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**NONREACTOR NUCLEAR  
SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA AND  
EXPLOSIVES SAFETY CRITERIA GUIDE**  
*for use with*  
**DOE O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY**



**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**

**Office of Environment, Safety and Health**

## FOREWORD

This Guide provides guidance on the application of requirements for nonreactor nuclear facilities and explosives facilities of Department of Energy (DOE) O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY, Section 4.1, Nuclear and Explosives Safety Design Criteria. The following guidelines were established for the development of this Guide.

- This Guide provides guidance on implementing the requirements stated in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1, as they apply to the design aspects for nuclear safety of nonreactor nuclear facilities and safety requirements for explosives facilities. The guidance provided in this Guide is restricted to the requirements identified in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1. This Guide does *not* establish requirements.
- Safety analyses performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94 establish the identification, function, and performance of safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and must be conducted early in the design process.
- Applicable current Rules, Standards, and Orders will be referenced herein and text and requirements from these documents will not be repeated.
- Same-subject information will be grouped in a single section and cross referenced elsewhere as required.
- Management and policy requirements will *not* be included in this document.

Throughout this Guide, the words “must” and “should” are used to identify actions that need to be accomplished to meet this guidance. The word “must” denotes actions that are required to comply with this Guide. The word “should” is used to indicate recommended practice (DOE-STD-1075-94).

Users are encouraged to submit suggestions for improving this Guide to the office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Standards.

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## GLOSSARY

**NOTE:** Origins of the definitions are indicated by references shown in brackets, [ ], although in some cases the referenced Orders are being replaced. If no reference is listed, the definition originates in this Guide and is unique to its application. Terms used within this Guide that are not defined in the Glossary carry their definition from the referenced documents.

**Accident.** An unplanned sequence of events that results in undesirable consequences.  
[DOE-STD-3009-94]

**Accident analysis.** For the purposes of properly implementing the Unreviewed Safety Question Order, the term “accident analysis” refers to those bounding analyses selected for inclusion in the Safety Analysis Report. These analyses refer to design basis accidents (DBAs) only.  
[DOE 5480.21]

Accident analysis has historically consisted of the formal development of numerical estimates of the expected consequence and probability of potential accidents associated with a facility. For the purposes of this Guide, accident analysis is a follow-on effort to the hazard analysis, not a fundamentally new examination requiring extensive original work. As such, it requires documentation of the basis for assignment to a given likelihood of occurrence range (e.g., 1/y to  $10^{-2}$ /y,  $10^{-2}$ /y to  $10^{-4}$ /y,  $10^{-4}$ /y to  $10^{-6}$ /y) in hazard analysis and performance of a formally documented consequence analysis. Consequences are compared with offsite evaluation guidelines to identify safety-class structures, systems, and components. [DOE-STD-3009-94]

**ALARA.** As low as reasonably achievable.

### Confinement barriers.

- **Primary confinement.** Provides confinement of hazardous material to the vicinity of its processing. This confinement is typically provided by piping, tanks, gloveboxes, encapsulating material, and the like, along with any offgas systems that control effluent from within the primary confinement.
- **Secondary confinement.** Consists of a cell or enclosure surrounding the process material or equipment along with any associated ventilation exhaust systems from the enclosed area. Except in the case of areas housing glovebox operations, the area inside this barrier is usually unoccupied (e.g., canyons, hot cells); it provides protection for operating personnel.
- **Tertiary confinement.** Typically provided by walls, floor, roof, and associated ventilation exhaust systems of the facility. It provides a final barrier against the release of hazardous material to the environment.

**Construction.** Any combination of engineering, procurement, erection, installation, assembly, or fabrication activities involved in creating a new facility or altering, adding to, or rehabilitating an existing facility. It also includes the alteration and repair (including dredging, excavating, and painting) of buildings, structures, or other real property.

**Decommissioning.** The process of closing and securing a nuclear facility or nuclear materials storage facility to provide adequate protection from radiation exposure and to isolate radioactive contamination from the human environment. [DOE 5480.30]

**Decontamination.** The act of removing a chemical, biological, or radiological contaminant from or neutralizing its potential effect on a person, object, or environment by washing, chemical action, mechanical cleaning, or other techniques. [DOE 5480.30]

**Design basis.** Information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure, system, or component of a facility, and the specific values or range of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds of design. These values may be (1) restraints derived from generally accepted “state of the art” practices for achieving functional goals, or (2) requirements derived from analyses (based on calculations and/or experiments) of the effects of a postulated accident for which a structure, system, or component must meet its functional goals. [10 CFR 50.2]

**Design basis accident.** An accident postulated for the purpose of establishing functional and performance requirements for safety structures, systems, and components. [DOE-STD-3009-94]

**Effluent monitoring.** The collection and analysis of samples or measurements of liquid and gaseous effluents for the purpose of characterizing and quantifying contaminants, assessing radiation exposures of members of the public, providing a means to control effluents at or near the point of discharge, and demonstrating compliance with applicable standards and permit requirements. [DOE 5400.1]

**Evaluation guideline.** Radiation dose value against which the safety analysis evaluates. Offsite evaluation guidelines are established for the purpose of identifying and evaluating safety-class structures, systems, and components.

**Explosives facility.** Any facility or location used for storage or operation with explosives or ammunition.

**Facility.** For the purpose of this Guide, the definition most often refers to buildings and other structures, their functional systems and equipment, and other fixed systems and equipment installed therein to delineate a facility. However, specific operations and processes independent of buildings or other structures (e.g., waste retrieval and processing, waste burial, remediation, groundwater or soil decontamination, decommissioning) are also encompassed by this definition. The flexibility in the definition does not extend to subdivision of physically concurrent operations having potential energy sources that can seriously affect one another or which use

common systems fundamental to the operation (e.g., a common glovebox ventilation exhaust header). [DOE-STD-3009-94]

**Fail safe.** A design characteristic by which a unit or system will become safe and remain safe if a system or component fails or loses its activation energy.

**Hazard.** A source of danger (i.e., material, energy source, or operation) with the potential to cause illness, injury, or death to personnel or damage to an operation or to the environment (without regard for the likelihood or credibility of accident scenarios or consequence mitigation). [DOE 5480.23]

**Hazard analysis.** The determination of material, system, process, and plant characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences, followed by the assessment of hazardous situations associated with a process or activity. Largely qualitative techniques are used to pinpoint weaknesses in design or operation of the facility that could lead to accidents. The Safety Analysis Report hazard analysis examines the complete spectrum of potential accidents that could expose members of the public, onsite workers, facility workers, and the environment to hazardous materials. [DOE-STD-3009-94]

**Hazard classification.** Evaluation of the consequences of unmitigated releases to classify facilities or operations into the following hazard categories. [DOE 5480.23]

- **Hazard Category 1:** Shows the potential for significant offsite consequences.
- **Hazard Category 2:** Shows the potential for significant onsite consequences.
- **Hazard Category 3:** Shows the potential for only significant localized consequences.

DOE-STD-1027-92 provides guidance and radiological threshold values for determining the hazard category of a facility. DOE-STD-1027-92 interprets Hazard Category 1 facilities as Category A reactors and other facilities designated as such by the Program Secretarial Officer. [DOE-STD-3009-94]

**Hazardous material.** For the purpose of this Guide, any solid, liquid, or gaseous material that is not radioactive but is toxic, explosive, flammable, corrosive, or otherwise physically or biologically threatening to health.

**Nonreactor nuclear facility.** Those activities or operations that involve radioactive and/or fissionable materials in such form and quantity that a nuclear hazard potentially exists to the employees or the general public. Included are activities or operations that—

- produce, process, or store radioactive liquid or solid waste, fissionable materials, or tritium;
- conduct separations operations;



- conduct irradiated materials inspection, fuel fabrication, decontamination, or recovery operations;
- conduct fuel enrichment operations; and
- perform environmental remediation or waste management activities involving radioactive materials.

Incidental use and generating of radioactive materials in a facility operation (e.g., check and calibration sources, use of radioactive sources in research and experimental and analytical laboratory activities, electron microscopes, and x-ray machines) would not ordinarily require the facility to be included in this definition. [DOE 5480.23]

**Public.** All individuals outside the DOE site boundary. [DOE-STD-3009-94]

**Risk.** The quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that considers both the probability that an event will occur and the consequence of that event. [DOE 5480.23]

**Safety analysis.** A documented process: (1) to provide systematic identification of hazards within a given DOE operation; (2) to describe and analyze the adequacy of the measures taken to eliminate, control, or mitigate identified hazards; and (3) to analyze and evaluate potential accidents and their associated risks. [DOE 5480.23]

**Safety Analysis Report.** A report that documents the adequacy of safety analysis to ensure that a facility can be constructed, operated, maintained, shut down, and decommissioned safely and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. [DOE 5480.23]

**Safety basis.** The combination of information relating to the control of hazards at a facility (including design, engineering analyses, and Administrative Controls) upon which DOE depends for its conclusion that activities at the facility can be conducted safely. [DOE 5480.23]

**Single-failure criterion.** Safety systems must perform all required safety functions for a DBA in the presence of the following.

- Any single detectable failure within the safety systems concurrent with all identifiable but undetectable failures.
- All failures caused by the single failure.
- All failures and spurious system actions that cause, or are caused by, the DBA requiring the safety function.

The single failure could occur prior to, or at any time during, the DBA for which the safety system is required to function. [ANSI/IEEE Standard 379-1994, Chapter 4]

**Site boundary.** A well-marked boundary of the property over which the owner or operator can exercise strict control.

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC/DC	alternating current/direct current
ACGIH	American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
ACI	American Concrete Institute
AISC	American Institute of Steel Construction
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ANS	American Nuclear Society
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	American Petroleum Institute
ASHRAE	American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
AWWA	American Water Works Association
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DBA	design basis accident
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDESB	Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
DOE	Department of Energy
DOE O	Department of Energy Order
DOE G	Department of Energy Guide
DOE-STD	DOE Standard
EIA	Electronic Industries Association
ERDA	Energy Research and Development Administration (predecessor to DOE)
HEPA	high-efficiency particulate air (filter)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
I&C	instrumentation and control
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IES	Illumination Engineering Society
ISA	Instrumentation Society of America
MOI	maximally exposed offsite individual
NCRP	National Council on Radiation Protection
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NQA	Nuclear Quality Assurance
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG	Nuclear Regulatory Guide
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
QA	quality assurance
RAM	reliability, availability, and maintainability
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SMACNA	Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association
SSC	structures, systems, and components

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 General**

This Implementation Guide provides an acceptable approach for satisfying the requirements of Department of Energy (DOE) Order (O) 420.1, Facility Safety, Section 4.1, Nuclear and Explosives Safety Design Criteria. The objective of the Guide is to provide a methodology for selecting industry codes and standards for nuclear safety aspects of nonreactor nuclear facility design. The Guide stresses that safety design should be driven by safety analysis and provides interpretive guidance on the performance-level requirements of the Order. A successful safety design depends on the quality of the safety analysis and on engineering judgment in the transformation of this guidance to the final design.

