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two parts of every mission statement which guides the exercise of initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCRP 5-12C)

**concept of operations**—A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander's concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**concept plan**—An operation plan in concept format. Also called **CONPLAN**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**contingency**—An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**contingency plan**—A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic sub areas of the command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**crisis action planning**—**1.** The JOPES process involving time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. **2.** The time-sensitive planning for deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**critical vulnerability**—An aspect of a center of gravity that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. (MCRP 5-12C)

## D

**decision point**—An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a critical decision. Also called **DP**. (MCRP 5-12C)

**decision support template**—A staff product initially used in the wargaming process which graphically represents the decision points and projected situations and indicates when, where, and under what conditions a decision is most likely to be required to initiate a specific activity (such as a branch or sequel) or event (such as lifting or shifting of fires). (MCRP 5-2A)

**deliberate planning—1.** The JOPES process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. **2.** A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**direction of attack—**A specific direction or route that the main attack or center of mass of the unit will follow. The unit is restricted, required to attack as indicated, and is not normally allowed to bypass the enemy. The direction of attack is used primarily in counterattacks or to ensure that supporting attacks make maximal contribution to the main attack. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**doctrinal template—**A model based on postulated enemy tactical doctrine. It generally portrays frontage depths, echelon spacing, and force composition as well as his disposition of combat, combat support and combat service support units for a given type of operation. It portrays how the enemy would like to fight if he was not constrained. (MCRP 5-2A)

## E

**endstate—1.** What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. (Joint Pub 1-02) **2.** A set of required conditions that, when achieved, attain the aims set for the campaign or operation. (MCRP 5-2A)

**essential elements of friendly information—**Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called **EEFI**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**event template—**A model against which enemy activity can be recorded and compared. It represents a sequential projection of events that relate to space and time on the battlefield and indicate the enemy's ability to adopt a particular course of action. It is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and surveillance planning. (MCRP 5-2A)

**execute order—1.** An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. **2.** An order to initiate military operations as directed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## F

**feasibility**—Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**fragmentary order**—An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in the basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**friendly force information requirements**—Information the commander needs about friendly forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances, information on unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistics status could become a friendly force information requirement. Also called **FFIR**. (MCRP 5-12C)

## H

**high-payoff target**—Target whose loss to the threat will contribute to the success of the friendly COA. (MCRP 5-2A)

**high-value target**—Assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of a specific COA. (MCRP 5-2A)

## I

**intelligence preparation of the battlespace**—In Marine Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called **IPB**. (MCRP 5-12C)

## M

**main effort**—The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power and is directed against a center of gravity through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)

**mission**—**1.** The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. **2.** In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## N

**named area of interest**—A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity

within a named area of interest will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. Also called **NAI**. (MCRP 5-2A)

## O

**on-order mission**—A mission to be executed at an unspecified time in the future. (Proposed for inclusion in MCRP 5-12C)

**operation order**—A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called **OPORD**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operation plan**—Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. **a. OPLAN**—An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called **OPLAN**. **b. CONPLAN**—An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called **CONPLAN**. **c. CONPLAN with TPFDD**—A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**outline plan**—A preliminary plan which outlines the salient features or principles of a course of action prior to the initiation of detailed planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## P

**priority intelligence requirements**—**1.** Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. (Joint Pub 1-02) **2.** In Marine Corps usage, an intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. Also called **PIR**. (MCRP 5-12C)



## R

**rear operations**—Military actions conducted to support and permit force sustainment and to provide security for such actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

**risk**—Chance of hazard or bad consequences: exposure to chance of injury or loss. Risk level is expressed in terms of hazard probability or severity. (MCRP 5-2A)

## S

**sequel(s)**—Major operations that follow the current major operation. Plans for these are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. (MCRP 5-12C)

**situation template**— A series of projections that portray, based on enemy doctrine, the most probable disposition and location of enemy forces within constraints imposed by weather and terrain. (MCRP 5-2A)