This Guide is not intended to be all inclusive with respect to the nuclear/radiological safety requirements and guidance for designing a DOE nonreactor nuclear facility. Where other DOE Orders, Rules, and national and industry codes and standards contain requirements and supporting guidance pertaining to safety of nuclear facilities, such guidance will not be repeated in this document. Instead, a short discussion will point to the relevant document. Examples are found in the areas of natural phenomena hazards mitigation, fire protection, criticality safety, and explosives safety.

### **1.2 Applicability**

The requirements of DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1, are applicable to the design and construction of new nonreactor nuclear facilities and for modifications to existing nonreactor nuclear facilities when the modifications significantly increase the probability or consequence of a nuclear accident or require a change in the Technical Safety Requirements of a facility. It is intentionally left to the judgment of the proposing contractor and the approving DOE authority to define “significant.” In part, this is intended to allow upgrading of existing safety equipment or installation of minor new improvements without subjecting the process to onerous procedural requirements and thus discouraging improvements.

Modifications to facility design and construction during the design and construction phase must conform to the design requirements for new facilities.

All new construction must, as a minimum, conform to the model building codes applicable for the state or region, supplemented with additional safety requirements associated with the hazards in a facility in a graded manner.

### **1.3 Content**

This Guide is structured to represent the progressive logic of design. Section 1, Introduction, provides a general statement regarding the intent and applicability of the Guide. The following sections provide guidance for nuclear safety design concepts or assurances, elements of design

for nuclear safety, functional design criteria, and criteria for safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

Contained within Section 2, Safety Analysis and Design Process, are nuclear safety design concepts that when implemented along with specific criteria should ensure a safe facility design. This section addresses the importance of starting the safety analysis as early as possible in the design and maintaining an interrelationship between the design process and the safety analysis, as they both evolve. The section provides explicit guidance for the application of the offsite evaluation guideline for the proper classification of safety class SSCs. Other concepts addressed under this section are defense in depth, system engineering, and quality assurance (QA). These are nuclear safety design concepts and strategies to be applied at the beginning and throughout the design process to ensure safety concerns are addressed and incorporated into the design as necessary.

Section 3, Elements of Design for Nuclear Safety; Section 4, Functional Design Criteria; and Section 5, Supplementary Design Criteria for Safety Structures, Systems, and Components, describe specific criteria that are to be applied, as applicable, to the facility under design. The guidance within these sections relates to safety as it applies to the overall facility and its impact on facility design.

Section 3 addresses nuclear safety criteria that should be considered during the design process such as siting, natural phenomena, architecture, accessibility and maintainability, human factors, and decontamination and decommissioning.

Section 4 is more specific to the safety function(s) that are to be performed within or by the facility under design. These nuclear safety criteria include nuclear criticality, radiation protection, hazardous material protection, effluent monitoring and control, waste management, fire protection, emergency preparedness and emergency communications, and explosives criteria and their applicability to the safety of the facility, depending on the function or mission of the facility.

Section 5 provides guidance for specific criteria requirements for the SSCs that are identified, via the safety analysis, to function as safety-class or safety-significant SSCs. These criteria are applied to those specific elements within the facility.

#### **1.4 Compliance with DOE O 420.1 Requirements**

This section provides a correlation of the requirements contained in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1, to this Guide. The objectives of DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1, Nuclear Safety, are covered in the Introduction section defining the intent and applicability to DOE design activities.

The requirements for the development process of the safety analysis are set forth in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1.1.1, General Requirements. Also contained in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1.1.1, and DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1.1.2, Design Requirements, are the requirements pertaining to the implementation of defense in depth and the quality level requirements for facility design and

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construction. Section 2, Safety Analysis and Design Process, of this Guide provides guidance for performing the safety analysis and maintaining an interrelationship with the design process. This Guide section also contains guidance for nuclear safety design concepts such as defense in depth, system engineering, and QA to meet the requirements set forth in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1.

Guidance for the additional nuclear safety design requirements set forth in Section 4.1.1.2 of DOE 420.1 are addressed in detail in Section 3, Elements of Design for Nuclear Safety, Section 4, Functional Design Criteria, and Section 5, Supplementary Design Criteria for Safety Structures, Systems, and Components, of this Guide. Requirements related to the overall facility design (e.g., siting; natural phenomena; architecture; reliability, accessibility, and maintainability; and decontamination and decommissioning) are provided in Section 3 of this Guide. Section 4 of this Guide provides guidance to meet the nuclear safety functional requirements of DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1.1.2, as they pertain to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), waste management, and other functional operations. The guidance to meet the requirements for safety SSCs to be designed so they can perform their safety functions when called upon to operate and to be designed and fabricated under a QA program as defined in Section 4.1.1.2 of DOE O 420.1 are addressed in Section 5 of this Guide.

Guidance to comply with the requirements contained in Section 4.1.2, Explosives Safety, of DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1, are provided in Section 4.8, Explosives Criteria, of this Guide.

## 2. SAFETY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN PROCESS

### 2.1 Design Process and Safety Analysis Relationship

In this section, the relationship between the facility design process and the parallel development of the facility safety analysis is discussed. Continuous coordination is necessary between these two activities throughout the project to ensure that the final design meets the mission requirements and includes the required safety features and to ensure that the principles of integrated safety management systems as described in DOE P 450.4 and DOE G 450.4-1A are implemented. The safety analysis must be performed in accordance with the guidance in DOE-STD-3009-94 and the requirements of DOE 5480.23 to develop and validate the functional and performance requirements for the safety SSCs. One of the objectives of the hazard and accident analyses is to identify the complete suite of safety SSCs for a facility and to designate them as safety class or safety significant, as appropriate to their importance and role. From the Introduction to DOE-STD-3009-94, the techniques for hazard analysis provide methodologies for comprehensive definition of the accident spectrum for workers and the public. Throughout the evaluation process, preventive and mitigative SSCs and pertinent elements of programmatic controls are identified. This identification also establishes functional requirements for SSCs, which will subsequently delineate the technical information needed to establish performance criteria. The most significant aspects of defense in depth and worker safety are subject to definition as safety-significant SSCs and coverage by Technical Safety Requirements. Safety-class designation is reserved for SSCs needed for public protection and carries with it the most stringent requirements. Demonstration of compliance with the nuclear facility design requirements of DOE O 420.1 in accordance with the guidance for performing safety analyses DOE-STD-3009-94 (Chapters 3 and 4 of the Standard) and this Implementation Guide must be shown in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (or a Safety Analysis Report for significant modifications to existing facilities), DOE approval of which must be received before construction can begin.

Selection and design of safety SSCs is an important part of the overall facility design process. As the facility design progresses from conceptual design through the finalization of design, designers and safety analysts must exchange information in an iterative process. Early in the conceptual design, a hazard analysis must be conducted based on the anticipated physical and chemical processes to be used in support of the overall facility mission, external human-induced hazards, and natural phenomena hazards. The hazards associated with processes may influence the design (e.g., alternative physical layouts, segmentation of facilities to isolate particularly hazardous processes, or the use of multistage or parallel processes to reduce the hazardous material in any particular process step). Natural phenomena hazards must be considered in accordance with DOE O 420.1, Section 4.4, Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation, and the associated Guide. External human-induced hazards peculiar to the site (such as pipelines and hazardous materials storage) must be considered.

The results of the hazard analysis must be used to identify the design basis accidents (DBAs) that in turn must be used to define the functional and performance requirements of the facility safety

SSCs. Safety SSCs required to prevent or mitigate accidents whose consequences approach or exceed offsite evaluation guidelines must be defined as safety-class SSCs. Safety-significant SSCs must be selected for worker protection and to provide defense in depth.

The defense-in-depth concept, described in Section 2.3 of this Guide, must be integrated into the facility design process. The application of the defense-in-depth concept to the facility design will help identify potential safety features to be included in the facility design. Consideration should be given to prevent or mitigate accident consequences from contaminating the environment, even when direct public or worker safety is not an issue.

Sufficient hazard and accident analyses must be completed during the preliminary design to verify and finalize the selection of safety SSCs. These hazard and accident analyses must be sufficiently complete to determine the design environmental and load conditions for safety SSCs.

Accident analysis examines a limited subset of accidents (DBAs) derived from the hazard analysis. The accident analysis forms the basis for evaluating the ability of the safety SSCs to perform their safety functions. The identification of DBAs is therefore based on the hazard analysis to ensure that a reasonable spectrum of potential accidents are considered for the design. DBAs should be analyzed conservatively using the applicable deterministic phenomenological methods. During the design process, the accident analysis should also be used to establish design requirements that minimize or eliminate potential hazards. Therefore, prevention and control of potential hazards through early and iterative interaction with the design process should be a primary objective of the hazard and accident analyses.

### **2.1.1 Functional Classification of Safety SSCs**

In Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 the classification of safety SSCs as safety class or safety significant is discussed. The concept of using an evaluation guideline for identifying safety class SSCs is introduced. The use of the evaluation guideline is only one element in a larger safety SSC functional classification process that is intended to contribute to “adequate safety.” Other operational contributors are disciplined conduct of operations, training, and safety management programs such as a radiation protection program, emergency response program, etc. Some principles that should be incorporated in a functional classification process are:

- Protection of the public is contributed to by all facets of safety in design, including safety class SSCs as well as safety significant SSCs, and, in many DOE cases, by remote siting. The expectation is that public design basis accident dose consequences (considering the protection provided by safety systems) would generally be a small fraction of the evaluation guideline.
- Protection of the public is predominant in safety design; protection of workers is no less important. However, the degree of protection for facility workers achievable by SSCs is limited. Other factors such as disciplined conduct of operations, training, and safety management programs are no less important in assuring worker safety.



- In prioritization of items for a facility safety strategy:
  - Minimization of hazardous materials (material at risk) is the first priority.
  - Safety SSCs are preferred over Administrative Controls.
  - Passive SSCs are preferred over active SSCs.
  - Preventative controls are preferred over mitigative controls.
  - Facility safety SSCs are preferred over personal protective equipment.
  - Controls closest to the hazard may provide protection to both workers and the public.
  - Controls that are effective for multiple hazards can be resource effective.

## **2.1.2 Application of Offsite Evaluation Guidelines for Safety-Class SSCs**

A computational construct using the concepts of an unmitigated accident release and an evaluation guideline has been developed to aid in the designation of safety class SSCs. The process uses the same initiating events as identified in the hazard and accident analyses discussed in Section 2.1, but for the purposes of showing which SSCs are sufficiently important to classify as safety class, it presumes that the candidate safety systems are not functional (unmitigated release). Other parameters of the analyses should conservatively reflect physical realities; e.g., energies driving the release, release fractions, etc. If the resulting site boundary dose approaches the evaluation guideline, then the candidate SSCs need to be evaluated to see if their effectiveness in preventing or mitigating the accident justifies one or more of them being designated as safety class. These analyses and evaluations should be retained as backup information to support the designations of safety class SSCs.

The evaluation guideline has been set at 25 rem total effective dose equivalent. The dose estimates compared to it are those which would be received by a hypothetical maximally-exposed individual at the site boundary from an unmitigated accidental release of radionuclides during a finite period, nominally 2 hours, but no longer than 8 hours. The time limitation is solely for the purpose of limiting the calculation to time periods for which a significant release rate might be expected and to provide a stable basis for the calculation. The 25 rem level was chosen to be representative of a potential release that could impact the offsite public and warrant special consideration of preventative and mitigative measures. The intended function of the evaluation guideline is strictly to identify safety SSCs that should be given the special designation of safety class and be subject to more rigorous design criteria as described in Section 5 of this Guide. Because of uncertainties in analysis and design parameters before final design, the 25 rem value should not be regarded as a "bright line." If unmitigated dose results are in the rem range, then serious consideration should be given to identifying related safety SSCs as safety class. In most cases it will be found that mitigating safety class SSCs effectively reduce offsite doses far below 25 rem. Especially considering this, it should emphatically be understood that 25 rem is not an acceptance criterion for safety design.

If a postulated bounding accident for any accident scenario type could be expected to occur during facility operations, then, in addition to the evaluation guideline discussed above, it must also be considered as part of normal operations, which is governed by 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection; unintended releases of sufficiently high frequency as considered a part of



normal operations would also be governed by this regulation. This is not to imply, however, that safety SSCs should be identified based on compliance with 10 CFR 835. Any accidents that have a significant consequence potential to the public or workers, independent of likelihood, must be thoroughly evaluated, including the identification of appropriate safety SSCs and Administrative Controls.

The relevant factors for dose calculation are discussed below, and guidance is given for each.

### **Dose Calculation Location**

For the purposes of comparison to the evaluation guideline, the comparison point is taken to be the location of a theoretical maximally exposed offsite individual (MOI) standing at the site boundary. This location can also be beyond the DOE site boundary if a buoyant or elevated plume is not at ground level at the DOE site boundary. In such cases, the calculation location is taken at the point of maximum exposure, typically where the plume reaches ground level. With regard to members of the public who may be on-site, DOE's position on this issue is that individuals on-site, both workers and public, come under the emergency response plans and capabilities of the site. This protection, along with implementation of defense-in-depth and worker safety philosophy through safety SSCs and DOE's safety management programs address on-site safety. However, an annual assessment of any changes in the site boundary and potential effects on safety SSC classification should be performed, in association with the required annual update of the Safety Analysis Report for a facility. These may be affected by privatization and site turnover initiatives.

### **Atmospheric Dispersion**

The 95th percentile of the distribution of doses to the MOI, accounting for variations in distance to the site boundary as a function of direction, is the comparison point for assessment against the evaluation guideline. The method used should be consistent with the statistical treatment of calculated X/Q values described in regulatory position 3 of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.145 for the evaluation of consequences along the exclusion area boundary. The determination of distance to the site boundary should be made in accordance with the procedure outlined in position 1.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.145. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23 presents acceptable means of generating the meteorological data upon which dispersion is based. Accident phenomenology may be modeled assuming straight-line Gaussian dispersion characteristics, applying meteorological data representing a 1-hour average for the duration of the accident. Accident duration is defined in terms of plume passage at the location of dose calculation, for a period not to exceed 8 hours. Prolonged effects, such as resuspension, need not be modeled. It is important to note, however, that the calculation requires MOI immersion in the main body of the plume for a period representative of its passage (subject to the 8-hour restriction). The accident progression should not be defined so that the MOI is not substantially exposed (i.e., using a release rate that is specifically intended to expose the MOI to only a small fraction of the total material released, or defining time and windspeed so that the plume has not reached the MOI). The exposure period begins from the time the plume reaches the MOI.

For ground releases, the calculated dose equates to the centerline dose at the site boundary. For elevated, thermally buoyant, or jet releases, plume touchdown may occur beyond the site boundary. As noted in the discussion of receptor location, these cases should locate the dose calculation at the point of maximum dose beyond the site boundary, which is typically at the point of plume touchdown.

Accidents with unique dispersion characteristics, such as explosions, may be modeled using phenomenon-specific codes more accurately representing the release conditions. Discussion should be provided justifying the appropriateness of the model to the specific situation. For accident phenomena defined by weather extremes, actual meteorological conditions associated with the phenomena may be used for comparison to the evaluation guideline.

### Source Term

The radioactive airborne source term is typically estimated as the product of five factors: (1) material-at-risk, (2) damage ratio, (3) airborne release fraction, (4) respirable fraction, and (5) leakpath factor. Detailed discussion of these parameters is provided in DOE-HDBK-3010-94, *Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities*.

**Material-at-Risk.** The material-at-risk values used in hazard and accident analysis should represent documented maximums for a given process or activity. While DOE-STD-1027-92, Change 1, September, 1997 excludes material in qualified containers from consideration for the purposes of hazard classification, such material can be excluded in the source term for the applicable accident scenarios, only if the containers can be shown to perform their functions under the accident environments (per the Standard).

**Damage Ratio.** The damage ratio is that fraction of material actually impacted by the accident-generated conditions. DOE-HDBK-3010-94 notes that some degree of ambiguity can result from overlapping definitions of material at risk and damage ratio in various applications. One consistent means of definition should be used throughout.

**Airborne Release Fractions and Respirable Fractions.** Bounding estimates for radionuclide airborne release fractions and respirable fractions for a wide variety of material at risk and release phenomena are systematically presented in DOE-HDBK-3010-94. In those cases where there may be significant direct shine contribution to dose, that contribution should be evaluated without use of the respirable fraction.

**Leakpath Factor (LPF).** The leakpath factor is the fraction of material passing through some confinement deposition or filtration mechanism. Several leakpath factors may be associated with a specific accident; e.g., fraction passing from a glovebox, fraction passing from a room, fraction passing through filtration vis-a-vis door leakage. (For unmitigated accident calculations, LPF = 1.0.)

### **2.1.3 Safety-Significant SSCs**

The following paragraphs constitute the definition of safety significant SSCs as first presented in DOE-STD-3009-94. Together with the discussions of defense in depth of Section 2.3 of this Guide, they provide guidance for the identification of safety significant SSCs.

Safety-significant structures, systems, and components (safety-significant SSCs) are structures, systems, and components not designated as safety-class SSCs, but whose preventive or mitigative function is a major contributor to defense in depth (i.e., prevention of uncontrolled material releases) and/or worker safety as determined from hazard analysis.

As a rule of thumb, safety-significant SSC designations based on worker safety are limited to those systems, structures, or components whose failure is estimated to result in a prompt worker fatality or serious injuries (e.g., loss of eye, loss of limb) or significant radiological or chemical exposures to workers. This rule of thumb is neither an evaluation guideline nor a quantitative criterion. It represents a threshold of concern for which safety-significant SSC designation may be warranted. Estimates of worker consequences for the purpose of a safety-significant SSC designation are not intended to require detailed analytical modeling, due to the uncertainties in analyses, especially for facility workers. Considerations should be based on engineering judgment of possible effects and the potential added value of safety-significant SSC designation. Experience has shown that safety-significant SSCs identified through defense-in-depth considerations also provide safety for workers.

## **2.2 External Design Constraints**

The primary inputs for facility design include the DOE mission requirements, DOE O 420.1, and externally imposed regulatory inputs from Federal [e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Environmental Protection Agency, etc.], State, and local governments where the facility is located (e.g., a stack monitor to record releases to comply with local environmental monitoring requirements), and DOE O 430.1A, LIFE CYCLE ASSET MANAGEMENT, which calls for the use of national consensus codes and standards. As a minimum, design and construction must conform to the model building codes applicable for the state or region, supplemented with additional safety requirements associated with the hazards in the facility in a graded manner.

## **2.3 Defense in Depth**

Defense in depth includes conservative siting, minimization of material at risk, the use of conservative design margins and QA, the use of successive physical barriers for protection against the release of hazardous materials, the provision of multiple means to ensure critical safety functions (those basic safety functions needed to control the processes, maintain them in a safe state, and to confine and mitigate hazardous materials associated with the potential for accidents with significant public impact), the use of equipment and Administrative Controls which restrict deviations from normal operations and provide for recovery from accidents to achieve a safe condition, means to monitor accident releases required for emergency response, and the provision of emergency plans for minimizing the effects of an accident.

With respect to factors within the influence of the facility designer, defense in depth is a safety design concept or strategy that must be applied at the beginning and maintained throughout the facility design process. This safety design strategy is based on the premise that no one layer of protection is completely relied upon to ensure safe operation. By applying this safety strategy, the DOE O 420.1 objective of providing multiple layers of protection to prevent or mitigate an unintended release of radioactive material to the environment can be achieved. Conceptually, there are three levels of defense in depth.

The first level of defense consists of a well-designed facility with process design to reduce source terms, reliable SSCs that are simple to operate and maintain and resistant to degradation, and personnel well trained in operations and maintenance and committed to a strong safety culture.

The second level recognizes that failures of systems and components and human failures cannot be entirely eliminated and that protective features (e.g., engineering design features and Administrative Controls) are required. These features are provided to ensure a return to normal operation or to bring the facility to a safe condition in the event of postulated abnormal events. These features may provide automatic system response to such events or may be monitors that alert operators to the necessity of taking manual action. Such response to off-normal conditions can effectively halt the progression of events toward an accident.