**suitability**—Operation plan review criterion. The determination that the course of action will reasonably accomplish the identified objectives, mission, or task if carried out successfully. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**supporting effort**—Designated subordinate unit(s) whose mission is designed to directly contribute to the success of the main effort. (MCRP 5-12C)

**supporting plan**—An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**synchronization matrix**—A format for the staff to record results of wargaming and synchronize the course of action (COA) across time, space, and purpose in relation to the enemy's most likely COA. The staff can readily translate a synchronization matrix into a graphic decisionmaking product such as a decision support matrix. (MCRP 5-2A)

## T

**targeted area of interest**—The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will cause the enemy to either abandon a particular course of action or require him to use specialized engineer support to continue, where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all targeted areas of interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only targeted areas of interest associated with high-payoff targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning and wargaming. Targeted areas of interest differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons. Targeted areas of interest might be engaged by a single weapon. Also called **TAI**. (MCRP 5-12C)

**targeting—1.** The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. **2.** The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**times—**(C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day. **a.** C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. **b.** D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. **c.** F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. **d.** H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. **e.** L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. **f.** M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. **g.** N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. **h.** R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. **i.** S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000). **j.** T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup). **k.** W-day. Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (Joint Pub 1-02)

**trafficability—**Capability of terrain to bear traffic. It refers to the extent to which the terrain will permit continued movement of any and/or all types of traffic. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## W

**war game**—A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**wargaming**—A step-by-step process of action, reaction, and counteraction for visualizing the execution of each friendly course of action in relation to enemy courses of action and reactions. It explores the possible branches and sequels to the primary plan resulting in a final plan and decision points for critical actions. (MCRP 5-2A)

**warning order**—**1.** A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (DOD) **2.** A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. **3.** A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. **4. WARNING ORDER** (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD) A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## Appendix I

### References

#### **DODD (Department of Defense Directive)**

3025.14                      Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and  
Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad  
w/ changes 1 and 2 1.

#### **Joint Publications (Joint Pubs)**

0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
1-02	DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
1-03	Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) General Instructions
2-0	Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support Operations
2-01	Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations
2-02	National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-02	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-05	Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
3-13	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-13.1	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
3-50	National Search and Rescue Manual Volume I: National Search and Rescue System
3-50.1	National Search and Rescue Manual Volume II: Planning Handbook
3-50.2	Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
3-52	Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
3-54	Joint Doctrine for Operations Security
3-56.1	Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
3-58	Joint Doctrine for Military Deception
4-01	Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System
5-0	Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations
5-00.1	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning
5-00.2	Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures
5-03.1	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures)

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)**

3122.03                      Joint Operation Planning and Execution System,  
Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSMI)**

3211.01B                      Joint Military Deception

**Naval Publications**

NDP 5                      Naval Planning  
OPNAVINST 4740.2F              Salvage and Recovery System

**Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)**

1                      Warfighting  
1-1                      Strategy  
1-2                      Campaigning  
1-3                      Tactics  
2                      Intelligence  
3                      Expeditionary Operations  
4                      Logistics  
5                      Planning  
6                      Command and Control

**Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)**

0-1                      Marine Corps Operations (under development)  
0-1.1                      Componentency  
2-1                      Intelligence Operations  
3-25.4                      Marine Tactical Air Command Center Handbook  
4-1                      Logistics Operations  
4-11                      Tactical-Level Logistics (under development)  
4-11.6                      Bulk Liquids Operations  
5-11.1                      Aviation Planning  
5-11.1A                      Aviation Planning Documents

**Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)**

2-12A                      Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace  
5-2A                      Operational Terms and Graphics  
5-12C                      Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of  
Defense Dictionary of Military and  
Associated Terms