The final level of defense consists of conservatively designed safety SSCs to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that may be caused by errors, malfunctions, or by events that occur both internal and external to the facility.

The following are elements of defense-in-depth related to safety design and construction that must be objectives during the design process.

- **Siting.** Consider site locations that reduce the need to provide design measures to alleviate potentially hazardous conditions or to protect surrounding populations. For example, consideration of ground instability, flooding, and hazards due to nearby installations or activities.
- **Material at risk.** Apply facility and process design and Administrative Controls to minimize and control inventories of radioactive materials and their forms.
- **Conservative design.** Design conservative margins that may allow operations to deviate from normal conditions before requiring corrective actions and taking into consideration the potential degradation of elements and operational errors.
- **Quality assurance (QA).** Use QA practices for the design and construction of safety SSCs whose stringency is commensurate with anticipated hazards, including but not limited to the assurance of qualified design and construction personnel, traceability of design decisions and procurements, and documentation of changes in design and construction.

- **Physical barriers.** Design physical barriers to confine radioactive material and thereby prevent uncontrolled releases.
- **Critical safety functions.** Design to provide multiple ways for safety functions to control processes, to maintain processes in a safe state, and to confine radioactivity when accidents could have the potential for significant public radiological impact.
- **Equipment and Administrative Controls.** Include features to control process variables to values within safe conditions, to alert operating personnel of an approach toward conservative process limits, to allow timely detection of failure or malfunction of critical equipment, and to allow for the imposition of Administrative Controls assumed in the hazard analysis, and/or accident analysis.
- **Emergency features.** Include alarms and monitors to alert workers and the public to the existence of unsafe conditions and to record the sequence and severity of an accident. Evacuation considerations incorporated into the facility design are to be coordinated with the development of the emergency plan.

The detailed design criteria requirements for these defense-in-depth elements that must be used are defined in Section 3, Elements of Design for Nuclear Safety; Section 4, Functional Design Criteria; and Section 5, Supplementary Design Criteria for Safety Structures, Systems, and Components, of this Guide.

## 2.4 Systems Engineering

The systems engineering process covers a broad range of activities that involves the design and management of a total facility. For the purpose of this Guide, the focus will be on those elements of systems engineering that relate to nuclear safety and should be considered as part of the overall facility system engineering activities. The systems engineering activities relating to nuclear safety include the following:

- identifying and integrating facility nuclear safety requirements;
- coordinating multidisciplinary teamwork in implementing facility safety requirements;
- providing nuclear safety-related interface management;
- providing configuration management to include the establishment of baseline configuration; and
- coordinating technical reviews of the facility nuclear safety features.

The application of systems engineering activities to the nuclear safety aspects of facility design should be graded and commensurate with the facility hazards and complexity. The goal is to ensure that the systems engineering activities include consideration of the appropriate facility safety features. Electronic Industries Association Interim Standard, System Engineering, and the

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applicable Guides for DOE O 430.1A should be used for guidance in developing systems engineering activities to enhance the facility safety design.

## **2.5 Quality Assurance**

As required by 10 CFR 830.120, Quality Assurance Requirements, nuclear facilities must develop and implement a QA program that meets the requirements contained therein. Supplemental information and acceptable methods for implementing these requirements are found in Implementation Guide For Use with 10 CFR 830.120, G-830.120. QA encompasses all those planned and systematic actions and controls necessary to ensure that risk to the public health and safety and the environment are controlled and that the safety, reliability, and performance are realized through the application of effective management systems. The “graded approach” should be applied when identifying QA requirements for SSCs; that is, the scope and breadth of the requirements contained within the QA program should be adjusted to reflect the importance of the safety function of the SSCs.

The degree of implementation of the QA Program should evolve concurrently with the project through its life cycle. Specifically, the QA requirements identified for the design, fabrication, construction, and modification of an SSC must be documented and supported by the facility’s safety analysis.

Document and change control for project design documents and supporting documentation must be provided by the design activity during the design. By the start of construction, document and change control must be provided by an appropriate QA configuration management program. Subsequent changes to project design and supporting documents must be made by means of a formal change control program in accordance with 10 CFR 830.120. Additional QA criteria for safety SSCs are found in Section 5, Supplementary Design Criteria for Safety Structures, Systems, and Components, of this Guide.

### **3. ELEMENTS OF DESIGN FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY**

#### **3.1 General**

This section provides design guidance and identifies key documents that contain safety design requirements for the design and construction of DOE nonreactor nuclear facilities. The predominant model building codes in the region must govern on issues not covered in this Guide. Section 4.2, Fire Protection, of DOE O 420.1 must apply for fire protection and life safety criteria.

When developing the safety aspects of the facility design, there is a logical sequence of design considerations to follow. First, the radioactive and/or hazardous material inventory should be minimized and material forms considered. Next, conservative design margins should be applied as appropriate. Finally, appropriate preventive and mitigative features should be considered. Successful application of these principles and features into the facility design will result in a safe facility design.

##### **3.1.1 Radioactive and/or Hazardous Material Inventory**

The basic and most effective means of controlling the hazards inherent in the facility is the restriction of inventories and forms of radioactive and/or hazardous materials. Emphasis should be placed on limiting the quantities of radioactive and/or hazardous materials in both process and storage areas. Material may be rendered less hazardous by maintaining it in more stabilized and less dispersible forms. For example, a quantity of plutonium stored in metal form presents less of a hazard than the same quantity stored in its oxide form.

##### **3.1.2 Conservative Facility Design**

The next area of emphasis should be conservative design margins that account for deviations from normal process parameters. The facility design also should accommodate means such as monitors and automatic and manual controls to restrict deviations from normal operations and to assist recovery during the early stages of an accident sequence. Conservative design features apply to safety SSCs as described in Section 5.1.1.1 of this Guide.

##### **3.1.3 Preventive Features**

To prevent abnormal facility conditions from progressing to accidents, preventive features should be considered in the design. The objective of these features is to provide a return to normal operation or return to a safe condition. These features may provide automatic system response to such events or may be monitors that alert operators to the necessity of taking manual action. Such response to off-normal conditions can effectively halt the progression of events toward an accident.



### 3.1.4 Mitigating Features

Safety SSCs must be provided to mitigate consequences of accidents that may still occur despite the application of the preceding conventions. The safety SSCs must be identified through the safety analysis (see Section 2.1 of this Guide).

## 3.2 Siting Criteria Development

The following factors should be considered in determining facility site suitability and in establishing facility safety design criteria:

- the site boundary and land-use characteristics of the site surroundings, including properties at risk from accidental exposures, public exclusion zones (access control), population-center distances, and population density;
- proximity of services such as the fire department and emergency medical centers;
- utility systems essential to support safety class SSCs;
- physical characteristics of the site, including topography, meteorology, and hydrology;
- geological and subsurface elements such as earthquake loading, soil bearing design capacity, rock or other bearing stratum, and groundwater elevations;
- natural phenomena hazards as discussed in Section 3.3, Natural Phenomena Hazards, of this Guide and DOE O 420.1, Section 4.4, Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation, including seismic activity, wind, hurricane, tornado, flood, hail, volcanic ash, lightning, and snow;
- emergency response considerations, including population sheltering or shielding parameters and evacuation delay times and rates for the public and colocated workers;
- potential human-induced hazards from nearby facilities or activities such as industrial and military facilities, aircraft impacts, pipelines, and transportation routes;
- proximity and hazard to other facilities (from the proposed facility); and
- site-related assumptions of the Environmental Impact Statement.

For the purpose of this Guide, a radiological siting criterion of 25 rem, 50-year total effective dose equivalent must be used, from releases over the course of postulated design basis accidents from uptakes at the site boundary that could be delivered during a one year period.



### **3.3 Natural Phenomena Hazards**

#### **3.3.1 General Application**

Safety SSCs must be designed and constructed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena hazards. Fundamental requirements for natural phenomena hazards are specified in the regional model building codes. The natural phenomena design requirements for safety SSCs as specified in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.4, and the associated DOE Standards must apply to safety SSCs as determined by the methodology described in DOE-STD-3009-94. The safety-class or safety-significant designation is the basis for selecting the specified natural phenomena design requirements found in the referenced DOE Standards.

#### **3.3.2 Primary Applicable Requirements**

- DOE O 420.1, Section 4.4, and its Guide
- DOE-STD-1020-94, *Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities*
- DOE-STD-1021-93, *Natural Phenomena Hazards Performance Categorization Guidelines for Structures, Systems, and Components*
- DOE-STD-1022-94, *Natural Phenomena Hazards Site Characterization Criteria*
- DOE-STD-1023-95, *Natural Phenomena Hazards Assessment Criteria*
- DOE-STD-1024-92, *Guidelines for Use of Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Curves at Department of Energy Sites for Department of Energy Facilities*

#### **3.3.3 Other Considerations**

Design considerations for volcanic eruption and ash fall, lightning strikes, range fires, snow loads, and extreme temperatures are not provided in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.4, and other associated standards. Criteria for the assessment and mitigation of these hazards must be developed on a site-specific basis and approved by DOE prior to use. Lightning protection systems must be considered for buildings and structures that contain, process, and store radioactive, explosive, and similarly hazardous materials. Lightning protection systems must be designed to comply with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 780. (See DOE O 420.1, Sections 4.3 and 4.4.)

Design considerations should be given to the interaction of more than one event, particularly those more likely to occur simultaneously. For example, heavy rains usually accompany tornadoes or high winds; excessive roof loads may result from rain and accumulated volcanic ash; and upstream dams may fail due to seismic events.

### **3.4 Architectural**

The type and level of hazards should be determined for each functional area, the attendant degree of risk established, and the possibility of cross contamination considered. Wherever possible, work areas with compatible contaminants should be located together to simplify design criteria related to air supply and exhaust, waste disposal, decontamination, and cross contamination.

Radioactive and hazardous material contamination control requirements should be considered in the design to minimize the potential for contamination spread.

Office areas should be located in common-use facilities (e.g., data computation and processing, word processing, etc.) and away from process areas to minimize risks to workers of exposure to radioactive and/or hazardous materials.

#### **3.4.1 Building Layout**

The building layout should provide protection from the hazards associated with handling, processing, and storing of radioactive and/or hazardous materials. In addition, the following items should be considered in the facility safety design.

- Additional space should be provided for temporary or additional shielding in the event radiation levels are higher than anticipated.
- The arrangement and location of hazardous process equipment and its maintenance provisions should provide appropriate protective and safety measures as applicable.
- The building design should accommodate prompt return to a safe condition in emergencies and allow ready access for and protection of workers in areas where manual corrective actions are required and in areas that contain radiation monitoring equipment readouts.
- Facility layout should provide specific control and isolation, if possible, of quantities of flammable, toxic, and explosive gases, chemicals, and other hazardous materials admitted to the facility.

#### **3.4.2 Access Control**

The facility design should accommodate the requirements for safeguards and security, emergency egress, and area access control for worker protection. Where these requirements may appear to conflict, life safety must take precedence. For example, safeguards and security requirements would minimize the number of entrances and exits, but for worker safety, the emergency-egress requirements would provide an adequate number of exits. Specific requirements for access control must be implemented as specified by 10 CFR 835 for radiological hazards, by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and

disposal facilities, and by 29 CFR 1910 and 1926 (OSHA) for hazardous material locations within operating facilities and construction sites.

Where access control is provided for control rooms that contain safety-class SSC controls and monitoring, the same level of qualification must be considered for the access control features. Access controls must not prevent operator actions required to achieve and maintain a facility in a safe condition.

### **3.5 Accessibility and Maintainability**

Section 4.1.1.2 of DOE O 420.1 requires that facilities be designed to facilitate inspection, testing, maintenance, and repair and replacement of safety SSCs to assure their continued function, readiness for operation, and accuracy. The facility design must include provisions for accessibility and maintainability that include but are not limited to the following:

- Surveillance equipment should be located and sufficient space provided for relative ease of routine testing and maintenance activities.
- Accessible inspection covers to allow for visual inspection should be provided and located such that necessary routine inspections can be conducted with minimum disruption to the facility or equipment operation. Examples include ducting and process piping systems.
- The facility design should include features that provide for ease of routine maintenance without a subsequent mission reduction. Examples include providing sufficient clearance around equipment to accommodate change out of large components and providing permanent ladder(s) and platform(s) access to lubrication and equipment areas.

A Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) program should be established in accordance with the guidance of DOE RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, AND MAINTAINABILITY GUIDELINES (Draft) and graded as to the complexity and hazards of the facility. The purpose of a RAM program is to help ensure that the project will be free of RAM-related problems that could prevent achieving health, safety, environmental, performance, schedule, and economic goals.

### **3.6 Human Factors Engineering**

Appropriate human factors engineering principles and criteria should be integrated into the design, operation, and maintenance of DOE facilities. The human factor elements that should be considered include, but are not limited to, the following: equipment labeling, workplace environment (temperature and humidity, lighting, noise, vibration, and aesthetics), human dimensions, operating panels and controls, component arrangement, warning and annunciator systems, and communication systems. The applicable criteria found in Nuclear Regulatory Guide (NUREG) 0700, MIL-STD-1472D [Department of Defense (DoD)], and American

National Standards Institute (ANSI)/Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 1023 should be considered in the design of these elements.

### **3.7 Design to Facilitate Deactivation, Decontamination, and Decommissioning**

#### **3.7.1 Deactivation**

Deactivation is the process of removing hazardous materials and neutralizing hazardous conditions at the end of a facility's life or mission prior to decontamination and decommissioning. Design to facilitate deactivation would incorporate facility features that aid in the removal of surplus radioactive and chemical materials; storage tank cleanout and maintenance; stabilization of contamination and process materials; and the removal of hazardous, mixed, and radioactive wastes. In general, these features would reduce the physical risks and hazards associated with facility decontamination and decommissioning and would also be called for when designing for ease of maintenance during operation.

#### **3.7.2 Decontamination**

In accordance with DOE O 420.1, the facility design must incorporate measures to simplify decontamination of areas that may become contaminated with radioactive or hazardous materials. Items such as service piping, conduits, and ductwork should be kept to a minimum in potential contamination areas and should be arranged to facilitate decontamination. Walls, ceilings, and floors in areas vulnerable to contamination should be finished with washable or strippable coverings. Metal liners should be used in areas that have the potential to become highly contaminated. Cracks, crevices, and joints should be filled and finished smooth to prevent accumulation of contaminated material. The facility design should incorporate features that will facilitate decontamination to achieve facility decommissioning, to increase the potential for other uses, or both.

#### **3.7.3 Decommissioning**

Design features consistent with the requirements of DOE O 435.1, RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, should be developed during the planning and design phases based on decommissioning requirements or a conversion method leading to other facility uses. The following design principles should be considered:

- Use of localized liquid-transfer systems with emphasis on localized batch solidification of liquid waste to avoid long runs of buried contaminated piping. Special provisions should be included in the design to ensure the integrity of joints in buried pipelines.
- Location of exhaust filtration components of the ventilation systems at or near individual enclosures to minimize long runs of internally contaminated ductwork.
- Equipment, including effluent decontamination equipment, that precludes, to the extent practicable, the accumulation of radioactive or other hazardous materials in relatively

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inaccessible areas, including curves and turns in piping and ductwork. Accessible, removable covers for inspection and cleanouts are encouraged.

- Use of modular radiation shielding in lieu of or in addition to monolithic shielding walls.
- Provisions for flushing and/or cleaning contaminated or potentially contaminated piping systems.
- Provisions for suitable clearances, where practical, to accommodate remote handling and safety surveillance equipment required for future decontamination and decommissioning.
- Use of lifting lugs on large tanks and equipment.
- Piping systems that carry contaminated or potentially contaminated liquid should be free draining via gravity.

## **4. FUNCTIONAL DESIGN CRITERIA**

### **4.1 Nuclear Criticality Safety**

#### **4.1.1 Conditions that Initiate Requirements of this Section**

Any DOE facility that may produce, process, store, transfer, dispose, or otherwise handle sufficient quantities of fissionable material that present a concern for accidental criticality must be designed to meet the requirements of DOE O 420.1, Section 4.3, Nuclear Criticality Safety.

#### **4.1.2 Primary Applicable Requirements**

DOE O 420.1, Section 4.3, contains requirements that facilities be designed in such a manner that the probability of a criticality accident is acceptably low and, to the extent practical, the public, the workers, and the environment are protected from damaging effects and undue hazards that may arise from a criticality accident as required; that no single credible event or failure must result in a criticality accident having unmitigated consequences; and that criticality accident alarm systems and criticality detection systems be included. See DOE O 420.1, Section 4.3, and its supporting standards for details.

### **4.2 Radiation Protection**

#### **4.2.1 Primary Applicable Requirements**

The control of radiological exposures of workers, the public, and the environment must be in accordance with Section 4.1.1.2 of DOE O 420.1, 10 CFR 835, and 10 CFR 834 (Proposed). Additional guidance is contained in the *DOE Radiological Control Manual* (DOE/EH-0256T).

#### **4.2.2 General Application**

The primary objective of radiological protection is to minimize personnel external and internal exposures to radioactive materials; provide adequate radiation posting, sampling, monitoring, and notification or alarm capabilities; and apply ALARA principles. Radiation protection should be provided through facility physical design (e.g., shielding, remote handling, area layout, equipment layout, confinement, and ventilation) and supplemented by cautionary systems. ALARA principles to minimize personnel exposures must be applied to all equipment and facility designs.

Specific criteria for monitoring and entry control systems, posting and labeling of radioactive materials, nuclear accident dosimetry, and ALARA applications must be applied as required by 10 CFR 835.

Offsite dose limits used to assess acceptability of the facility safety design during normal operations and anticipated operational occurrences must comply with 10 CFR 834 (Proposed).

Physical layout and details of proven radiological equipment designs are contained in the DOE adopted IAEA Safety Series 30 Standard and Faust (1988).

The projected dose rates must be based on occupancy, duration, and frequency of exposure and must not exceed values specified in 10 CFR 835. This may require that shielding be provided for areas requiring normal and intermittent access, such as those for preventive maintenance, component changes, or adjustment of systems and equipment. The type of shielding should be determined by the characteristics of the radiation, structural requirements, fire protection requirements, and radiation damage potential. Shielding should also be installed to minimize nonpenetrating external radiation exposures to the skin and lens of the eye where required. In most cases, confinement barriers or process equipment provide this function. Where shielding is an integral part of the facility structure, it must be designed and installed to at least the same level of natural phenomenon qualification as the facility structure. Additional guidance is contained in ANSI/ANS 6.4.2. Where shields are identified as safety class, the additional requirements stated in Section 5 of this Guide.

Occupied operating areas for normal operating conditions must be designed not to exceed the airborne concentration limits of 10 CFR 835. Respirators should not be required under normal operating conditions except as a precautionary measure. Engineered controls and features should be designed with consideration of contaminant chemical forms to minimize potential inhalation of radioactive materials.

Devices to monitor individual exposures to external radiation and to warn personnel of radioactive contamination must be used in accordance with 10 CFR 835. Air sampling equipment should be placed in strategic locations to detect and evaluate airborne contaminant conditions at work locations. Continuous air monitors with preset alarms should be provided to give early warning of significant releases of radioactive materials. Air monitoring and warning systems must comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 835 with consideration for additional guidance contained in ANSI N13.1.

Breathing-air supply systems, if required, must comply with 29 CFR 1910.134.

#### **4.2.3 Special Considerations and Good Engineering Practices**

American Nuclear Society document ANS 11.16 contains guidance on functional designs based on both DOE and NRC experiences. DOE/EH-0256T provides details on radioactive material identification, storage, and transport. These documents provide descriptions and details of use-proven principles and designs and identify considerations that affect configuration, hardware selection, installation, maintenance, and controls that can be used in developing a sound functional design.

Shielding should be designed to limit the total external dose during normal operations to the annual exposure limit values as specified in 10 CFR 835. Design of facilities and shields applicable to machines and sources is summarized as good practices in NCRP Report 49. Additional guidance is contained in ANSI N43.2.

Guidance on ventilation design is provided by an ACGIH document (ACGIH 2092-1998) and ERDA 76-21. Alarms for loss of ventilation or differential pressure must be provided on primary confinement systems (gloveboxes or hoods) and should be considered on secondary confinement systems (rooms). ANSI/ASME N509 contains requirements for the design of nuclear facility air cleaning systems and ANSI/ASME N510 contains requirements for testing air cleaning systems.

Change rooms for changing into and out of protective clothing should be designed to ensure that clean clothing (personal clothing) and contaminated clothing (protective clothing) are segregated. The design objective is to ensure that storage of contaminated protective clothing will control contamination so that it does not spread beyond the storage container. The change room exhaust air should be high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtered as applicable if dispersible radionuclides are handled in the process areas it serves.