## **Marine Corps Order (MCO)**

P3000.18

Marine Corps Planner's Manual

## **Army Field Manuals (FMs)**

34-130/FMFM 3-23-2

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
Operations

100-5

101-5

Staff Organization and Operations

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## **Appendix J**

### **Rapid Planning**

The goal of rapid planning is to expend less time planning in order to provide the executing forces with the maximum time allowable to prepare for the mission. Rapid planning conducted by well-trained, experienced commanders and their staffs can create a tempo of operations that overwhelm the enemy and achieve the commander's objectives. But, hastily conceived, ill-considered plans probably won't succeed, and could result in death. Therefore, the commander and the staff must achieve balance between sufficient time to develop a feasible COA, sufficient time to coordinate its critical details, and sufficient time to prepare for its execution. The commander and the staff must be thoroughly familiar with potential contingencies or missions, and every individual involved with planning must know his role in the planning process. Successful rapid planning is predicated on the unit's early retrieval or receipt of sufficient intelligence and related information; planning experience; foresight to make significant preparations in organizing, training, and equipping; information management; and highly refined, well-rehearsed SOPs. If rapid planning is successful, both planning and preparation requirements are conducted concurrently.

The speed in which a unit can plan an operation varies with the complexity of the mission, the experience of the commander and the staff, and METT-T factors. If time does not allow use of the full, six-step Marine Corps Planning Process, then the commander and the planners may use the rapid response planning process (R2P2), which is a time-constrained version of the full planning process. The R2P2 was developed to enable the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU(SOC)) to plan and begin execution of certain tasks within a 6-hour time period. The rapid planning techniques discussed in this appendix focus on the MEU(SOC) and its 6-hour timeline, but these techniques may be tailored and employed to meet any unit's needs. Rapid planning by non-MEU(SOC) units is usually more effective when conducting routine missions, standard missions, or tasks for which the unit has been well trained and has established SOPs.

#### **1. Actions Prior to Rapid Planning**

To best employ R2P2, a unit must develop capabilities in four areas: planning cells, planning and operations SOPs, intelligence, and information management. If one of these areas is lacking, effective rapid planning may not be achieved.

### **a. Planning Cells**

The amount of staff turnover in the planning cells, to include the commander, directly impacts the staff's ability to plan rapidly; therefore, the composition and membership of the various planning cells used in rapid planning should remain standard. This is particularly true during the pre-deployment training program and deployment of the MEU(SOC) and amphibious squadron (PHIBRON). The planning cells employed by the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON usually include the crisis action team (CAT), the battle staff, and the mission planning cells. These cells must participate in frequent planning exercises that involve real-world scenarios similar to those the unit might encounter. These exercises ensure that the CAT, battle staff, and mission planning cells are thoroughly trained in rapid planning; their members know their commanders and each other; and the planners possess situational awareness of likely contingency missions and areas of operations. Planning cells should understand where they are to meet, what they are to accomplish, and how much time they have to complete their planning efforts. The planning cells also must be capable of conducting concurrent (simultaneous at different echelons of the same command) and parallel (between equivalent echelons of different commands) planning.

### **b. Planning and Operations SOPs**

SOPs are the cornerstone of rapid planning. The planning SOP should be second nature to all concerned. Operations SOPs are equally important because they allow planners to select proven and practiced tasks that provide solutions to tactical problems. SOPs allow major subordinate elements (MSEs) to carry out familiar tasks effectively and efficiently with minimal or no higher-level guidance or communications. The SOP for each type of mission should include a pre-designated task organization; equipment and ordnance lists; elements of a landing plan; mission execution procedures; and an execution checklist with codewords. The SOPs must be studied, rehearsed, executable on a moment's notice, and supported by timesaving factors. For example, standard ordnance packages for likely missions (e.g., tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel [TRAP], platoon-size reinforcements) are pre-staged in readily accessible locations in their magazines in order to reduce the time needed to break out and issue ammunition. In addition, mission smart packs are created for each mission profile. Smart packs contain specific planning information and SOPs based on the mission profile (e.g., light, medium, or heavy helicopter raid). Smart pack planning and coordination of information are also used as references during mission execution.

### **c. Intelligence**

The commander and the staff must anticipate possible contingencies based on continual analyses of open-source news and classified intelligence reports. For



each situation, the staff should be equipped with the latest intelligence (e.g., a MEU(SOC) usually prepares mission folders), possible targets, area studies, and other relevant information. Periodic reviews of potential contingencies maintain situational awareness and assist in updating information. When appropriate, a commander conducts deliberate planning and refocuses unit training based on likely scenarios. The intelligence staff must also be familiar with the *Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH)*, which is produced by Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. The GIRH contains suggested essential elements of information for various mission types.