Personnel decontamination facilities should be located close to areas that are potential sources of contamination. Safety showers may be used if water collection from their use is controlled. Portable personnel decontamination equipment should be considered for facilities with no permanent structures.

Respiratory protection should be provided to maintenance personnel where potentially significant exposures exist for maintenance operations and design constraints preclude the ability to perform maintenance either remotely or in a glovebox. However, every reasonable effort should be made to allow routine maintenance activities to be conducted without the need for respiratory protection.

### **4.3 Hazardous Material Protection**

This section provides functional design guidance for hazardous material protection other than radioactive material protection. While not controlled by DOE O 420.1, Section 4.1, directly, these considerations may indirectly relate to nuclear safety in that hazardous material releases may cause or exacerbate nuclear accidents. The hazard analysis must establish any potential for hazardous material release accidents that cause or exacerbate a nuclear accident. This potential must be considered in the accident analysis and the selection of safety SSCs.

#### **4.3.1 Conditions that Initiate Requirements of this Section**

Any facility where personnel could potentially be exposed to hazardous materials listed in 29 CFR 1910 at concentrations approaching the listed permissible exposure limits (8-hour, time-weighted average, normal operations) must comply with the requirements of the applicable laws for hazardous material protection.

#### **4.3.2 Primary Applicable Requirements**

Requirements for design of engineered controls for hazardous material protection are contained in 29 CFR 1910, Subparts G, H, and Z.



### 4.3.3 General Application

Ventilation systems are engineering controls commonly used to prevent worker exposure to hazardous materials and are used in combination with personal protective equipment and operational procedures. 29 CFR 1910, Subpart G, 1910.94, requires that where ventilation is used to control worker exposures, it must be adequate to reduce the hazardous material concentrations of air contaminants to the degree that the hazardous material no longer poses a health risk to the worker (i.e., concentrations at or below the permissible exposure limits). 29 CFR 1910, Subpart Z, 1910.1000, requires that wherever engineering controls are not sufficient to reduce exposures to such levels, they must be used to reduce exposures to the lowest practicable level and supplemented by work practice controls. The design should ensure that respirators are not required for normal operating conditions or routine maintenance activities except as a precautionary measure.

Ventilation systems for hazardous material protection should use exhaust hoods to control concentrations of hazardous materials from discrete sources, or should control the number of air changes per hour for an entire room or bay. Air flow and other design requirements for specific types of systems must comply with 29 CFR 1910, Subparts G and H. 29 CFR 1910, Subpart Z, provides requirements for monitoring and alarm systems for facilities that manage or use specific hazardous materials. Additional guidance on design of ventilation systems for hazardous material protection is provided in ANSI Z9.2 and ASHRAE 62. Decontamination facilities, safety showers, and eyewashes to mitigate external exposures to hazardous materials must be provided where mandated by 29 CFR 1910, Subparts H and Z. These systems must be designed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI Z358.1 and ANSI Z124.2.

### 4.3.4 Special Considerations and Good Engineering Practices

Facilities with hazardous material exposure concerns should be designed to minimize personnel exposures, both external and internal, and to provide adequate monitoring and notification capabilities to inform workers of unsafe conditions. Hazardous material protection should be provided through facility design (e.g., remote handling, area and equipment layout, spill-control features, confinement, ventilation, etc.). Occupied spaces should be designed to preclude locations where low oxygen content or air displacement may occur or where reactive, combustible, flammable, or explosive gas, vapor, or liquid accumulation might occur.

Safety controls and features should be designed to consider contaminant chemical forms and minimize the potential for inhalation and contact under all conditions. Directed ventilation flow paths should be used to move contaminants away from worker breathing zones. The design should ensure that ventilation flow will cascade from clean areas to contaminated areas to preclude contamination spread. Uniform distribution of incoming air and/or air mixing equipment should be provided to ensure that no pockets of stagnant air exist in areas where workers are present.

## **4.4 Effluent Monitoring and Control**

### **4.4.1 Applicability**

This section applies to any DOE facility that produces airborne or liquid radioactive and/or hazardous material effluents, including contaminated storm water, under normal operating conditions.

### **4.4.2 Special Considerations and Good Engineering Practices**

Liquid process wastes containing radioactive and/or hazardous material should be collected and monitored near the source of generation before batch transfer via appropriate pipelines or portable tanks to a liquid-waste treatment facility. Waste storage tanks and transfer lines must be designed and constructed so that any leakage should be detected, contained, and collected for removal before it reaches the environment. Double-walled transfer pipelines or multiple encasements should be used for high-level radioactive liquid wastes and other liquid wastes that have the potential to cause significant localized consequences as defined by safety analysis, or significant exposures during the implementation of mitigating measures in the event of an accidental release. Provisions should be made for the collection, removal, and appropriate disposition of infiltration into the annulus of double-walled pipelines. Radioactive- and hazardous-waste collection, transfer, and storage systems must be designed to avoid the dilution of radioactive or hazardous waste by waste of lower concentrations of radioactivity, toxicity, or other hazard. Emphasis should be placed on reducing radioactive constituents in liquid effluents released to surface waters or soil columns to levels ALARA.

All airborne effluents from areas in which hazardous or radioactive materials are managed other than in closed containers should be exhausted through a ventilation system designed to remove particulate material, vapors, and gases, as necessary, to comply with applicable release requirements and to reduce releases of radioactive materials to levels ALARA. The design of airborne-effluent systems should preclude holdup of particulate materials in offgas and ventilation ductwork and include provisions to continuously monitor buildup of material and material recovery. The design of systems must also preclude the accumulation of potentially flammable quantities of gases generated by radiolysis or chemical reactions within process equipment.

The design capacity for effluent monitoring and control systems must be consistent with the needs for handling process effluents during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, and DBA conditions. Alarms must be provided that will annunciate in the event concentrations of radioactive or hazardous materials above specified limits are detected in the effluent stream. Appropriate manual or automatic protective features must be provided to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive and/or hazardous material to the environment or the workplace. Portions of effluent management systems and components that are required to control or limit the release of radioactive or hazardous materials to the environment or for safe operation of the system must be provided with redundancy where required by applicable federal, state, and local environmental regulations and permits. Effluent monitoring and control systems

must be designed to allow periodic maintenance, inspection, and testing of components and to maintain occupational radiation doses ALARA during these operations. Appropriate nuclear criticality safety provisions must be applied to the design of airborne effluent systems. This includes design to preclude the holdup or collection of fissile material and other material capable of sustaining a chain reaction in portions of the system not geometrically favorable and design to ease of recovery of these materials in case of an accident as well as during normal operations.

The design of safety SSCs, as identified in the facility-specific safety analysis, must comply with the requirements of Section 5 of this Guide. Safety-class effluent monitoring and control SSCs are generally designed to operate in conjunction with physical barriers to form a confinement system to limit the release of radioactive or other hazardous material to the environment and to prevent or minimize the spread of contamination within the facility. Adequate instrumentation and controls must be provided to assess system performance and to allow the necessary control of system operation. Equipment in safety-class systems must be appropriately qualified or protected to ensure reliable operation during normal operating conditions, during anticipated operational occurrences, and during and following a design basis earthquake. Safety-class air filtration units, effluent transport systems, or effluent collection systems must be designed to remain functional throughout DBAs and to retain collected radioactive and hazardous materials after the accident.

## **4.5 Waste Management**

This section applies to any DOE facility that under normal operating conditions produces containers of wastes having constituents that are regulated as radioactive, hazardous, or mixed waste. The design of waste management systems must be in accordance with the requirements of DOE O 435.1 and the Federal, State, and local requirements referenced therein.

Unless it can be demonstrated that the risk is acceptable, waste management and storage systems and associated support systems should be designed to remain functional following a DBA and should facilitate the maintenance of a safe shutdown condition. For high-level waste containment systems, at least one confinement barrier should be designed to withstand the effects of DBAs.

## **4.6 Fire Protection**

### **4.6.1 General Application**

Facility design must comply with the applicable fire protection requirements contained in DOE O 420.1, Section 4.2, Fire Protection; DOE O 440.1A, WORKER PROTECTION MANAGEMENT FOR DOE FEDERAL AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES; and their companion document, DOE G 440.1-5, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR USE WITH DOE ORDERS 420.1 AND 440.1, FIRE SAFETY PROGRAM. Acceptable methods for fire protection design may be found in DOE-STD-1066-99, *Fire Protection Design Criteria*.

#### **4.6.2 Fire Hazard Analysis**

A fire hazard analysis must be prepared for each DOE facility in accordance with DOE O 420.1, Section 4.2, and should be initiated early in the design process and closely coordinated with the safety analysis effort as discussed in Section 2.1, Design Process and Safety Analysis Relationship, of this Guide.

### **4.7 Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Communications**

#### **4.7.1 Conditions that Initiate Requirements of this Section**

This section applies to any DOE facility that must respond to internal or external emergency events to control acute exposures to radiation in excess of the annual exposure limits or to hazardous materials in excess of Permissible Exposure Limits, or to preclude multiple fatalities.

#### **4.7.2 Primary Applicable Requirements**

Provisions for emergency preparedness are contained in the requirements of DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, which address installation of an Emergency Operations Center. Primary and backup means of communications with the Emergency Operations Center, provisions for evacuation and accountability; and adequate equipment and supplies for emergency response personnel to carry out their respective duties and responsibilities related to nonreactor nuclear facility must be provided in the facility design consistent with DOE O 151.1.

#### **4.7.3 General Application**

Emergency evacuation annunciation systems must conform with ANSI/ANS N2.3. General communication system installation requirements must be per NFPA 72, Section 3-12, which describes the minimum requirements for transmission of alarm conditions to building occupants, and Sections 6-3 and 6-4, which include minimum requirements for audibility above background noise and the use of visual signals, including minimum light intensities.

For facilities handling dispersible materials, meteorological data necessary to control consequences from an emergency event should be obtained from either the nearest U.S. Geological Survey or local (onsite) meteorological stations.

### **4.8 Explosives Criteria**

The design and construction of all new DOE explosives facilities and modifications to existing explosives facilities must conform to the DOE explosives safety requirements established in the DOE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL, DOE M 440.1-1. Facility structural design and construction must comply with the requirements of TM5-1300 (DoD), *Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions*, and DOE/TIC-11268, *A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loading of Structures*. Blast resistant design for personnel and facility protection must

be based on the TNT equivalency of the maximum quantity of explosives and propellants permitted. In accordance with TM5-1300, the TNT equivalency must be increased by 20 percent for design purposes.