#### **d. Information Management**

Due to the time constraints inherent in rapid planning, there is less opportunity for the commander and the staff to analyze information requirements. Also, computer technology is increasing the speed and volume of information flow, so an overabundance of information may obscure vital facts. It is critical that every participant in the planning process realizes the importance of his mission area and take positive steps to appropriately share knowledge. Commanders and staff officers must possess the ability to present clear and concise information. Simple, concise presentations best support rapid planning.

## **2. Composition of MEU(SOC) Planning Cells**

#### **a. Crisis Action Team**

The central planning cell in the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON is the CAT. Although its final composition depends on the commander and METT-T, its basic composition is established in the command SOP. Three factors to consider in determining membership in the CAT are the physical space available to accommodate the group; the benefits of additional input from a wider array of functional areas; and the drawbacks of too many participants. CAT members of a MEU(SOC) may include the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders and their primary staffs, MSE commanders and their operations officers, and subject matter experts.

*Note: Some MEU(SOC)s interchangeably refer to the CAT or the landing force operations center (LFOC) watch team as the battle staff.*

#### **b. Battle Staff**

Some MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders employ a battle staff. The battle staff may consist of staff officers at the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON and MSE level, plus representatives from attachments and functional areas not included in the CAT. Ideally, any potential member of a mission planning cell not part of the

CAT should be on the battle staff. The battle staff convenes whenever the CAT is established, which provides leaders and planners an opportunity to gain identical situational awareness with the CAT and to prepare for participation in any mission planning cell. Because there are insufficient personnel in some functional areas to staff all mission planning cells simultaneously, the battle staff may have members that support more than one mission planning cell.

### **c. Mission Planning Cell**


Early in the planning process, the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders designate a mission commander (usually one of the MSE commanders or the maritime special purpose force commander). The mission commander then establishes his own mission planning cell to plan the details of the operation. Consideration must be given to the feasibility of separate planning cells due to limited staff members; therefore, the mission commander may designate more than one planning cell in order to plan concurrent, contingency, or follow-on missions. Additionally, a separate reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) mission planning cell may be established to plan R&S operations. Each mission planning cell should include appropriate representation from relevant experts (e.g., a battalion landing team planning cell might include air and logistic subject matter experts and Navy representatives). Maintaining the same personnel in the planning cells throughout the work-up and deployment speeds and improves the planning process (e.g., if the ACE is the primary mission commander for a TRAP, then the GCE should send the same representative to all TRAP planning meetings). The planning cell's working spaces must be pre-designated so that all cell members know where to report and so that two cells are not competing for the same space. Lower echelon units, such as companies and platoons, must be prepared to plan concurrently with the mission planning cells and also have a designated planning space.

## **3. MEU(SOC) Rapid Response Planning Process**

R2P2 is a time-constrained, six step process that mirrors the Marine Corps Planning Process of—

- Mission analysis.
- COA development.
- COA war game.
- COA comparison and decision.
- Orders development.
- Transition.

## a. Mission Analysis



Effective mission analysis is achieved through prior familiarization with both the situation and the type of mission, as well as reliance on intuitive decision-making (which emphasizes rapid recognition of patterns based on experience, training, and education). Planning times can be shortened if the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON perform anticipatory planning for various contingencies.

Upon receipt/acknowledgement of a warning order or an operation order, an authorized individual immediately orders establishment of the CAT.

The MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders may retain or delegate the authority to establish a CAT to their operations officers and/or the MEU(SOC) executive officer and the PHIBRON chief of staff.

The decision to establish the CAT is passed immediately to the other ships.

If it is a standard mission covered by an SOP, the initiation of cross-decking, based on the SOP, may occur.

Designated personnel in the LFOC watch section produce copies of the order for the CAT and battle staff (or mission planning cells) and ensure that planning spaces are prepared for use.