The technical basis for establishing explosives quantity–distance separation for facility location, design, and operation (under normal and potential DBA conditions) must follow the stricter of the criteria provided in DoD 6055.9-STD, *Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards*. DoD 6055.9 specifies the minimum distance for protection from hazardous fragments to facility boundaries, critical facility, and inhabited structures unless it can be shown that there will be no hazardous fragments or debris at lesser distances. The method of calculation presented in the DoD Explosive Safety Board (DoDESB) Technical Paper No. 13 may be used to establish a smaller fragment exclusion zone. It is not intended that these minimum fragment distances be applied to operating facilities or dedicated support functions within an operating line. The criteria presented in DOE M 440.1-1 must apply for these exposures.

For an unproven facility design, either a validated model or a full-scale test is required to ensure structural adequacy unless a high degree of confidence can be provided by calculations or other means. The contract administrator (head of field organization) with the advice of competent engineering review must concur in any determination regarding test requirements.

When an explosives facility is also a nonreactor nuclear facility, the requirements for nonreactor nuclear facilities must also apply.

## **5. SUPPLEMENTARY DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SAFETY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS**

This section provides supplementary guidance for the design and construction of safety SSCs to ensure reliable performance of their safety function under those conditions and events for which they are intended. Design methods and criteria commonly used to ensure required availability are discussed in Section 5.1, General Requirements, of this Guide. Discipline-specific consensus codes and standards (e.g., electrical, mechanical, and structural) are presented in Section 5.2, Specific Criteria, of this Guide. These design methods, design criteria, and consensus codes and standards are the minimum set of requirements that must be applied when designing safety SSCs.

### **5.1 General Requirements**

Safety SSCs and their associated support systems must be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to standards and quality requirements commensurate with their importance to safety. An acceptable level of assurance that the safety SSCs will perform their intended safety function can be achieved by meeting the requirements contained within the following sections.

#### **5.1.1 Assurance of Safety Function**

Safety SSCs must be designed to reliably perform their safety function under those conditions and events for which their safety function is intended. The following subsections must be applied to the design of safety SSCs to most effectively enhance system availability and provide for robust design. Further design guidance can be found in IAEA Standard No. 50-P-1 and ANSI/IEEE 603.

##### **5.1.1.1 Conservative Design Features**

Safety SSCs must be designed to withstand all design basis loadings with an appropriate margin of safety. The design should incorporate, commensurate with the importance of the safety function, multiple levels of protection against normal, anticipated, and accident conditions. For example, while built-in process controls may maintain pressure within a conservative limit, the design may also require provisions for relief valves, automatic shutdown capability, or other preventive features.

The design of safety-class SSCs must incorporate suitably conservative criteria contained in applicable DOE Orders and Standards addressing safety functions (e.g., natural phenomena design mitigation).

##### **5.1.1.2 Design Against Single-Point Failure**

The facility and its systems must be designed to perform all safety functions with the reliability indicated by the safety analysis. The single-point failure criterion, requirements, and design

analysis identified in ANSI/IEEE 379 must be applied during the design process as the primary method of achieving this reliability.

#### **5.1.1.3 Environmental Qualification**

Environmental qualification must be used to ensure that safety-class SSCs can perform all safety functions, as determined by the safety analysis, with no failure mechanism that could lead to common cause failures under postulated service conditions. The requirements from ANSI/IEEE 323 for mild environmental qualification must be used unless the environment in which the SSC is located changes significantly as a result of the DBAs. In general, qualification for mild environments should consist of two elements:

- Ensuring that all equipment is selected for application to the specific service conditions based on sound engineering practices and manufacturers' recommendations.
- Ensuring that the system documentation includes controls that will preserve the relationship between equipment application and service conditions.

#### **5.1.1.4 Safe Failure Modes**

The facility design must provide reliable safe conditions and sufficient confinement of hazardous material during and after all DBAs. At both the facility and SSC level, the design must ensure that more probable modes of failure (e.g., fail to open versus fail to close) will increase the likelihood of a safe condition.

### **5.1.2 Support System and Interface Design**

Safety SSCs often rely upon other SSCs to support their operation. Therefore, it is important to identify these support systems and the associated interfaces between safety and nonsafety SSCs. The following subsections address the design considerations for these related systems.

#### **5.1.2.1 Support Systems**

In some cases, safety SSCs rely upon supporting SSCs to perform their intended safety function. These support SSCs may be classified as safety-class or safety-significant SSCs. For example, a safety-class designation may be appropriate for an instrumentation and control (I&C) system that supports a tritium containment system if it can be demonstrated that failure of the I&C support system can lead to either failure or reduced availability of the safety-class containment barrier. In general, the following classification criteria apply.

- Support SSCs to safety-class SSCs must be classified as safety class if their failures can prevent a safety-class SSC from performing its safety functions.



- Support SSCs to safety-significant SSCs that mitigate or prevent accidents with the potential for significant onsite consequences should be classified as safety-significant if their failures prevent a safety-significant SSC from performing its safety functions.
- Support SSCs to safety-significant SSCs that mitigate or prevent accidents with the potential for significant localized consequences need not be classified as safety significant.

### 5.1.2.2 Interface Design

A nuclear safety design goal is to minimize interfaces between safety-class, safety-significant, and nonsafety SSCs. Ideally, safety SSCs should not have any interfaces; however, this is not always practical. Interfaces, such as pressure retention boundaries, integrity of fluid systems, electrical equipment, I&C, and mechanical and support systems, exist between safety SSCs and between safety SSCs and nonsafety SSCs. These interfaces must be evaluated to identify SSC failures that would prevent the safety SSCs from performing their intended safety function. For these SSC failures, isolation devices, interface barriers, or design class upgrades should be provided to ensure safety SSC protection and reliability. In many cases, systems may consist of a group of subsystems, where each subsystem supports the operation of the whole system. For example, an auxiliary power diesel generator system may consist of lubricating oil, fuel oil, diesel engine, jacket cooling, and room ventilation subsystems. System interface evaluations should clearly define these boundaries. In all instances, a case-by-case evaluation should be performed.

### 5.1.3 Quality Assurance

The QA requirements for the design, fabrication, construction, and modification of safety SSCs are developed using the facility safety analysis. At the earliest stages of the design, a hazard analysis, which identifies the functional requirements of safety SSCs, should be used as a basis for determining appropriate QA requirements.

As the design progresses, more detailed safety analyses will be performed to develop the basis for safety SSCs performance requirements. Once the safety SSCs and their performance requirements are identified, a set of detailed QA requirements can then be specified. As part of the safety analysis, a list of all safety-class SSCs must be prepared and maintained for the life of the project through decommissioning. This listing must identify the functions, performance requirements, and natural phenomena design requirements for each safety-class SSC and the associated QA requirements. These detailed component-specific requirements are typically contained in consensus codes and standards (e.g., ANSI/IEEE). A similar listing of all safety-significant SSCs should also be prepared.

In most cases, components used in DOE nonreactor nuclear facilities will be “off the shelf”; that is, they will not be subjected to the rigorous Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA)-1-based requirements for “nuclear-grade” components. Therefore, safety SSC quality standards can



either be design based or achieved through testing, vendor control, and inspection. However, the requirements of 10 CFR 830.120 still apply to safety SSCs.

## **5.2 Specific Criteria**

The application of design criteria to safety SSCs entails the selection of appropriate and relevant criteria commensurate with the levels of safety. A purely prescriptive approach to the use of national codes and standards may fail to provide the appropriate level of safety. While national codes and standards will provide guidance and the basic design criteria for most systems, blanket application of such individual codes and standards or collections thereof is not necessary. It is necessary to tailor selections of codes and standards for each specific application based on the required safety function.

Note that the safety analysis conducted in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94 that results in a particular safety classification is also the same analysis used to identify and define design criteria. Safety analyses identify the functions that must be performed and the conditions under which these functions must perform. These analyses will then result in both the functional safety classification and the identification of the appropriate and relevant criteria to ensure the prescribed safety functions can be performed.

Categorization and listing of design codes and standards as a portion of the design criteria process are performed to ensure that a correct and appropriate level of engineering design detail and attention are used for each safety classification. The intent is to specify the design codes and standards that will ensure that each safety SSC will perform its required safety function, including due consideration of the intangible areas of influence.

The national codes and standards listed in the following sections provide guidance on the minimum aggregation of codes, standards, and standard practices that should be considered in identifying the design criteria and other considerations for each specific SSC commensurate with its function. Additional design criteria may be applied as necessary to perform the safety function.

Specific design criteria for safety SSCs often relate to a confinement function. Generally, three confinement systems are used to achieve the complete confinement system objective. The terms confinement and confinement barriers used in the following sections are used in the context of the three types of confinement: primary, secondary, and tertiary (as defined in the glossary).

### **5.2.1 Structural**

Structures classified as safety class or safety significant normally provide a passive confinement barrier and do not require redundancy in their design. The design of safety-significant and safety-class structures must ensure satisfaction of the functional requirements for the specific confinement system of which they are a part. In addition, safety-class confinement barriers must be designed to withstand likely secondary events as well as primary events with an appropriate margin of safety. Potential secondary events might be fire, explosion, or nuclear criticality

caused by the primary event. Likely secondary events are those with a probability greater than 0.1, given the primary event. See Table 5.1 for the relevant codes and refer to Section 4.4 of DOE O 420.1 and Section 3.3 of this Guide for additional natural phenomena hazards design guidance information.

**Table 5.1. Codes for Safety-Significant and Safety-Class Structures.**

<b>Structures</b>	<b>Safety Significant</b>	<b>Safety Class</b>
Concrete	ACI-318	ANSI/ACI-349
Steel	AISC-M011	ANSI/AISC-N690

## **5.2.2 Mechanical**

Mechanical equipment classified as safety significant or safety class provides both passive and active safety functions. The redundancy criteria as described in Section 5.1.1.2 of this Guide must be applied to the design of safety-class SSCs that provide an active safety function. The redundancy criteria should be considered in the design of safety-significant SSCs that provide an active safety function. Redundancy criteria are generally not applied to the design of safety SSCs that provide a passive safety function.

### **5.2.2.1 Ventilation**

In general, the safety function of ventilation and offgas systems is to provide confinement integrity and to filter exhaust, thereby preventing or mitigating uncontrolled releases of radioactive and/or hazardous materials to the environment. Ventilation and offgas systems are included as a vital part of the primary and secondary confinement design. The need for redundancy and the degree of redundancy in these systems must be determined by the safety analysis process and maintenance concerns for both active and passive components. Designs must provide for periodic maintenance, inspection, and testing of components. Adequate shielding must be included in the design of filters, absorbers, scrubbers, and other air treatment components to ensure that occupational exposure limits are not exceeded during maintenance and inspection activities.