The CAT and battle staff (or mission planning cells) assemble in their respective spaces. These spaces should be selected or identified in the SOP to prevent conflicts (e.g., the battle staff is to assemble in the wardroom during meal hours). The CAT and battle staff (or mission planning cells) should be in their spaces and have copies of the warning order as soon as possible.

Designated staff personnel begin obtaining updated personnel and equipment status reports. Ideally, these reports are collected in a manner that avoids distracting planners from the planning process (e.g., outside the planning cells or on status boards in the planning spaces).

The MEU(SOC) operations officer serves as the facilitator of the CAT and calls the group to order.

A designated scribe takes roll or members check in with the scribe upon their arrival.

The CAT determines if there is a need for clarification during mission analysis. If so, a designated staff member, not involved in the CAT, requests clarification from higher headquarters.

The CAT confirms cross-deck requirements and considers the need for subject matter experts based on the nature of the mission. For example, if the mission involves a raid on a chemical weapons site, the CAT may include a nuclear, biological, and chemical defense officer.

If expertise in a critical area is lacking, the CAT may initiate the process of obtaining reach-back expertise.

The meteorology officer provides the latest weather information. The MEU(SOC) S-2 and the PHIBRON N-2 provide an intelligence update. The division of labor between these two officers should be clearly stated in the SOP to avoid overlap.

The entire CAT then conducts mission analysis in the same manner as the MCPP, with the following differences:

- Time-constrained units should have their IPB products ready prior to starting the planning process. During mission analysis, these products are updated if time permits. If IPB products are not available, the staff generates them.
- Rapid planning requires that SOPs are already understood. Units lacking well-rehearsed SOPs require additional time in all of the planning steps, leading to a more deliberate, slower planning process.
- The lack of "orientation" time associated with rapid planning may require an initial staff orientation. A staff orientation informs the planners of previously unknown and unresearched mission-related facts.
- At the end of the mission analysis, a mission commander may be assigned.

The next phase of mission analysis is the issuance of the commanders' planning guidance. The beginning of this phase depends, however, on whether and how the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders use the battle staff. The workings

of the CAT may be viewed directly by the battle staff or the mission planning cells via video teleconferencing or a channel on the ship's secure, closed-circuit television, which affords them the same situational awareness as the CAT. If the battle staff or mission planning cells do not have connectivity with the CAT, they can conduct their own version of mission analysis simultaneously with the CAT. However, the results of the CAT's mission analysis must be provided to the battle staff or the mission planning cells to ensure that all planners have the same situational awareness. Orientation of the staff occurs shortly after completion of the mission analysis in order to allow the battle staff or the appropriate mission planning cells (identified during mission analysis) to convene in their designated spaces.

The MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders (beginning with the supporting commander) provide their planning guidance to the CAT and the battle staff/mission planning cells at the conclusion of mission analysis (or any required staff orientation).

A mission commander may be assigned at this point.

The supported commander follows with his intent, assessment of centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, mission priorities (relative to ongoing, standby, and follow-on), COA considerations/restrictions, timing, phasing, warfighting function considerations, and other significant information that addresses planning for R&S as well as the main mission(s).

The commander's guidance reflects the experience and proficiency of his staff.

The supporting commander provides any additional guidance.

The MEU(SOC) S-3 provides the planning timeline and assigns definite times for completing each step.


The locations for planning and any required augmentation for their planning cells are determined.

Augmentees acknowledge their requirements and identify themselves to the mission commander.

Participants adjourn to their respective mission planning cells once mission analysis is complete and the mission is assigned.

Based on the type of mission assigned, the mission commander may also direct commencement of specific preparations by his forces. For example, if the ACE has been assigned to conduct a TRAP, the ACE can simultaneously prepare the standard package of aircraft while the pre-designated ground force draws the standard list of ordnance and prepares mission-associated equipment.

## b. Course of Action Development



For simplicity purposes, this step of the R2P2 process assumes that the mission commander is developing COAs.

The mission commander begins COA development by convening his mission planning cell and conducting roll call.