Safety-significant and safety-class ventilation system designs must include adequate instrumentation to monitor and assess performance with necessary alarms for annunciation of abnormal or unacceptable operation. Manual or automatic protective control features must be provided to prevent or mitigate an uncontrolled release of radioactive and/or hazardous material to the environment and to minimize the spread of contamination within the facility.

Vent streams potentially containing significant concentrations of radioactive and/or hazardous materials must be processed through an offgas cleanup system before being exhausted to the

environment. Cleanup systems are to remove particulates and noxious chemicals and control the release of gaseous radionuclides. The design of safety-significant and safety-class offgas systems must be commensurate with the sources and characteristics of the radioactive and chemical components of the offgas air stream to prevent or mitigate the uncontrolled releases of radioactive and/or hazardous materials to the environment. See Table 5.2 for the relevant codes.

**Table 5.2. Codes for Safety-Significant and Safety-Class Ventilation System Components.**

<b>Ventilation</b>	<b>Safety Significant</b>	<b>Safety Class</b>
Ducts	SMACNA Manual	SMACNA Manual
Fans	ASHRAE Handbook	ASHRAE Handbook; ANSI/ANI-59.2
Filtration	ASHRAE-52.1; Mil-F-51068F; ANSI/ASME-N509 and N510; DOE NE STD-F3-45	ASHRAE-52.1; Mil-F-51068F; ANSI/ASME-N509 and N510; DOE NE STD-F3-45

### **5.2.2.2 Process Equipment**

The usual safety function of process equipment is to provide primary confinement and prevent or mitigate radioactive and/or hazardous material releases to the environment. Process equipment that would be required to provide primary confinement includes the following: piping, tanks, pressure vessels, pumps, valves, and gloveboxes. These examples represent process system components that could be used to contain radioactive or toxic materials directly. Process equipment for some applications can provide secondary confinement. Examples include double-walled piping systems, double-walled tanks, and gloveboxes.

Safety-class and safety-significant process equipment providing passive confinement (piping, tanks, holding vessels, etc.) must be designed to suitably conservative criteria; redundancy in their design is not required. The redundancy criteria as described in Section 5.1.1.2 of this Guide must be applied to the design of safety-class SSCs that involve active confinement process equipment (pumps, valves, etc.). The redundancy criteria should be considered in the design of safety-significant SSCs that involve active confinement process equipment. See Table 5.3 for the relevant codes.

**Table 5.3. Codes for Safety-Significant and Safety-Class Process Equipment.**

<b>Process Equipment</b>	<b>Safety Significant</b>	<b>Safety Class</b>
Pressure vessels	ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1 or 2	ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1 or 2
Tanks (0-15 psig)	API-620; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1 or 2	API-620; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1 or 2
Tanks (containing flammable liquids)	ANSI/API-620; ANSI/API-650; NFPA 30	ANSI/API-620; ANSI/API-650; NFPA 30
Tanks (atmospheric pressure)	ANSI/API-650; AWWA-D100; ANSI/ASME-B96.1	ANSI/API-650; AWWA-D100; ANSI/ASME-B96.1
Pumps	ANSI/API; ANSI/ASME B73.1M, B73.2M; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII; AWWA; Hydraulic Institute Standards	ANSI/API; ANSI/ASME B73.1M, B73.2M; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII; AWWA; Hydraulic Institute Standards
Piping	ANSI/ASME B31.3	ANSI/ASME B31.3; ANSI-N278.1
Valves	ANSI/ASME B16.5, B31.3	ANSI/ASME B16.5, B31.3
Heat exchangers	ASHRAE Handbook; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1; TEMA B, C, or R	ASHRAE Handbook; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1; TEMA B, C, or R
Gloveboxes	ANSI/ASTM C852; ANS 11.16	ANSI/ASTM C852; ANS 11.16

### 5.2.2.3 Mechanical Handling Equipment

Safety-significant and safety-class handling equipment (cranes, manipulators, etc.) will only be classified as such if their failure would create a radiological material release exceeding the guidelines for either classification. The safety-significant classification, as a defense-in-depth provision, will be the more common classification for remote material handling equipment.

Failure modes for mechanical handling equipment used to move radioactive materials must address mid-operational failures, and designs must include recovery methods for such occurrences. Designs must accommodate periodic maintenance and inspection. See Table 5.4 for the relevant codes.

**Table 5.4. Codes for Safety-Significant and Safety-Class Handling Equipment.**

<b>Handling Equipment</b>	<b>Safety Significant</b>	<b>Safety Class</b>
Cranes	CMAA; ANSI/ASME NOG-1; ANSI/ASME B30.2; DOE-STD- 1090-96	CMAA Nuclear Sections; ANSI/ASME NOG-1; ANSI/ASME B30.2; DOE-STD- 1090-96
Other equipment	ANSI N 14.6; AISC M011	ANSI N14.6; AISC M011

### 5.2.3 Electrical

The safety function of an electrical power system is to provide power to systems and components that require electrical power in order to perform their safety functions. A safety-significant or safety-class electrical power system is defined as the system or component that provides actuation or motive force to safety equipment. These systems consist of onsite AC/DC power supply systems and associated distribution systems and components (e.g., conduits, wiring, cable trays, etc.).

Safety-class electrical power must be designed against single-point failure in accordance with the criteria in Section 5.1.1.2 of this Guide. Redundancy requirements for electrical systems pertain to normal and alternative power sources and should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. For safety-significant systems, redundancy is not required if it can be shown that there is sufficient response time to provide an alternative source of electrical power.

Environmental capability of safety-class electrical equipment must be demonstrated by testing, analysis, and operating experience, or a combination of these methods in accordance with Section 5.1.3 of this Guide.

For the commercial nuclear industry, a multitude of ANSI/IEEE Standards define the requirements for the manufacture, installation, and testing of reactor Safety Class 1E electrical systems and components. The Safety Class 1E requirements may not be directly applicable to the safety-class category defined for nonreactor nuclear facilities. These standards, however, contain useful and significant information that should be considered. Table 5.5 lists a minimal set of national codes and standards that should be addressed for safety-significant and safety-class electrical systems, keeping in perspective the applicable use of ANSI/IEEE standards for Safety Class 1E components. Table 5.6 presents a list of ANSI/IEEE standards that can be used for guidance in specific applications. Before using these standards, their applicability to the design(s) being considered should be reviewed.

**Table 5.5. Codes for Safety-Significant and Safety-Class Electrical Systems.**

<b>Electrical</b>	<b>Safety Significant</b>	<b>Safety Class</b>
Hardware	NFPA 70; NFPA 110; NFPA 780; IES Lighting Handbook; ANSI C2; ANSI/IEEE C37; ANSI/IEEE -80, -141, -142, -242, -399, -493, -577	NFPA 70; NFPA 110; NFPA 780; IES Lighting Handbook; ANSI C2; ANSI/IEEE C37; ANSI/IEEE-80, -141, -142, -242, -308, -338, -379, -384, -399, -493, -577, -603

**Table 5.6. ANSI/IEEE Standards to be Used as Guidance for Both Safety-Significant and Safety-Class Electrical Systems, as Appropriate.**

<b>Electrical</b>	<b>Safety Significant and Safety Class</b>
Guidance standards for use as applicable for specific hardware	ANSI/IEE -323, -334, -336, -344, -381, -382, -383, -420, -450, -484, -535, -628, -649, -650, -833, -934, -944, -946

### 5.2.4 Instrumentation, Control, and Alarm Systems

The safety functions of instrumentation, control, and alarm systems are to provide information on out-of-tolerance conditions/abnormal conditions; ensure the capability for manual or automatic actuation of safety systems and components; ensure safety systems have the means to achieve and maintain a fail-safe shutdown condition on demand under normal or abnormal conditions; and/or actuate alarms to reduce public or site-personnel risk (e.g., effluent monitoring components and systems).

The design of safety-class and safety-significant instrumentation and control systems must incorporate sufficient independence, redundancy, diversity, and separation to ensure that all safety-related functions associated with such equipment can be performed under postulated accident conditions as identified in the safety analysis. Safety-significant components should be evaluated as to the need for redundancy on a case-by-case basis. Under all circumstances, safety-class instrumentation, controls, and alarms must be designed so that failure of nonsafety equipment will not prevent the former from performing their safety functions.

Safety-significant and safety-class instrumentation, control, and alarm-system designs must ensure accessibility for inspection, maintenance, calibration, repair, or replacement.

Safety-class instrumentation, control, and alarm systems must provide the operators sufficient time, information, and control capabilities to perform the following safety functions:

- Readily determine the status of critical facility parameters to ensure compliance with the limits specified in the Technical Safety Requirements.
- Initiate automatic or manual safety functions.
- Determine the status of safety systems required to ensure proper mitigation of the consequences of postulated accident conditions and/or to safely shut down the facility.

ANSI/IEEE standards contain design, installation, and testing requirements that should be considered for instrumentation, control, and alarm components without invoking all of the Safety Class 1E requirements. See Table 5.7 for the relevant codes.

**Table 5.7. Codes for Safety-Significant and Safety-Class Instrumentation, Control, and Alarm Components.**

<b>Instruments, Controls, and Alarms</b>	<b>Safety Significant</b>	<b>Safety Class</b>
Hardware	NFPA-70, -110; ANSI C2; ANSI/ANS-8.3, -N42.18, -N13.1; ANSI/ISA-Series; ANSI/IEEE-141, -142, -242, -493, -1050	NFPA-70, -110; ANSI C2; ANSI/ANS-8.3, -N42.18, -N13.1; ANSI-N320, -N323; ANSI/ISA- Series; ANSI/IEEE-141, -142, -242, -323, -336, -338, -344, -379, -384, -493, -1050

## APPENDIX A

### REFERENCES

#### Code of Federal Regulations

- 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.2, Definitions (1999).
- 10 CFR 830.120, Quality Assurance Requirements (1999).
- 10 CFR 834, Radiation Protection of Public and the Environment (Proposed Rule), Federal Register, 3-25-93.
- 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection (1999).
- 29 CFR 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Subpart G, Occupational Health and Environmental Control; Subpart H, Hazardous Materials; and Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous Substances (1994).
- 29 CFR 1910.134, Respiratory Protection (1999).
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