The mission commander may quickly review significant material from the first step of the process if some cell members were not present for mission analysis. This review may include an intelligence brief by the S-2 and a presentation by the S-3 on the mission and the CAT's mission analysis.

The mission commander summarizes the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders' guidance and then presents his own.

If information is required to support COA development, the commander directs specific members of his mission planning cell to gather the required information.

The mission planning cell then begins to develop COAs.

Depending on the guidance received from the MEU(SOC), PHIBRON, and mission commanders, the mission planning cell may initially concentrate on specific COAs. COAs are developed as in the Marine Corps Planning Process, but effective COA development relies on intuitive decisionmaking and operational SOPs



in order to meet the reduced timeline of R2P2. The planning cell develops each COA considering such factors as—

- R&S link-up procedures (if applicable).
- Movement from the ship to the objective.
- Movement from objective back to the ship.
- Fire support.
- Command and control.
- Task organization.
- Special equipment.
- General timeline

The mission planning cell prepares graphics and narratives for each COA. COAs are typically broken into phases and evaluated to ensure they are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

If surface reconnaissance is required, then the R&S mission commander convenes his own planning cell and simultaneously conducts R&S COA development.

To ensure that the parallel planning efforts of the primary and R&S mission planning cells are coordinated, liaison personnel from each cell remain in constant contact; e.g., an R&S coordinator moves from planning cell to planning cell while keeping in close contact with the MEU S-3. Since R&S elements are normally inserted prior to other forces, the R&S cell must develop its COAs in a shorter period of time, but the R&S effort must support the information needs of the primary mission commander.

The next step in the process is the COA brief. The COA brief can be presented to the CAT, the entire battle staff or only to the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders, the MSE commanders, the primary mission commander, and a few key staff officers. The R&S planning cell normally briefs first (probably while the primary mission planning cell is still developing COAs). At the conclusion of the R&S COA brief, the R&S portion of the operation can immediately move on to COA wargaming.

At this point, the primary mission commander has completed COA development and his planning cell is preparing its own brief. The MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders may approve the R&S COA before receiving the COA brief for the primary mission. Alternatively, the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders could delay COA wargaming, as well as COA comparison and decision for the R&S mission, until deciding on a COA for the primary mission, but this delay would drastically reduce time needed to prepare and launch R&S forces.


The COA brief for the primary mission is then given to the CAT and the battle staff. (If the battle staff concept is not employed, standby and follow-on mission planning cells and designated additional staff officers and attachment leaders may also attend the COA brief.) The brief follows the unit planning SOP, but typically opens

with the MEU(SOC) S-3 reviewing any on going/projected missions and providing updates/clarifications obtained from HHQ.

The MEU(SOC) S-2 and the PHIBRON N-2 provide an updated intelligence picture, focusing on changes since their last brief and including any answers received to PIRs/CCIRs or RFIs.

The mission commander quickly summarizes the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON mission, the envisioned endstate, measures of effectiveness, and the COAs. He presents the sketch; describes expected events by phase; and provides the task organization, timeline, concept of fire support, other significant details, and a list of key advantages/disadvantages for each COA.

### c. Course of Action War Game



BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Once all the COAs have been briefed, staff officers (to include appropriate attachment leaders and subject matter experts) develop their estimates of supportability as per unit SOP. To assist in reaching quick conclusions and to avoid any



oversights, each staff officer uses a prepared matrix that lists each consideration relevant to his area of concern (e.g., the S-4 could address supply quantities and transportation means). Each SOP-designated staff member prepares an independent estimate that is based solely on his area of expertise and includes each friendly COA's strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls as it applies to a warfighting function, staff section, or attachment. These estimates assist senior commander's in reaching their decisions. The order of briefing the estimates is established in the planning SOP.

Identify which COAs are unsupportable, if all are equally supportable, or if one is superior to the others.

Identify any salient facts requiring the attention of the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders.

Address impact of a COA on SOPs.

Address impact of COAs on future operations (e.g., if "X" amount of helicopter and flight deck time is used today, "X" amount will be available tomorrow).

An intelligence officer is also usually tasked to produce an estimate from the enemy commander's perspective. The enemy commander's viewpoint (as expressed by the S-2/N-2) and staff discussion of hypothetical situations serve as additional wargaming within the time constraints of the planning process. At a minimum, this estimate identifies the most dangerous (hardest to counter) COA.

The MSE commanders (not assigned as the mission commander) also provide concise estimates.


The scribe records the information on a clearly visible staff estimate worksheet.

An execution matrix or synchronization matrix is started at this point in the planning process.

The mission commander makes the final input (to avoid influencing staff estimates) and explains why a COA is selected.

Rapid planning wargaming differs from the Marine Corps Planning Process in that it may be conducted internally within each staff section rather being conducted as one large war game where all MSEs and staff sections are represented. If time permits, the latter method is preferred.


### d. Course of Action Comparison and Decision



BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Based on personal experiences and information acquired from COA wargaming, the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders compare the COAs and rapidly reach a decision. Although the supported commander is the lead decisionmaker, he typically seeks concurrence from his counterpart, particularly when significant reliance is placed on assets from the supporting command. The commanders may accept a single COA, modify a COA, or decide to execute something entirely different. Unless the situation is changing rapidly, both time constraints and continuous involvement of the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON staff should preclude significant COA alterations. In announcing their decision, the commanders provide their refined commander's intent and any additional guidance needed to finalize the plan.

## e. Orders Development



During orders development, all echelons involved in the operation complete required detailed planning for the approved COA. This vertical and horizontal flow of information among the chain of command and all elements of the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON is vital to concurrent planning and preparation. If the mission forces or supporting echelons encounter any difficulties or if the situation changes, the mission planning cell is alerted immediately and the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders are notified if any potential, significant alterations to the COA arise. If changes in the situation threaten the suitability of

the COA, and if time permits, the commanders may direct the staff and the mission planning cell to return to an earlier step in the planning process.

The mission commander immediately passes the results of COA comparison and decision to his forces to assist their planning and preparations.

The mission commander and the mission planning cell continue to update and forward planning details as changes occur.


Plans for supporting or contingency missions may also be developed (e.g., mass casualty, MEDEVAC, platoon-size reinforcement, initial terminal guidance, link-up, evasion and recovery plan).

Supporting echelons (e.g., ships, other MSEs) receive updated information from their liaison officers inside the mission planning cell.

The mission planning cell produces a confirmation brief, which essentially serves as the draft operation order.

The MEU(SOC) S-3 creates and delivers a written concept of operations in addition to other documents required by higher headquarters. To save time and ensure coordinated execution, the commander may not approve the completed final order until after the confirmation brief.

## f. Transition



BOLD TEXT INDICATES MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

The commander approves the mission for execution immediately following the confirmation brief; therefore, the confirmation brief is the primary tool used to transition from planning to execution. It is also the optimum means of final coordination within the time available and it can serve as a form of rehearsal. The brief's purpose is to ensure that those involved in executing the plan completely understand the plan and achieve situational awareness.

The brief also ensures agreement among force elements, since all critical participants are present. Because the confirmation brief is primarily for those who have a role in executing the mission, all available members of the mission planning cell and the mission force should attend. Supporting elements (e.g., ships

personnel) not represented in the mission planning cell should also attend. All standby and follow-on mission planning cells that might be affected by the primary mission should also observe the brief. The CAT and battle staff members should attend to provide expertise and answer questions.

Using the format in the unit planning SOP, the confirmation brief is conducted by the mission commander. The SOP provides the format and media (e.g., small-scale maps, sketches) for each participant's brief in order to avoid overlaps or omissions. The presentation media are collected by the scribe and assembled into a smart pack that may serve as the written order.

*Note: An initial version of the smart pack may be assembled during orders development, but it should not be issued until sanctioned by the commander at the confirmation brief.*

The original confirmation brief's contents, together with any resulting changes or decisions, must be provided to the R&S force (particularly if no representative attended) to ensure that the final, approved mission is understood.

The brief's major focus is on actions occurring in the objective area. The commander of the element executing these actions (e.g., the raid force commander) provides a detailed explanation of the intended actions and the specific tasks assigned to subordinate elements. During the brief, the commanders and their staffs identify any potential problems. Conflicts that arise from the brief are resolved or planned for prior to the completion of the brief. Additional planning must occur if anything is briefed that is not yet planned for or coordinated.

The primary mission confirmation brief is usually limited to an hour. The MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON commanders may schedule confirmation briefs for standby or follow-on missions following completion of the primary mission brief. Upon completion of the primary mission brief, various elements of the force may conduct supporting briefs to the same audience. The commander then designates time for subordinate element leaders to accomplish any remaining preparations and rehearsals. A final inspection of troops and equipment is conducted to ensure mission readiness. During the period before launch of forces, the MEU(SOC) and PHIBRON command echelons supervise the final preparations and coordination of subordinate elements and prepare for their own role in command and control of the operation. SOPs establish C2 procedures for various types of operations except that preparation time is limited. Assumptions and preconditions are revalidated as much as possible. Branch and sequel planning should occur.

## 4. Sample Planning Matrix

This following matrix is only a sample. Units normally develop their own time-lines and SOPs.

TIMELINE	WHO	COMMAND AND STAFF ACTIONS	PRODUCTS	CONCURRENT AND PARALLEL ACTIONS
<b>MISSION ANALYSIS</b>				
0:00–0:30	CAT	Receipt of mission Commander's orientation Break out IPB and intelligence folders Conduct mission analysis	Mission statement Commander's intent Commander's planning guidance Updated IPB products Specified tasks Implied tasks Essential tasks Constraints (must do) Restraints (must not do) Assumptions Resource/SME shortfalls COG analysis Approved CCIRs	Battle staff forms Cross-deck requirements Command and staff supervision
0:30–0:50	Battle staff	Initial staff orientation Determine information requirements Commander's planning guidance	Warning orders Planning schedule RFIs Initial staff estimates	Acknowledge receipt Issue planning schedule R&S planning Command and staff supervision
<b>COA DEVELOPMENT</b>				
0:50–1:10	Battle staff	Convene planning cells (if not already done) Update IPB/intelligence Develop COA(s)	COAs written and graphics developed (time and distance identified) Each potential response force commander prepares actions in objective area plan Air support requirement to carrier battle group Staff/subordinate command estimates Commander's wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria	R&S planning/brief Command and staff supervision

TIMELINE	WHO	COMMAND AND STAFF ACTIONS	PRODUCTS	CONCURRENT AND PARALLEL ACTIONS
<b>COA WAR GAME/COA COMPARISON AND DECISION</b>				
1:10–1:30	Battle staff	Conduct COA war game Refine COAs/IPB COAs briefed Compare/evaluate COAs Commander makes decision	War game results Warning orders Concept of operations Execution matrix Refined staff estimates Identify branches/sequels Updated CCIRs	Response force/support element planning Command and staff supervision
<b>ORDERS DEVELOPMENT</b>				
1:30–3:00	Battle staff	Refine IPB Prepare OPORD Order reconciliation Order crosswalk OPORD approval	Timeline Graphic and overlay Fire support plan Landing plan Communications plan Execution checklist Warning orders Concept of operations message to higher headquarters Charts/maps Confirmation briefing slides	Develop timeline/plan R&S launch Command and staff supervision Cross-decker return Final planning conference
<b>TRANSITION</b>				
3:00–4:00	Battle staff	Confirmation brief/issue the order	Total understanding by all hands of the plan	Response force commander briefs response force/support elements
4:00–6:00	Amphibious task force	Drills	All hands ready to execute mission	Develop alternate/sequel plan(s)





## Notes

1. MCDP 5, *Planning* (July 1997) p. 4.
2. MCDP 6, *Command and Control* (July 1996) p. 113.
3. MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (June 1997) p. 86.
4. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1996) p. 320.
5. *Leadership: Quotations From the Military Tradition*, ed. Robert A. Fitton (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. 1990) p. 76.
6. MCDP 5, p. 64.
7. Ibid, p. 89.